Situation Report

Situation Update (13:10Z, 13 DEC 2025)

This report integrates intelligence derived from new sources (12:39Z - 13:07Z, 13 DEC 2025) with baseline context, focusing on immediate kinetic threats and escalating hybrid operations.

Key updates since last sitrep

• RF Escalation in Zaporizhzhia (MEDIUM Confidence): Confirmed utilization of the TOS-2 heavy thermobaric system against UAF strongholds on the western bank of the Haychur River in Huliaipole (12:45Z, Воин DV). This indicates elevated pressure and willingness to expend high-value area-denial assets in the Southern sector.
• Immediate Deep Strike Threat Shift (HIGH Confidence): A new UAV track has been confirmed operating from Sumy Oblast and entering Poltava Oblast (13:04Z, Air Force UAF). This confirms the ongoing RF strategy of overloading UAF air defenses by continually shifting the deep-strike target geometry, likely focused on Poltava logistics hubs.
• Coordinated Rail Security Incidents (HIGH Confidence): Multiple simultaneous bomb threats were reported targeting international rail routes (Kyiv-Uzhhorod, Kyiv-Budapest, Bucharest-Kyiv), forcing security responses (12:48Z, ЦАПЛІЄНКО, РБК-Україна). This is assessed as a synchronized hybrid/PSYOPS effort designed to sow internal chaos and disrupt international traffic flow.
• UAF Counter-Offensive Fires (MEDIUM Confidence): UAF 1st Territorial Defense Brigade successfully destroyed five RF artillery pieces on the Pokrovsk axis (12:49Z, STERNENKO), indicating active counter-fire operations aimed at suppressing the RF mechanized advance.
• RF Manpower Indicators (MEDIUM Confidence): Reports indicate intensified mobilization/conscription sweeps in major Russian cities (Moscow/St. Petersburg) (13:05Z, МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ). This is an indicator of RF struggling to meet sustained manpower requirements or preparing for a further large-scale force rotation.

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: GROUND OFFENSIVE SUSTAINED The enemy maintains high pressure across the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis. RF Spetsnaz units (oOSpN 'Okhotnik') are confirmed operating in close proximity to UAF lines, engaging vehicles at night on the Konstantinovka direction (12:59Z, Народная милиция ДНР). This indicates RF close-combat penetration and operational momentum. UAF forces are actively mitigating the advance through targeted counter-battery fire (destruction of 5 RF guns near Pokrovsk) and continued rear-guard actions.

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv/Kupyansk)

Status: STABILIZED/CLEARING OPERATIONS UAF control of Kupyansk remains confirmed. Ukrainian forces, utilizing foreign volunteers and drone support, are conducting successful clearing operations within the urban environment (12:50Z, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС). This supports the previous assessment that the Kupyansk/Kharkiv sector is stable, allowing for localized offensive/clearing maneuvers.

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia)

Status: ESCALATION OF FIXING ATTACKS The claimed use of the TOS-2 thermobaric system in Huliaipole (12:45Z) signals an escalation in RF efforts to break UAF defensive positions here. If confirmed, the use of this high-impact weapon against the western bank of the Haychur River confirms the intent to fix and destroy UAF forces to prevent reserves from redeploying to the critical Donetsk sector.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL – Coordinated Deep Strike and Hybrid Sabotage

1. Deep Interdiction Shift (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The UAV trajectory shift towards Poltava Oblast (13:04Z) represents an immediate, high-priority kinetic threat to Central Ukraine's rail, fuel, and energy infrastructure, likely following saturation strikes against Chernihiv/Pryluky.
2. Hybrid Rail Sabotage (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The coordinated bomb threats against international rail lines (12:48Z) are assessed as a deliberate, low-cost/high-impact hybrid attack. Intent: Overwhelm civilian security services (SBU/Police), disrupt foreign diplomatic access (Budapest/Bucharest routes), and generate cognitive friction among the population.
3. High-Value Weaponry Deployment (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The employment of the TOS-2 system introduces a higher tactical risk for UAF forces on the Huliaipole front due to its psychological and physical effects (area saturation).

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Effective Counter-UAS Measures (MEDIUM Confidence): UAF claims interception of high volumes of enemy UAVs using the P1-SUN interceptor system (13:02Z). While the numerical claims require verification, it confirms the active deployment and effectiveness of specialized counter-UAS technology against the ongoing deep-strike campaign. (Analytic Support: DS belief of P1-SUN use is 0.125).
• Active Defense in Kupyansk (HIGH Confidence): Successful clearing operations confirm UAF holds initiative in key contested urban areas, leveraging drone support and integrating foreign volunteer units.
• Force Reorganization IO Target (LOW Confidence): RF sources are promoting the UNCONFIRMED narrative that UAF is dissolving international legions (12:45Z). This appears to be an IO attempt to undermine the confidence of foreign volunteers, but requires internal verification regarding any doctrinal changes for these units.

Information environment / disinformation

The IO landscape is heavily focused on undermining UAF international political support and justifying RF aggression.

1. Undermining US Peace Plan (MEDIUM Confidence): European sources are reportedly concerned that any US-backed peace proposal contains a "Trojan Horse" for Russia (12:52Z). This narrative is actively promoted by RF channels to generate distrust between Kyiv and its key NATO allies regarding future security guarantees.
2. Amplification of Belarusian Role (HIGH Confidence): RF and Minsk-aligned channels continue to inflate Lukashenko's importance, claiming US envoys consult him for "very useful" advice on conflict resolution (12:41Z). This legitimizes Minsk as a geopolitical player and reinforces the narrative of Western fragmentation.
3. NATO Hardening as Justification (HIGH Confidence): The confirmed construction of bunkers by Estonia (12:51Z) and German assistance to Poland for anti-tank barriers (13:07Z) provides immediate visual evidence that RF IO will leverage to justify its actions as preemptive defense against NATO aggression.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The RF ground focus remains on Donetsk, but operational attention must immediately shift to the central rear due to expanding hybrid threats.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Targeted Interdiction and PSYOPS Overload (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The UAV track entering Poltava Oblast will result in a kinetic strike targeting critical transportation nodes (rail junctions or fuel depots) within the next 4-8 hours. Concurrently, RF or proxy assets will maintain the coordinated hybrid campaign, initiating further high-profile threats (e.g., renewed ZNPP power threat or additional railway sabotage calls) to force dispersal of UAF resources.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Zaporizhzhia Breakthrough Attempt (MEDIUM Confidence): Following the observed TOS-2 preparatory fires, the RF Vostok Group of Forces initiates a rapid mechanized thrust from Huliaipole westward, supported by overwhelming fire, aimed at securing operational depth and disrupting the UAF defensive posture on the Southern axis, forcing the recall of reserves from the Donetsk theater.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE & FORCE PROTECTION (J3/J7): POLTAVA PRIORITY SHIFT.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately divert specialized air defense assets (e.g., P1-SUN, Gepard) to secure the primary rail and energy infrastructure hubs within Poltava Oblast, preempting the strike from the confirmed UAV track (P1).
   • Action B: Increase the readiness posture of SSO and Engineering units along the potential UAV strike path to rapidly conduct BDA and emergency restoration.

2. COUNTER-HYBRID OPERATIONS (J7/SBU): RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE HARDENING.

   • Action A: Implement an immediate, temporary heightened security protocol for key international rail departure/arrival nodes (Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa) to mitigate the impact of ongoing bomb threats and prevent potential physical sabotage.
   • Action B: Utilize StratCom channels to preemptively explain the ongoing hybrid PSYOPS campaign targeting civilian infrastructure, maintaining public confidence in the transport network.

3. MANEUVER & FIRE SUPPORT (OC South): HULIAIPOLE FIRE SUPERIORITY.

   • Action A: Task deep-strike assets (HIMARS/ATACMS if available) to target known or suspected RF staging areas or supply points supporting TOS-2 deployment in the Huliaipole sector, raising the cost of using high-value thermobaric systems.
   • Action B: Prepare contingency plans for tactical withdrawal or counter-attack in the Huliaipole area should the RF leverage the TOS-2 usage for a major breakthrough.