Situation Report

Situation Update (08:08Z, 13 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Odesa Utility Paralysis Worsens: All electrical traction substations in Odesa City are now confirmed disabled due to the RF attack, compounding the existing lack of heat and water (07:55Z, РБК-Україна, HIGH). This severely impacts internal logistical movement, including electric rail/tram networks.
• Mykolaiv Contingency Activated: Mykolaiv Oblast has completed the transfer of all critical infrastructure (C2, essential services) onto generator power (07:45Z, РБК-Україна; 08:01Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH). This confirms successful execution of contingency planning under massed kinetic attack.
• Eastern Axis Kinetic Suppression: RF MoD claims destruction of two UAF UAV command/launch points in the Konstantinovka direction (07:48Z, TASS, LOW). This activity supports the expected mechanized thrust by attempting to neutralize UAF tactical reconnaissance and FPV capability immediately preceding the full GRAU artillery initiation.
• UAF Internal Friction Confirmed: Colonel Manko, Assault Troops Directorate, issued a highly critical public statement demanding security services address "enemy saboteurs" and criticizing "politicians" (07:48Z, STERNENKO, HIGH). This signals significant internal C2 strain and distrust during the high-pressure pre-assault phase.
• RF Domestic IO Focus Shift: RF media reported alleged UAF UAV strike resulting in two civilian deaths in Saratov Oblast (08:03Z, Военкор Котенок, UNCONFIRMED). This escalates the RF counter-narrative following UAF deep strikes.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Operational Command (Odesa, Mykolaiv)

Status: LOGISTICAL CRISIS / CONTINGENCY ACTIVATED RF operations have successfully created a crisis environment. The paralysis of Odesa's internal electrical logistics (traction substations) restricts movement of necessary humanitarian aid and complicates the immediate deployment of non-generator-dependent assets. Mykolaiv’s shift to 100% generator dependence stabilizes immediate C2 but introduces long-term fuel and sustainment vulnerability.

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: IMMINENT MECHANIZED THRUST (Final Precursors) RF forces are executing the final preparatory steps ahead of the expected 260th GRAU barrage NLT 1000Z. The focus on suppressing UAF UAV infrastructure (07:48Z) indicates RF is attempting to secure temporary air superiority in the cognitive domain, ensuring UAF ISR is degraded during the critical breach window. RF claims of FPV drone successes against UAF logistics (ammo depot, BTR) near Rusyn Yar/Shakhovo (08:02Z, Народная милиция ДНР, LOW) suggest active use of ISR and precision strikes against UAF rear area elements in preparation for maneuver.

Northern Operational Command (Sumy/Kharkiv)

Status: RECONNAISSANCE PRESSURE A UAF Air Force alert confirms active UAV presence on the outskirts of Sumy, tracking South (07:47Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH). This maintains the threat of deep strike targeting in central Ukraine, preventing UAF from massing Air Defense assets near the primary Eastern thrust line.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL (Synchronization Point)

1. Synchronization of Effects: RF kinetic operations are tightly synchronized: logistical paralysis in the South (Odesa/Mykolaiv) is now fully active, coinciding precisely with the final kinetic suppression measures (KABs, UAV node destruction) on the Eastern front.
2. RF Tactical Adaptation (FPV): The demonstrated integration of FPV drones for real-time logistics interdiction (Rusyn Yar, Huliaipole claims) suggests the RF is prioritizing the disruption of UAF tactical resupply in depth as the ground assault begins.
3. Enemy Morale/Sustainment (Analytical Judgment): Internal RF reports noting that 20% of returning soldiers require psychological support (08:01Z) indicate high rates of combat fatigue and psychological injury. While RF forces maintain momentum, this attrition rate poses a long-term risk to combat effectiveness and recruitment quality.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Contingency Activation: UAF leadership in OC South has successfully implemented the transition to generator power for critical nodes in Mykolaiv, maintaining C2 integrity under severe kinetic pressure.
• Deep Strikes (Confirmed by Adversary IO): UAF deep strikes into Russia (Saratov Oblast, 08:03Z) continue to force RF Air Defense dispersal and introduce high-value IO opportunities for RF domestic mobilization.
• Internal C2 Strain: The public frustration voiced by Colonel Manko (07:48Z) regarding internal enemies/political interference requires immediate attention from J1/J2. Assessment: This risks degrading unit cohesion and confidence in the command structure during the critical 6-hour window.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Targeted IO (Internal Friction): Colonel Manko’s highly public critique of internal actors, potentially aimed at security services (SBU/HUR) or political leadership, is immediately exploitable by RF IO to amplify narratives of governmental and military incompetence/division.
2. Domestic Mobilization (RF): RF media is aggressively leveraging the alleged civilian casualties in Saratov (08:03Z) to frame the conflict as Ukrainian terrorism against Russian civilians, justifying further escalation.
3. Global Grand Strategy: RF media continues promoting themes of Western weakness (07:54Z) to diminish the perceived value of UAF resistance and erode international resolve.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The primary decision point remains the initiation of the 260th GRAU artillery barrage. Time remaining until the estimated initiation (NLT 1000Z) is approximately 1 hour 52 minutes.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Full GRAU Initiation & Mechanized Breach (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF will synchronize the artillery preparatory fire NLT 1000Z, immediately followed by the synchronized mechanized breach attempt from the Pokrovsk salient, aiming to exploit the current UAF logistical strain in the rear and the suppressed ISR capacity in the tactical zone.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Immediate Coordinated EA/Cyber Attack (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF capitalizes on the total electrical failure of Odesa’s traction infrastructure by launching a coordinated, high-power Electronic Attack (EA) across the Donetsk axis, aiming to fully disrupt UAF C2 and EW capabilities in the sector precisely as the kinetic barrage begins. Concurrently, a focused cyber operation targets the newly generator-dependent C2 nodes in Mykolaiv to degrade logistics planning and response capabilities.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY C2 & COUNTER-IO (J1/J6/StratCom): STABILIZE INTERNAL COHESION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): J1/HUR must immediately engage with Colonel Manko and the relevant Assault Troop leadership to address concerns regarding internal security and political friction. Internal communication must reinforce unit cohesion and confidence in the command structure ahead of the major assault.
   • Action B: J6 must enforce immediate adherence to all C2 contingency protocols, including the assumption of impending EA, focusing strictly on resilient SATCOM and frequency rotation before 1000Z.

2. LOGISTICS & RESILIENCE (J4/OC SOUTH): MITIGATE ODESA ELECTRIC FAILURE.

   • Action A: Expedite deployment of diesel rail assets to maintain critical throughput via the Artsyz corridor, compensating for the lack of electrical traction power within Odesa and surrounding hubs.
   • Action B: Prioritize fuel reserves for Mykolaiv critical infrastructure generators for a minimum 48-hour sustainment window, anticipating prolonged power grid recovery delays.

3. FIRE SUPPORT (J3/OC EAST): MAINTAIN UAV DENSITY.

   • Action A: Immediately reinforce FPV and short-range ISR unit replacement capability in the Konstantinovka/Pokrovsk area, countering the RF suppression efforts. UAF must not be blinded during the GRAU initiation window.
   • Action B: Execute standing counter-battery plan immediately upon P1 CR confirmation (GRAU ignition) NLT 1000Z. Focus suppression on deep RF artillery concentrations capable of saturation fire.