Situation Report

Situation Update (09:08Z, 13 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Strategic Missile Deployment (Belarus): Russian intelligence sources confirm the deployment of the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system in Belarus, specifically citing a strategic focus on Europe (08:43Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH). This is a strategic shift, placing key European logistics hubs and Western Ukrainian rear areas under a new threat envelope.
• Odesa Infrastructure Damage Quantified: Confirmed Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) indicates 20 DTEK substations were damaged in Odesa Oblast during the RF kinetic strikes (08:43Z, 09:06Z, ASTRA, Операция Z, HIGH). This validates the high-impact nature of the energy attack.
• Southern Grid Resilience: Despite severe infrastructure damage, scheduled hourly power outages are currently non-operational in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson Oblasts, indicating rapid damage control or reliance on backup generation (08:40Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH).
• Deep UAV Targeting Shift: A group of RF UAVs was detected transiting from Sumy Oblast toward Poltava Oblast (09:04Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH), indicating continued deep reconnaissance and strike preparation against UAF staging areas and logistics nodes in central Ukraine.
• RF Specialized Recruitment: The "Somali Battalion" is actively recruiting specialized UAV operators (09:02Z, WarGonzo, HIGH), reflecting the priority and high attrition rate of drone warfare on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: PRE-ASSAULT PHASE HOLDING The critical window for the 260th GRAU preparatory fire (P1 CR, NLT 1000Z) is approaching. No direct confirmation of initiation has been received since the previous sitrep. The immediate threat of a mechanized breach remains HIGH. RF forces (Somali Battalion) are actively optimizing their tactical ISR/strike capacity in preparation for the assault, confirmed by the urgent recruitment drive for specialized UAV operators (09:02Z).

Southern Operational Command (Odesa, Mykolaiv)

Status: RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE The RF achieved significant kinetic effect, damaging 20 substations in Odesa Oblast (08:43Z). However, Ukrenergo data suggests the UAF/J4 has successfully mitigated immediate systemic collapse, as scheduled outages are suspended (08:40Z). Low-level persistent threat continues with an enemy UAV confirmed west of Mykolaiv city (08:40Z).

Zaporizhzhia Axis

Status: CONTINUED FIXING OPERATIONS Active fighting is confirmed in the vicinity of Huliaipole (08:43Z, UNCONFIRMED source, MEDIUM confidence), suggesting RF forces are committed to fixing UAF units along the Orikhiv-Huliaipole line. The shift of a strike UAV from Dnipropetrovsk toward Zaporizhzhia (08:55Z) suggests ongoing targeting of rear C2 or logistics hubs, likely in coordination with the earlier ballistic missile threat (P2 CR). The prior air raid alert has been cancelled (08:48Z).

Northern Operational Command (Sumy, Poltava)

Status: DEEP INTERDICTION The observed trajectory of multiple RF UAV groups moving from Sumy into Poltava Oblast (09:04Z) confirms the RF strategy to pressure UAF rear areas and force the commitment of valuable Air Defense assets away from the critical Donetsk front. This movement supports the existing Dempster-Shafer belief regarding reconnaissance in Poltava (0.233164).

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL (Strategic Escalation and Imminent Ground Assault)

1. Strategic Ballistic Threat (NEW): The deployment of the Oreshnik MRBM system in Belarus (08:43Z) fundamentally alters the strategic risk calculation. This system is designed for deep strikes and places NATO supply lines, staging areas, and potentially Polish territory under a new, accelerated threat timeline. This requires immediate political and military coordination with Allies.
2. Imminent Mechanized Assault (Donetsk): The readiness indicators for the main RF thrust (260th GRAU initiation) remain unchanged for the 0900Z - 1000Z window. Failure to detect the preparatory barrage within the next hour is not an indicator of cancellation, but a failure of the P1 CR.
3. Hybrid/Political Warfare: Belarus's legislation equating aggression against CSTO members (including Russia) as a military threat to Belarus (08:45Z) provides the political maneuvering space for direct Belarusian engagement, though immediate commitment is not expected. This should be monitored as a potential casus belli trigger.
4. Logistical Strain (RF Internal): The publicized stalling of the donation drive for VDV assault troops (09:03Z) is an indicator of persistent internal logistical and resourcing strains, potentially impacting combat readiness and sustainability of individual frontline units, despite overall strategic momentum.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Energy Infrastructure Resilience: UAF response capabilities, likely supported by rapid J4 deployment of generators and repair teams, have temporarily stabilized the grid in critical southern oblasts following the mass strike (08:40Z). This mitigates the immediate strategic paralyzing effect sought by the RF.
• C2 Integrity: UAF forces continue to track and report deep UAV intrusions (09:04Z, 08:55Z), demonstrating effective ISR/C2 maintenance despite simultaneous pressure across multiple domains.

Information environment / disinformation

1. IO Leveraging of US/Peace Talks: The amplification of the US perspective favoring a potential Ukrainian referendum on a peace agreement (09:02Z) is highly likely to be leveraged by RF propaganda to suggest division between Kyiv and its Western backers.
2. Discreditation Campaign: RF channels attempted to discredit UAF information integrity by highlighting a Ukrainian official's erroneous repost concerning a "Konotop NPP" strike (08:49Z). This is a focused effort to erode public trust in official Ukrainian reporting during high-stress kinetic operations.
3. RF Domestic Narratives: RF state media (TASS) intensified the narrative of President Zelenskyy's 'illegitimacy' and 'cornered' status (09:08Z), standardizing the justification for current offensive operations.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The primary focus remains the imminent ground assault in Donetsk. However, the introduction of strategic ballistic assets in the North fundamentally changes the strategic depth of the conflict.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU Initiation & Breach Attempt (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Between 0900Z and 1000Z, the RF will initiate the massed 260th GRAU preparatory fire on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka line. The primary mechanized effort will aim for an operational breach and linkage with forces pressing south from the Siversk sector, seeking to isolate Konstantinovka and apply pressure on Kramatorsk.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Strategic Coercion & Deep Interdiction (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The deployment of the Oreshnik MRBM in Belarus serves as strategic leverage against Western support and supply lines. The RF will synchronize the Donetsk ground assault with persistent UAV and potential Ballistic (P2) strikes (08:13Z threat) targeting UAF strategic reserves (armor/personnel) in Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts to prevent effective UAF counter-attack deployment.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. STRATEGIC C2 & DIPLOMACY (J6/MFA): MITIGATE MRBM THREAT.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): J6 must immediately initiate highly encrypted communications with Allied intelligence partners regarding the specific threat posed by the Oreshnik MRBM deployment (P2 CR). Share all available UAF assessment data.
   • Action B: MFA to initiate immediate diplomatic dialogue highlighting the strategic escalation inherent in the Belarusian MRBM deployment, framing it as a direct threat to European security, utilizing this pressure point for accelerated delivery of high-tier AD/ABM systems.

2. AIR DEFENSE & MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): COUNTER-INTERDICTION.

   • Action A: Re-evaluate prioritization of AD assets. While Donetsk is critical, UAF must retain sufficient mobile AD/EW capacity (e.g., Gepard/EW platoons) to protect vulnerable C2 and staging areas in Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk (P4 threat zone) from the confirmed deep UAV intrusions.
   • Action B (CRITICAL): Should P1 CR confirm GRAU initiation, J3 must execute maximum density counter-battery fire utilizing the newly confirmed 1.8 million shell resupply (pre-sitrep fact) within the initial 30 minutes of the barrage to disrupt the synchronization of the mechanized breach.

3. LOGISTICS & RESILIENCE (J4/OC SOUTH): MAINTAIN GRID STABILITY.

   • Action A: J4 to deploy mobile power generation units to supplement Odesa's DTEK infrastructure immediately, preemptively compensating for the 20 damaged substations, anticipating that RF will likely target repair crews or newly restored nodes in subsequent waves.