Situation Update (UTC 07:08Z, 13 DEC 2025)
Key updates since last sitrep
- Odesa Oblast Energy Collapse Confirmed: Massed RF kinetic strikes severely degraded power infrastructure across Odesa Oblast, resulting in confirmed widespread blackouts. RF sources claim successful targeting of ten substations (06:57Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU; 06:42Z, Fighterbomber, HIGH).
- Eastern Offensive Timeline Shift: The critical anticipated initiation of the synchronized preparatory fire (260th GRAU) on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis, forecast for NLT 0700Z, has NOT materialized as of 07:08Z (Analyst Judgment, HIGH). The RF shaping phase appears extended or delayed.
- UAF Deep Strike Strategic BDA: UAF Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS) confirmed the Syzyran Oil Refinery (Rosneft) was rendered COMPLETELY STOPPED following drone strikes on 05 DEC. This confirms strategic success in degrading RF oil processing capacity (09 Dec, Madyar, MEDIUM).
- Dnipropetrovsk AD Engagements: UAF Air Command (PvK) reports downing 7 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast this morning, indicating the RF saturation attack is geographically extending into the central operational rear (06:43Z, Dnipro ODA, HIGH).
Operational picture (by sector)
Strategic Operational Zone (Deep Rear)
RF operations are focused on paralyzing logistics and energy. UAF deep strike operations continue to provide strategic offset. The confirmed total shutdown of the Syzyran NPZ significantly reduces RF internal logistics sustainment capability (refinery capacity), requiring immediate RF reallocation of resources.
Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv/Kherson)
Status: OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS (ENERGY DEGRADATION)
RF kinetic operations have achieved a high level of success in local energy neutralization. The attack wave saturated defenses across Southern and Central Ukraine.
- Odesa/Logistics: Widespread blackouts across Odesa Oblast place severe stress on the Artsyz rail hub operations and maritime logistics support. Sustained power loss complicates the reliable movement of rail traffic and local C2 synchronization.
- Vector Adaptation: The sustained attacks across Kherson, Mykolaiv, and the simultaneous engagement in Dnipropetrovsk (7 UAVs downed) confirm an RF strategy to overwhelm and stretch UAF Air Defense by targeting key nodes across multiple, broad ingress corridors.
Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Sumy)
Status: CRITICAL WAITING PHASE
The critical timeline for the mechanized ground assault on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis (forecast NLT 0700Z) has lapsed without the initiation of the massed artillery barrage.
- Assessment: This delay suggests potential friction, C2 constraints, or tactical readiness shortfalls within the RF assault grouping, or a deliberate attempt to achieve greater operational surprise by shifting the commencement window. Maximum readiness must be maintained.
- Zaporizhzhia: RF sources claiming renewed intensity near Huliaipole (06:42Z) are likely intended to fix UAF reserves in the Zaporizhzhia sector, preventing them from reinforcing the critical Donetsk line ahead of the expected main thrust. (ANALYST JUDGMENT, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Threat Level: CRITICAL (Energy Paralysis Achieved / Ground Assault Pending Re-initiation)
- Logistics Isolation (Kinetic): RF successfully executed a synchronized, multi-domain attack to achieve localized operational paralysis in OC South (Odesa blackouts). This validates the intelligence forecast regarding the enemy's intent to isolate the Southern grouping.
- Delayed Synchronization Risk (Maneuver): The failure to initiate the 260th GRAU barrage at the forecasted time (0700Z) is a temporary tactical reprieve, not a reduction in threat. RF intent for a massive offensive remains validated. The most likely initiation window is now assessed as 0800Z to 1000Z (ANALYST JUDGMENT, HIGH CONFIDENCE).
- Adaptive Threat: The extended geographic reach of the UAV saturation attacks (confirmed Dnipropetrovsk) confirms RF intent to degrade defensive depth and C2 resilience across Central and Southern Ukraine simultaneously.
Friendly activity (UAF)
UAF Air Defense forces remain highly effective in local engagements (7 UAVs downed in Dnipropetrovsk). UAF deep strike units (SBS) are actively engaged in counter-coercion operations, achieving notable strategic BDA (Syzyran NPZ total shutdown). The UAF focus must immediately shift to ensuring C2 redundancy and the operational status of contingency power in the Odesa blackout zone, per previous recommendations.
Information environment / disinformation
- RF Strategic Exploitation: RF state media and military channels are immediately broadcasting the success of the Odesa strikes (10 substations hit) to project military capability and undermine Ukrainian morale and resilience.
- Internal RF Narrative Fissures: Critical reporting from within the RF information space regarding the "Hero of Russia" award for the "liberation of Kupyansk" suggests a narrative aimed at exposing internal military cynicism and perceived elite corruption regarding claimed successes.
- Humanitarian Projection: TASS disseminated information regarding a mutual agreement on POW visits and parcels, likely an effort to counterbalance international focus on large-scale infrastructure destruction.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
The primary operational concern is the synchronization of the delayed Eastern offensive thrust with the sustained degradation of Southern logistics.
Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)
Delayed GRAU Initiation (0800Z-1000Z) & Mechanized Thrust (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF will resolve synchronization issues and initiate the anticipated massive artillery preparation on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis within the next 3 hours, followed immediately by mechanized exploitation aimed at breaching UAF forward defenses.
Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)
Electronic Warfare/Logistics Paralysis (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF sustains logistics strikes (specifically targeting the Artsyz rail hub) and exploits the widespread power blackouts in Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv by initiating a coordinated, high-power Electronic Attack (EA) campaign against UAF C2 frequencies across the affected areas, leading to tactical paralysis.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Real-time confirmation of the 260th GRAU preparatory fire initiation status. | CRITICAL SIGINT/ELINT monitoring (24/7) for mass artillery ignition signatures. Focus: 0800Z - 1000Z window on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka line. | HIGH |
| P2 (CRITICAL) | Assessment of UAF C2 functional status and logistics capacity in the Odesa blackout zone. | Internal Reporting (J3/J6) on the operational status of the Artsyz rail hub and C2 node contingency power activation success rate. | HIGH |
| P3 (URGENT) | Location/Status of RF Mechanized Reserves near Pokrovsk. | IMINT/ISR confirmation of exact positioning and readiness status of lead RF maneuver elements awaiting the artillery barrage order. | MEDIUM |
| P4 (UPDATE) | Comprehensive BDA on UAF deep strikes (Syzyran NPZ total shutdown). | OSINT/IMINT to resolve the duration and scale of the Syzyran shutdown to confirm strategic impact claims. | MEDIUM |
Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)
-
PRIORITY C2 & POWER (J6/OC SOUTH): MAINTAIN C2 INTEGRITY UNDER BLACKOUT.
- Action A (CRITICAL): J6 must confirm the functional status and redundant power supply (generators/UPS) of all OC South operational C2 nodes in the Odesa region. Prioritize the establishment of hardened radio and satellite relay systems to bypass grid dependency.
- Action B: Increase EW surveillance (SIGINT/ELINT) in the Odesa/Mykolaiv/Kherson sectors to detect pre-cursor signatures of a coordinated RF Electronic Attack intended to follow the power grid degradation.
-
FIRE SUPPORT (J3/OC EAST): MAINTAIN STANDING COUNTER-BATTERY ORDER.
- Action A: Hold all counter-battery assets at maximum readiness. Execute Phase 1 counter-battery fire immediately upon confirmation of the delayed 260th GRAU signature, prioritizing high-caliber systems detected in the new 0800Z-1000Z window.
-
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (StratCom/MFA): LEVERAGE DEEP STRIKE SUCCESS.
- Action A: Officially confirm and immediately publicize the total operational shutdown of the Syzyran NPZ. Use this BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) to demonstrate Ukraine’s capacity for strategic counter-coercion and offset the morale impact of the Odesa infrastructure strikes.