Situation Report

Situation Update (11:15Z, 13 DEC 2025)

This report provides an analysis of the shift in the RF preparatory phase, confirmation of strategic targeting, and the resulting force protection priorities following the massive overnight air/missile strike. The planned mechanized ground assault on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis remains the Principal Threat.

Key updates since last sitrep

• RF Strategic Strike Scale Confirmed (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF launched a total of 495 aerial attack assets overnight (12/13 DEC). UAF air defense achieved an 86.8% neutralization rate (430 targets suppressed or shot down) (10:38Z, 10:40Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, РБК-Україна).
• Critical Infrastructure Targeting Confirmed (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The massive strike successfully targeted electrical generation and distribution assets in four regions: Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv, leading to localized power outages (11:03Z, Colonelcassad). This strike served as the kinetic preparation for the delayed ground offensive.
• Dobropillia Salient Focus (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Pro-RF channels are identifying the Dobropillia salient (West of Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka) as a key operational focus area (10:40Z, Два майора). This suggests the MLCOA for the main RF ground thrust will prioritize this vector.
• Internal UAF Friction Reported (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Critical organizational friction and failure to execute military reform are reported within the 2nd International Legion, indicating potential challenges in the deployment and integration of foreign volunteer formations (10:59Z, Оперативний ЗСУ).
• Continued Hybrid Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Concurrent with the kinetic operations, the RF continued global cyber operations, evidenced by the US indictment of GRU hackers for targeting US critical infrastructure (11:01Z, STERNENKO).

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: MAXIMUM ALERT; PREPARATORY STAGE COMPLETE (AIR/MISSILE) The ground phase is now imminent following the massive air/missile strike that replaced the anticipated GRAU artillery barrage. The main RF effort remains staged opposite the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis. Pro-RF reporting focusing on the Dobropillia salient suggests the RF intends to initiate penetration efforts targeting the rear of UAF defenses in the Kostiantynivka sector via flanking maneuvers (10:40Z). UAF must assume the RF ground assault initiation clock reset after the conclusion of the 495-target strike.

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv / Sumy)

Status: ATTRITION AND PINNING EFFORTS RF forces continue kinetic pressure to fix UAF reserves. Kharkiv endured an unconfirmed PGM strike ("Molniya") on a civilian district (11:04Z, РБК-Україна, MEDIUM). RF UAV activity (Shahed) originating from the North towards Kharkiv confirms ongoing reconnaissance and deep strike efforts (10:56Z). The CI strikes on Chernihiv (11:03Z) further link this sector to the main effort by degrading C2/logistics depth.

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia / Kherson)

Status: ATTRITION AND SPECIALIZED ENGAGEMENT The kinetic tempo remains high, characterized by constant drone warfare. RF forces confirmed deployment of specialized assets, specifically UAV operators from the 16th Guards NBC protection brigade (Group Vostok), conducting anti-personnel/equipment strikes in Zaporizhzhia Oblast (10:47Z). This confirms RF's reliance on specialized assets for persistent, localized attrition warfare on secondary axes.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL – Synchronization of Kinetic and Cognitive Effects

1. Shifted Preparation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF executed the preparatory phase using a complex air/missile attack (495 assets) rather than the delayed mass artillery (GRAU). This indicates a flexible C2 structure capable of rapidly adapting the operational plan, using PGM/UAV saturation to achieve infrastructure degradation and C2 disruption where conventional fires were logistically constrained.
2. Targeted C2 Degradation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The multi-oblast CI strikes (Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Mykolaiv) aim to degrade the power necessary for rear-area UAF C2 hubs and logistics prior to the ground offensive. The RF is betting that the localized blackouts will slow UAF reserve deployment and tactical coordination.
3. Coordinated IO Campaign (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF-aligned media continues to amplify external narratives questioning UAF resolve (US pressure for concessions) and strategic viability (EU accession impossibility) (10:53Z, 10:57Z). This is a coordinated attempt to lower UAF morale and pressure key decision-makers just before the main kinetic push.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Air Defense Resilience (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The successful neutralization of 86.8% of incoming aerial threats during a massive strike showcases robust air defense system capacity, operator proficiency, and effective decentralized C2 necessary to manage simultaneous engagements across multiple regions.
• Organizational Vulnerability (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Public statements regarding significant internal friction and failure to integrate international forces efficiently pose a risk to operational readiness (10:59Z). This vulnerability could be exploited by RF disinformation to sow distrust or by RF forces attempting to target less cohesive units.

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment (IE) is characterized by RF strategic framing designed to hasten diplomatic concessions:

1. Territorial Concession Narrative (Amplified): RF sources are aggressively pushing the narrative of intense external (US/Trump) pressure on President Zelenskyy to trade territory for peace, specifically citing German reports (Bild) to lend false credibility to the claim of UAF strategic weakness (10:53Z).
2. Strategic Isolation Narrative: RF-aligned channels are citing European diplomatic sources to claim that Ukraine’s goal of EU membership by 2027 is "unfeasible," reinforcing the idea that continued fighting offers no viable political reward (10:57Z).
3. Cyber Threat Confirmed: The confirmed GRU cyber campaign targeting US critical infrastructure (11:01Z) provides UAF with leverage to demonstrate the interconnected, global nature of the RF threat to Western partners.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The RF has paid the kinetic cost of preparation and is now logistically optimized for the ground phase. The 6-12 hour window is the final operational pause before the expected ground offensive.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Delayed, Coordinated Ground Offensive (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces will initiate the mechanized assault against the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis NLT 1800Z. The main effort will exploit any confirmed C2/power degradation caused by the air strike, targeting a breakthrough in the Dobropillia salient to envelop or bypass forward UAF defenses. Advance is likely preceded by focused, short-duration kinetic fire on designated breakthrough zones.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Immediate Blitz Assault (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF C2 judges that the 495-asset strike successfully induced sufficient disorganization and shock to negate the need for further synchronization time. The assault is ordered immediately (NLT 1300Z), relying on tactical surprise and speed of execution to catch UAF reserves in transit or engaged in CI damage assessment.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. MANEUVER & C2 (J3/OC EAST): EXPLOIT OPERATIONAL SHIFT.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Do not wait for the 1800Z MLCOA window. Assume the assault can commence at any time (MDCOA). Reserves must maintain Stage 2 readiness (30-minute reaction time).
   • Action B: Immediately reinforce defenses specifically protecting the flanks of the Dobropillia salient. Prioritize anti-armor and counter-UAV assets in this sector, anticipating penetration attempts by specialized RF units (16th NBC Brigade UAV teams).
   • Action C: Ensure forward defensive units operate under decentralized power and redundant mobile C2 centers due to confirmed infrastructure damage in the rear.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J7/AF): SUSTAIN READINESS POST-STRIKE.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Rapidly prioritize the logistical flow of interceptor munitions to re-arm air defense assets that successfully neutralized the 495 targets. Anticipate a follow-on RF air attack synchronized with the ground assault.

3. INTERNAL COHESION (J1/J5): MITIGATE FRICTION RISK.

   • Action A: The General Staff should issue a high-level directive addressing the structural and integration issues raised by International Legion command (10:59Z). Publicly affirm commitment to reform efforts to mitigate morale decline and counter RF IO exploitation.