Situation Report

Situation Update (08:38Z, 13 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Coordinated Energy Attack Scope Widens: RF massed kinetic strikes targeted energy generation, distribution, and transmission infrastructure across four oblasts: Odesa, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk (08:08Z, 08:38Z, РБК-Україна, ASTRA, HIGH). This confirms an operation designed to degrade logistical and C2 capacity across three Operational Commands simultaneously.
• KAB and Air Activity Surge: RF forces initiated KAB (Guided Aerial Bomb) strikes on Donetsk (08:18Z) and Kharkiv (08:29Z) Oblasts, coinciding with active tactical aviation presence in the East (08:24Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH). This indicates the immediate kinetic preparatory phase for the expected ground assault.
• Ballistic Threat to Southeast: UAF Air Force issued a threat warning for ballistic missile launches originating from the southeastern axis (08:13Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH). Targets are assessed as high-value UAF concentrations or critical infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk.
• Mykolaiv Casualties Confirmed: Attacks on Mykolaiv Oblast resulted in five civilian casualties (08:21Z, 08:33Z, РБК-Україна, ASTRA, HIGH).
• Critical Artillery Aid Confirmed: Czech Prime Minister confirmed the delivery of 1.8 million artillery shells to Ukraine (08:31Z, ЦАПЛІЄНКО, HIGH). This substantially bolsters UAF fire support capability.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Operational Command (Odesa, Mykolaiv)

Status: SYSTEMIC INFRASTRUCTURE DEGRADATION The multi-pronged energy attack confirms RF intent to maximize humanitarian and logistical paralysis. By striking generation, distribution, and transmission assets simultaneously, RF forces are delaying recovery timelines beyond simple point defense responses. The generator-dependent status of Mykolaiv (per previous sitrep) is now under renewed pressure, especially regarding fuel supply endurance (J4 CR: P3). Casualties confirm the kinetic nature of the attacks.

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: IMMEDIATE PRE-ASSAULT KINETIC PHASE The window for the expected 260th GRAU preparatory fire (NLT 1000Z) is closing. RF actions are confirming IPB predictions:

1. Air Suppression: KAB strikes in Donetsk (08:18Z) are targeting hardened UAF positions.
2. Tactical Air: Increased RF tactical aviation activity (08:24Z) supports the KAB delivery and may indicate preparation for close air support (CAS) missions immediately preceding the mechanized push.
3. UAF Counter-Mobility: UAF forces (SIGNUM, 53rd Mech Bde) are demonstrating advanced counter-infantry capability using fiber-optic FPV drones in the Lyman sector (Serebryanske Forest, 08:22Z), successfully disrupting RF troop concentrations.
4. Siversk Claims (UNCONFIRMED): Enemy claims of positional advances linking Kirovo and Sviatookryanske (08:13Z, Сливочный каприз, LOW) suggest RF forces are actively pressing the secondary axis north of the Slovyansk hub, exploiting the previously reported loss of Siversk.

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv/Sumy/Chernihiv)

Status: PRESSURE MAINTENANCE RF kinetic activity is focused on fixing UAF reserves away from the Eastern thrust line. KAB strikes targeted Kharkiv (08:29Z). Renewed UAV activity observed in Sumy Oblast moving west (08:25Z) suggests ongoing deep reconnaissance or positioning for subsequent strikes. UAF clearing operations are confirmed in Kupyansk (08:19Z), maintaining the stability of the sector despite peripheral RF pressure.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL (Imminent Ground Assault)

1. Synchronization Point Reached: RF has achieved maximum synchronization: strategic paralyzing attacks in the South/Center concurrent with overwhelming kinetic preparatory fires (KAB, Artillery, Aviation) in the East. This highly coordinated approach maximizes shock effect ahead of the main mechanized effort.
2. Ballistic Focus: The ballistic missile alert (08:13Z) must be treated as a high-value threat targeting UAF divisional CPs, logistics hubs, or pre-positioned counter-battery firing positions in the East/Southeast rear areas.
3. Enemy Sustainment Degradation (Internal): The investigation into the theft of 40 million RUB from Rosgvardia state defense orders (08:16Z) highlights persistent systemic corruption that degrades the quality and availability of RF military material, primarily affecting rear echelon support and equipment readiness. This does not impact immediate tactical momentum but confirms strategic vulnerabilities.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Sustained C2 and Morale: The confirmed presence of CinC Syrskyi at a Kupyansk CP (08:19Z) reinforces C2 integrity and demonstrates commitment to holding the Northern axis despite the acute threat in Donetsk.
• Tactical Innovation: Successful employment of fiber-optic FPV systems (08:22Z) demonstrates UAF tactical adaptation and continued superiority in the low-level ISR/strike domain, countering previous RF attempts to suppress UAV capability.
• Strategic Resupply Confirmed: The confirmed delivery of 1.8 million shells from Czechia (08:31Z) directly addresses UAF ammunition requirements ahead of a major defensive operation. This mitigates the risk of defensive attrition due to low reserves.

Information environment / disinformation

1. IO Amplification of Kinetic Success: Pro-RF channels are immediately sharing visual evidence and claims of successful night strikes on infrastructure (08:21Z, 08:22Z), reinforcing the narrative of RF operational dominance and Ukraine's fragility.
2. Anti-Western/Mercenary Narrative: RF IO is actively promoting content designed to denigrate international support, characterizing foreign fighters as "meat" for the Ukrainian army (08:29Z). This is standard psychological operations (PSYOP) targeting international audiences and discouraging volunteerism (Dempster-Shafer belief: Information Warfare: Propaganda Effort by Russia: 0.0779).
3. US Political Coercion: Reporting on Trump's statement regarding a peace agreement (08:27Z) is amplified by RF-friendly sources, intended to destabilize global confidence in sustained long-term Western support for Ukraine.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The operational tempo is peaking. All indicators point to the immediate initiation of the primary ground offensive.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU Initiation, Breach Attempt (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Between 0900Z and 1000Z, the RF will initiate the massed 260th GRAU artillery barrage across the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka line. This will be immediately followed by synchronized mechanized assault waves seeking to exploit KAB-softened forward positions, aiming to achieve a significant operational breach and isolate Konstantinovka.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Deep Strike Combined Attack (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF ballistic assets, confirmed to be active (08:13Z), strike UAF reserves (armor/personnel) staging for counter-attack operations in the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia rear, simultaneous with the GRAU initiation. This denies UAF the ability to commit strategic reserves to plug the inevitable breaches created by the mechanized thrust.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE & C2 (J3/J6): MITIGATE BALLISTIC THREAT AND EA.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately alert all AD units in the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia regions to the P2 threat (Ballistic Missile Launch). Prioritize interception of incoming high-velocity targets NLT 0930Z.
   • Action B: J6 must initiate immediate frequency hopping and enforce pre-briefed silent communications protocols in OC East to mitigate the anticipated surge in kinetic and electronic attack (EA) prior to 1000Z.

2. FIRE SUPPORT (J3/OC EAST): EXPLOIT NEW MATERIAL ADVANTAGE.

   • Action A: Incorporate the confirmed 1.8 million shell delivery into immediate fire planning. Prioritize counter-battery fire against confirmed 260th GRAU concentrations immediately upon P1 CR confirmation, aiming for high density saturation to suppress the mechanized breach.
   • Action B: Increase deployment density of advanced FPV units (fiber-optic or enhanced capabilities) in threatened breach sectors (Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka approaches) to rapidly degrade RF mechanized unit momentum during the breakthrough attempt.

3. LOGISTICS & RESILIENCE (J4/OC SOUTH): ENERGY RESILIENCE.

   • Action A: Initiate immediate, low-emissions, distributed power generation for critical C2 and humanitarian nodes in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk, anticipating prolonged grid recovery.
   • Action B: J4 must confirm fuel reserves for generator operations in Mykolaiv are adequate for a 72-hour operational window, given the scale of the energy attack.