Situation Update (12:10Z, 13 DEC 2025)
Key updates since last sitrep
- UAF Deep Strike Confirmed (HIGH Confidence): A drone attack struck the RF 26th Missile Brigade base in Luga, Leningrad Oblast (11:53Z, ASTRA). This successful operation is a strategic counter-CI strike significantly deeper into RF territory than typically observed.
- Myrnograd/Dimitrov Engagement (MEDIUM Confidence): RF sources claim they thwarted a UAF attempt to break out of the encircled settlement of Dimitrov (Myrnograd) (11:52Z, Операция Z; 12:03Z, Colonelcassad). This, if true, confirms RF forces are securing their southern flank staging area, approximately 15 km southwest of Konstantinovka.
- Critical Rail Sabotage Attempt (MEDIUM Confidence): Confirmed reports indicate a high-level security threat related to the alleged mining of the Przemysl–Kyiv international rail line (11:47Z, ЦАПЛІЄНКО). This is a direct threat to strategic Western aid delivery.
- Amplified EU Funding Friction (HIGH Confidence): Czech Prime Minister Babis publicly stated Czechia will not guarantee funding for Ukraine (11:41Z, ТАСС). This confirms the RF IO narrative of EU financial fracturing is succeeding, following similar statements from Slovakia.
- US Sanctions Lift on Belarus (HIGH Confidence): Reports confirm the US is lifting sanctions on Belarusian potash, coinciding with diplomatic discussion regarding the war's resolution (11:41Z, 11:53Z). This suggests a potential introduction of Minsk as a third-party diplomatic mediator.
- Deep Fire on Pavlohrad (MEDIUM Confidence): A powerful explosion/hit was reported in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (11:43Z, Colonelcassad), targeting a critical UAF logistics and industrial node in the operational rear.
Operational picture (by sector)
Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)
Status: GROUND OFFENSIVE INITIATION PHASE
RF forces appear to be executing the ground offensive forecast in the previous report. The repeated RF focus on the Myrnograd (Dimitrov) area, claiming control and defeat of UAF maneuver forces, signals they are consolidating forward positions to bypass or directly engage Konstantinovka. If the RF claims are confirmed, the main thrust is centered on exploiting the breach made near Pokrovsk toward the Kramatorsk Defensive Hub. Additionally, RF claims of successful advancement in the Krasny Liman direction (11:53Z) suggest continued pressure intended to fix UAF reserves north of Slovyansk.
Central Operational Command (Dnipropetrovsk)
Status: LOGISTIC INTERDICTION
The strike on Pavlohrad (11:43Z) continues the pattern of RF deep strikes targeting UAF reconstitution and logistical nodes (rail hubs, fuel storage, repair facilities). This is synchronized with the front-line push to degrade UAF ability to sustain protracted defense.
Strategic Domain (RF Deep Rear)
Status: UAF COUNTER-CI STRIKE
The confirmed drone attack on the 26th Missile Brigade in Leningrad Oblast (11:53Z) is an important display of UAF capability to project kinetic force hundreds of kilometers into the RF strategic rear. The 26th Missile Brigade is assessed as a potential launch unit for intermediate-range missiles targeting UAF logistics and command centers. This action aims to disrupt RF deep-fire planning and force air defense asset reallocation.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Threat Assessment: CRITICAL – Synchronization of Kinetic and Hybrid Warfare
- Mechanized Consolidation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF mechanized forces are now actively securing the terrain immediately surrounding the Pokrovsk salient breach. The emphasis on Myrnograd suggests they are prioritizing operational freedom for a rapid, focused penetration toward Konstantinovka.
- Strategic Sabotage (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The security threat concerning the Przemysl–Kyiv rail line demonstrates the RF intent to utilize hybrid methods to choke off critical NATO supply lines simultaneously with the main ground offensive. This is intended to directly impact UAF capacity to use Western heavy armor against the current assault.
- Targeting Rationale Shift (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Pro-RF channels have explicitly framed the massive strikes on Odesa/Mykolaiv infrastructure as "retaliation for strikes on tankers" (12:01Z). This establishes a new, aggressive narrative for continued CI strikes, justifying them as responses rather than pure military preparation.
- Internal RF Coercion (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Testimony regarding threats of execution for refusing orders (12:01Z) indicates RF units committed to the assault are under extreme pressure, which suggests a high-stakes, high-casualty operational objective that commanders are desperate to achieve.
Friendly activity (UAF)
- Proactive Counter-Offensive Deep Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The strike on the 26th Missile Brigade is an excellent tactical move, forcing the RF to acknowledge and defend against UAF deep strike capabilities. BDA is required to assess the effectiveness.
- Internal Security Stress (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The reported rail threat (P2) demands immediate diversion of security and counter-sabotage assets. UAF command must rapidly assess this threat without degrading combat readiness on the critical Donetsk axis.
- Resource Constraints Narrative (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Internal friction reports regarding infrastructure collapse and potential corruption in Odesa (12:02Z) signal a risk to morale and public trust, which the RF is likely monitoring for exploitation in psychological operations.
Information environment / disinformation
The primary focus is leveraging real geopolitical events to undermine long-term Western commitment and introduce conditions favorable to RF interests.
- EU Financial Fracture: The RF is successfully propagating the narrative that Ukraine's Western financial support is fragile, citing Czech and Slovak statements (11:41Z). This directly supports the kinetic timeline by suggesting time is running out for Kyiv.
- Belarusian Mediation Play: The US move on sanctions provides the RF/Minsk with an immediate opportunity to promote Lukashenko as a constructive diplomatic player (11:53Z), potentially setting up favorable conditions for US-led peace initiatives that Moscow can influence ("Trojan Horse" narrative, 11:46Z). This is a strategic threat to UAF diplomatic objectives.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
The RF ground offensive is active. The next 6-12 hours will be decisive in determining if UAF defenses can hold the line between Myrnograd and Konstantinovka. The focus is shifting from preparatory fires to mechanized close combat.
Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)
Operational Isolation of Konstantinovka (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF mechanized Groupings will exploit the Myrnograd approach, focusing on interdicting Highway T0515 to complete the tactical isolation of Konstantinovka. Simultaneous pressure will be maintained on the Krasny Liman axis to pin UAF reserves.
Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)
Coordinated Logistics Seizure (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The RF executes a series of coordinated, low-signature hybrid attacks (sabotage, precision strikes, EW) targeting key Western border crossings and rail lines (following the Przemysl threat) over the next 6 hours, resulting in a temporary halt of high-value military aid shipments, thus denying UAF reserves the necessary equipment to respond to the mechanized breakthrough.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Real-time verification of Myrnograd/Dimitrov control and RF consolidation force disposition. | IMMEDIATE ISR RE-TASK: Utilize high-resolution assets (SAR/UAV) to monitor troop movement on secondary roads (T0515) and establish BDA of UAF breakout forces. | HIGH |
| P2 (CRITICAL) | Specific operational status (impact on throughput) of the Przemysl–Kyiv rail line following the security threat. | J4/J9 Operational Security Assessment: Confirm if the threat was real, neutralized, and the current delay/rerouting schedule for high-priority NATO materiel. | HIGH |
| P3 (URGENT) | BDA on the UAF strike against the RF 26th Missile Brigade (Leningrad). | GEOINT/OSINT Validation: Determine if radar assets, launch equipment, or C2 nodes were successfully damaged or destroyed. | MEDIUM |
| P4 (PRIORITY) | Specific content of the "Trojan Horse" peace plan allegedly proposed by the US. | J5 Diplomatic HUMINT: Determine the elements of the US proposal causing European concern (e.g., potential ceasefire lines, status of occupied territories). | MEDIUM |
Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)
-
MANEUVER & FORCE PROTECTION (J3/OC EAST): PRIORITIZE COUNTER-MOBILITY.
- Action A (CRITICAL): Execute immediate, priority counter-mobility operations (deep mining, artillery saturation) on all known avenues of approach between Myrnograd and Konstantinovka (specifically T0515 intersections) to slow the mechanized advance (P1).
- Action B: Utilize the captured Iraqi POW intelligence (from previous sitrep) to anticipate RF irregular unit deployment patterns if they are used to screen the Myrnograd flanking maneuver.
-
STRATEGIC LOGISTICS (J4/J9): COUNTER-SABOTAGE.
- Action A (CRITICAL): Establish 24/7 security escorts for all high-value military cargo rail movements west of Kyiv and implement real-time EW monitoring along key rail corridors to detect communication anomalies associated with sabotage attempts (P2).
-
STRATCOM/DIPLOMACY (J5/MFA): STABILIZE EU COHESION.
- Action A: Launch a rapid, coordinated diplomatic initiative targeting EU member states, secured by high-level UAF officials, to affirm the strategic importance of long-term aid and to present a united front against the RF IO campaign regarding financial fragility.
