Situation Report

Situation Update (10:38Z, 13 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• P1 Critical Window Passed (DELAY): The critical operational window (NLT 1030Z) for the 260th GRAU preparatory artillery fire has passed without confirmation of ignition. The anticipated massive synchronized mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk axis is assessed to be delayed (10:38Z, Analyst Judgment, HIGH).
• Massive RF Air Strike Defense (UAF Success): UAF Air Force confirmed 430 enemy targets were suppressed or shot down during the night of 12 DEC / morning of 13 DEC (10:33Z, Air Force, HIGH). This indicates the RF launched a massive combined air/missile strike, potentially substituting or preceding the mass artillery barrage.
• Kupyansk Blockade Confirmed: Russian troops are reported to be functionally blocked in the northern sector of Kupyansk (10:09Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, MEDIUM), reinforcing the tactical gains reported in the previous sitrep.
• High Kinetic Activity on Main Axis: UAF General Staff reports intense clashes across the primary Donetsk axis (10:15Z, GSZSU, HIGH), including direct engagements near Kostiantynivka (Scherbynivka) and sustained defensive actions against probing attacks near Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk (10:15Z, GSZSU; 10:37Z, Поддубный, HIGH).
• RF Probing Sumy Border: UAF forces repelled five Russian army assaults along the Kursk/North Slobozhansky (Sumy) direction (10:15Z, GSZSU, HIGH), confirming the RF maintains active ground pressure on the northern border, forcing UAF force commitment.

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: MAXIMUM ALERT; GROUND PHASE DELAYED The concentration of RF forces opposite the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis remains the center of gravity, but the anticipated synchronization trigger (260th GRAU) was not executed by 1030Z. Kinetic activity remains intense, confirmed by GSZSU reports of fighting around Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, and Chasiv Yar (10:15Z). RF sources claim they repelled a UAF spoiling attack involving tanks and maneuver elements near Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) (10:37Z, MEDIUM). This intense contact confirms the opposing forces are fully deployed and conducting final maneuvers. The main assault force is staged and ready, awaiting the C2 order.

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv / Sumy)

Status: CONSOLIDATION AND PROBING The UAF tactical success in Kupyansk is holding, with RF forces reportedly blocked north of the city (10:09Z). Further south on the Kharkiv axis, GSZSU reports persistent clashes near Vovchansk and Kolodyazne (10:15Z). Critically, RF probing attacks have intensified along the Sumy border (Kursk direction), where UAF forces repelled five assaults (10:15Z). This probing attempts to pin UAF reserves away from the Donetsk axis.

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia / Kherson)

Status: ATTRITION AND AIRSTRIKES RF aviation maintains sustained pressure via airstrikes targeting Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions (Huliaipole, Rizdvyanka) (10:15Z). Ground action continues near Orikhiv and Huliaipole (10:15Z), focused on maintaining the RF defensive line and preventing UAF consolidation. In Kherson, clashes continue near the Antonivsky Bridge (10:15Z), confirming UAF maintenance of small bridgeheads or persistent reconnaissance-in-force.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL – Synchronization Failure/Shift

1. Assault Delay and Preparatory Shift (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The failure of the RF to initiate mass artillery fire (GRAU) by the 1030Z deadline indicates either a logistical delay in positioning the 260th GRAU munitions or a strategic decision to transition the preparatory phase primarily to air/missile strikes (evidenced by the 430 targets engaged overnight). This delay should not be interpreted as a cancellation, but a postponement of the ground phase initiation.
2. Sustained Deep Strike Capacity (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The massive overnight combined attack (430 targets engaged) confirms the RF's high inventory and capability to execute widespread, simultaneous strikes against UAF air defense, logistics, and C2 nodes outside the immediate front line.
3. Information Warfare Preconditioning (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF-aligned media is executing a coordinated IO campaign focused on pressuring Kyiv toward territorial concessions, heavily citing unnamed US/Western sources (Bild, NYT, 10:23Z, 10:26Z). This is likely intended to undermine UAF command credibility internally ahead of the ground offensive.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Effective Air Defense (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The successful suppression/destruction of 430 enemy targets demonstrates robust and effective UAF air defense C2 and execution during a complex, multi-vector RF strike (10:33Z). This mitigates the intended operational shock effect of the RF's preparatory fires.
• Sustained Tactical Pressure (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): UAF units maintain active spoiling attacks (near Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk) and successful drone attrition operations (414th UAV Brigade, 10:37Z). The reported blockade of RF forces north of Kupyansk (10:09Z) reflects ongoing tactical initiative.
• Hardline Diplomatic Stance (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Kyiv confirms a peace plan that explicitly rejects withdrawal from controlled territories and maintains the right to NATO membership (10:10Z). This solidifies the UAF negotiating position against international pressure for concessions.

Information environment / disinformation

The IE is dominated by geopolitical narratives centering on rumored peace proposals and US pressure on Kyiv:

1. Concessions IO Campaign: Russian sources and proxy media are amplifying reports (attributed to Bild and NYT) suggesting Donald Trump is intensely pressuring Zelenskyy to make territorial concessions, particularly regarding Donbas (10:26Z, 10:23Z).
2. "Trojan Horse" Counter-Narrative: UAF sources are counter-messaging this by citing EU/BBG views that any US-backed concession plan is a "Russian Trojan Horse," designed to fracture Western support (10:27Z).
3. Financial Warfare Conflict: Analysis of European media highlights internal EU disagreement regarding the seizure and utilization of frozen Russian sovereign assets (08:44Z), which directly affects Ukraine's long-term financial sustainment capability.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The primary threat remains the ground assault on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis. The passing of the 1030Z trigger window necessitates an adjustment to the timeline.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Delayed Mechanized Assault (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF Command recognizes the synchronization failure (GRAU delay) or is assessing the results of the 430-target air strike. The ground assault will be delayed until NLT 1800Z to allow for PGM BDA, final artillery positioning, or a C2 re-briefing. The main thrust will still target penetration towards Konstantinovka.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Immediate, Unconventional Ground Assault (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The RF C2 decides the 430-target air strike was sufficient to achieve suppression and orders the mechanized units to push immediately (NLT 1200Z) without the mass artillery preparation. This relies on exploiting perceived UAF C2 disruption, increasing the risk for RF forces but potentially achieving a tactical surprise if UAF defenders were expecting a conventional preparatory fire signal.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. MANEUVER & PREPAREDNESS (J3/OC EAST): EXPLOIT RF DELAY.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Do not relax alert status despite the passed 1030Z window. Assume the assault is delayed, not cancelled. Reserves must maintain Stage 2 readiness (30-minute reaction time).
   • Action B: Utilize the operational pause (6-12 hours) to reinforce the forward defensive elements that absorbed the RF spoiling attacks near Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) and Kostiantynivka. Engineering units must prioritize final mining and hardening of known mechanized ingress routes.

2. AIR DEFENSE & C2 (J7/AF): SUSTAIN COUNTER-STRIKE EFFECTIVENESS.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately execute high-priority logistics to re-arm and re-position air defense assets that successfully engaged the 430 targets overnight. Anticipate a potential secondary, high-density RF air strike concurrent with the delayed ground push.
   • Action B: Ensure redundant mobile C2 centers are fully operational, assuming the RF air strike was designed to degrade fixed/stationary C2 structures.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (J5/MFA): COUNTER IO PRESSURE.

   • Action A: Officially deny any negotiation of territorial concessions, utilizing the internal UAF peace plan parameters (no withdrawal/NATO rights) as a definitive statement against the RF and US/Trump pressure narratives.
   • Action B: Disseminate the success of the UAF Air Force (430 targets suppressed) immediately to both domestic and international audiences to demonstrate resilience against the massive RF kinetic effort.