Situation Report

Situation Update (12:40Z, 13 DEC 2025)

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Key updates since last sitrep

• ZNPP Power Grid Failure (HIGH Confidence): The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost its external power supply for the 12th time during the conflict (12:21Z, ASTRA). This confirms the operational safety risk remains critical and ongoing.
• Deep UAV Threat Shift (HIGH Confidence): A new enemy Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) track has been confirmed operating over Chernihiv Oblast, directed towards the logistics node of Pryluky (12:30Z, AFU Air Force). This indicates a renewed RF focus on interdicting rear logistics far north of the main Donetsk axis.
• RF Claims Lyman "Liberated" (LOW Confidence): A pro-RF source claimed the "liberation" of Lyman and posed the question of the next objective, accompanying the claim with a tactical map (12:35Z, Colonelcassad). This is unconfirmed and likely an Information Operation (IO) intended to suggest deep strategic momentum.
• Belarusian IO Amplification (HIGH Confidence): Following the US lift of sanctions on Belarusian potash, pro-RF channels immediately framed the event as Lukashenko successfully "outplaying" the US diplomatic envoy (12:28Z, Операция Z; 12:29Z, Alex Parker). This reinforces the ongoing IO narrative of Western fragmentation.
• Confirmation of RF VDV Activity (HIGH Confidence): The Russian MoD awarded personnel of the 11th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade (VDV) for their role in the operation to "liberate" Sudzha, Kursk region (12:27Z, MoD Russia). This confirms the presence and operational focus of VDV elements in securing border regions against UAF raids.
• UAF Counter-Hybrid PSYOPS (HIGH Confidence): UAF channels disseminated evidence and details of a captured Iraqi national serving with RF forces, Ala Mohamed Tajil (12:28Z, Оперативний ЗСУ). This is a focused effort to exploit RF reliance on foreign fighters for morale and diplomatic effect.

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: GROUND OFFENSIVE INITIATION PHASE (Confirmation Pending) The kinetic focus remains centered on the Pokrovsk salient toward Konstantinovka. UK intelligence notes confirm the criticality of Siversk and the approaches to Pokrovsk (12:25Z). RF claims regarding the capture of Lyman (12:35Z) are highly dubious and assessed as an IO maneuver designed to pin UAF reserves in the north and mask the primary breakthrough operation near Myrnograd. Real-time tactical confirmation of RF mechanized force disposition remains the P1 collection requirement.

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia)

Status: FIXING ATTACKS (UNCONFIRMED) RF sources claim successes in an assault on Huliaipole (12:16Z). If confirmed, this is a clear attempt to fix UAF defenders on the Zaporizhzhia axis, preventing the redeployment of reserves needed to counter the main thrust in Donetsk. Confidence remains LOW.

Deep Rear / CI Operations

Status: LOGISTIC INTERDICTION (ESCALATED) The confirmed UAV track targeting Pryluky (Chernihiv Oblast) is highly significant. Pryluky is a major logistics hub serving the northern half of the UAF defense structure. This, combined with the earlier confirmed strike on Pavlohrad, signals a clear synchronization intended to isolate multiple operational areas from reinforcement simultaneously. RF propaganda is actively showcasing integrated Zala/Lancet systems (12:15Z), reinforcing their reliance on this C2 architecture for high-precision strikes.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL – Coordinated Deep Strike and Diplomatic Isolation

1. Deep Strike Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The shift in UAV targeting geometry (Mykolaiv, Chernihiv/Pryluky) confirms the RF is attempting to overload UAF air defense assets and disrupt logistics across multiple distant points, directly supporting the Donetsk ground offensive. The UAV targeting Pryluky is a P1 kinetic threat.
2. Infrastructure Instability (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The 12th external power loss at ZNPP confirms that RF actions in the vicinity continue to pose an unacceptable nuclear safety risk. While not necessarily a deliberate attack on the plant itself, RF control measures are inadequate.
3. VDV Deployment Confirmation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The recognition of the 11th VDV Brigade for Sudzha operations reinforces the operational reality that high-value RF units are actively involved in securing the border, potentially reducing their availability for reinforcement on the critical Donetsk axis.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Reinforced Diplomatic Stance (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): UAF has reportedly provided the US with a peace proposal that explicitly rejects RF demands for withdrawal from Donbas and the cessation of NATO aspirations (12:17Z, based on RF source commentary on NYT reporting). This signals a firm, non-compromising negotiating position, intended to pre-empt unfavorable US-led proposals.
• Effective PSYOPS/HUMINT Exploitation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The rapid deployment of captured Iraqi mercenary intelligence (Ala Mohamed Tajil) is an effective tactical PSYOPS action, aimed at damaging RF international reputation and undermining the morale of mercenary and irregular forces.
• Force Posture: UK intelligence assessment focus on Siversk and Pokrovsk indicates UAF commanders and allies recognize these areas as the highest priority for tactical commitment (12:25Z).

Information environment / disinformation

The RF IO campaign is achieving critical synergy by capitalizing on geopolitical events and amplifying corruption narratives.

1. Minsk Leveraging Success (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF narrative successfully portrays the US lifting sanctions on Belarusian potash as a diplomatic failure by Washington and a clear sign of Minsk's strength and importance (12:28Z, 12:29Z). This supports the wider RF goal of normalizing Minsk as a third-party diplomatic mediator.
2. Corruption Escalation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): MFA Spokesperson Zakharova has advanced the core RF corruption narrative, claiming Zelenskyy is blackmailing Western politicians to retain power (12:23Z). This is a concerted effort to delegitimize Kyiv and erode long-term Western political will.
3. Counter-PSYOPS (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The statement by RF Human Rights Commissioner Moskalkova countering UAF psychological operations targeting families of captured RF troops (12:11Z) confirms that UAF PSYOPS are having sufficient tactical impact to warrant an official RF response.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The RF ground offensive in Donetsk remains the center of gravity, but the hybrid threat is expanding geometrically into the logistical rear.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Synchronized Deep Interdiction and Mechanized Push (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces will maintain heavy ground pressure exploiting the Pokrovsk breach toward Konstantinovka. This ground maneuver will be supported by continued, high-volume deep UAV strikes (Shahed/Geran) specifically targeting logistics nodes in Chernihiv (Pryluky) and Dnipropetrovsk to degrade UAF ability to redeploy heavy reserves.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Critical Infrastructure Sabotage & Isolation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Simultaneous with the ground offensive, RF Special Operations Forces (SOF) or proxies execute a successful, high-impact hybrid attack (following the Przemysl threat) that severely limits rail throughput across the Western border. Concurrently, a deliberate kinetic strike causes a complete, protracted loss of external power for the ZNPP, forcing an emergency response and diverting critical national assets away from the combat zone.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE & FORCE PROTECTION (J3/J7): NORTHERN PRIORITY SHIFT.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately divert specialized air defense assets (e.g., Gepard/NASAMS batteries) to protect the Pryluky rail and fuel infrastructure against the confirmed UAV threat (P2).
   • Action B: Conduct immediate counter-sabotage sweeps of the rail corridor leading into Pryluky, anticipating correlated SOF activity.

2. NUCLEAR SAFETY & CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (J7/J4): ZNPP CONTINGENCY.

   • Action A: Review and harden the contingency plan for a sustained ZNPP external power loss (beyond 12 hours), including the security posture required to protect diesel backup generators and fuel supply lines.

3. STRATCOM/PSYOPS (J5/J9): COUNTER-PROPAGANDA.

   • Action A: Leverage the captured Iraqi mercenary evidence (Ala Mohammed Tajil) to maximum effect in international and targeted RF media markets, focusing on RF reliance on foreign fighters and low-quality recruits.
   • Action B: Prepare immediate, unified UAF and allied diplomatic responses to the Zakharova corruption claims, ensuring political leaders actively deny the RF narrative of blackmail and internal instability.