Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 06:08Z, 13 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Mykolaiv Infrastructure BDA Confirmed: Confirmed kinetic damage to critical infrastructure in Mykolaiv has directly impacted public mobility. Mayor Senkevich reports electric transport services are suspended and replaced by limited autonomous trolleybuses (05:50Z, RBK-U, HIGH).
• Persistent High-Density UAV Swarm on Odesa: RF forces escalated the UAV saturation effort, launching a large swarm (estimated 25 units) toward Odesa/Chornomorsk maritime access points (05:47Z, Vanek, MEDIUM). Further groups are targeting deep logistics nodes near the Danube Delta (Artsyz/Sarata) (06:07Z, Air Force, HIGH).
• UAF Deep Strike BDA Refined: RF official sources confirmed the target in Saratov was an industrial target, likely the Saratov Oil Refinery (NPZ), with confirmed fatalities remaining at 2 individuals (05:45Z, 05:57Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU/ASTRA, HIGH).
• Turkish Diplomatic Friction Confirmed: RF media reports (Operation Z) that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has called for an immediate cessation of the conflict following the strike on the Turkish commercial vessel in Chornomorsk (05:56Z, Operation Z, MEDIUM). This confirms the diplomatic fallout anticipated from the RF maritime strike.
• RF Claim of Pokrovsk Seizure: RF media published aerial video footage claiming to show "liberated Krasnoarmeysk" (Pokrovsk), corroborating previous reports of probable UAF withdrawal and RF consolidation of the southern flank toward Konstantinovka (05:43Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM).

Operational picture (by sector)

Strategic Operational Zone (Deep Rear)

The RF kinetic effort remains focused on sustaining pressure through persistent UAV attacks, testing UAF air defense resilience. UAF air defense successfully destroyed 7 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (06:00Z, Dnipro OMA, HIGH), but penetrations were confirmed in Dnipro (non-operational building damage) and Poltava (UAV tracked west of the city) (05:40Z, 05:44Z, Air Force, HIGH). The successful UAF deep strike on the Saratov NPZ confirms continued disruption capability against RF strategic infrastructure.

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv)

Status: CRITICAL LOGISTICS INTERDICTION / AD STRESS

The operational focus is unequivocally shifted to the isolation of OC South. The transition from CR strikes to persistent UAV saturation is stressing local air defenses and successfully impacting ground operations:

• Mykolaiv: Confirmed strikes on critical infrastructure have impacted power distribution, forcing the municipal government to implement emergency transport measures (05:50Z, RBK-U, HIGH). Persistent UAV tracking continues, including a confirmed single threat near the Inhulsky Bridge approach (05:44Z, Vanek, MEDIUM), potentially confirming BDA or secondary targeting.
• Odesa/Coastal: RF forces have massed UAV groups targeting Chornomorsk/Odesa and key logistics nodes deeper in the rear area, specifically Artsyz and Sarata (06:07Z, Air Force, HIGH). These nodes support the Danube river supply lines and maritime logistics south of Odesa city. Explosions were confirmed in Odesa Oblast (05:42Z, RBK-U, HIGH). This persistent, multi-pronged attack aims to severely degrade UAF logistics redundancy in the South.

Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia)

Status: HIGH THREAT/RF CONSOLIDATION

The RF is consolidating gains on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis. The publication of aerial footage claiming control of Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) suggests the RF is preparing to leverage this position for the anticipated main thrust toward Konstantinovka/Kramatorsk. The absence of new kinetic reports since the last sitrep suggests a tactical lull, potentially the final phase of maneuver preparation preceding the 260th GRAU initiation.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Ground Assault Imminent / Logistics Degradation)

1. Shift to Deep Logistics Interdiction: The deployment of new UAV groups targeting Artsyz and Sarata (Odesa Oblast) confirms RF intent to expand the strike zone beyond immediate operational rear areas and hit vital supply lines supporting the Danube Delta and southern forces (HIGH CONFIDENCE). This is a strategic adaptation aimed at ensuring OC South cannot be quickly resupplied from the Romanian border or interior logistics hubs.
2. Sustained Pressure on Mykolaiv C2/Logistics: The continuation of UAV attacks over Mykolaiv, targeting the urban area and bridge approaches, confirms RF intent to compound the damage inflicted by the earlier CR strike and maintain paralysis of the Southern Bug crossing points (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
3. IO Leveraging of Tactical Gains: RF media is actively using the claimed seizure of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) to reinforce the narrative of successful deep penetration and imminent encirclement of the Kramatorsk defense hub (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense Command (PvK) reported successful interception of 7 enemy UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (06:00Z, Dnipro OMA, HIGH), maintaining a robust defense posture despite widespread saturation attacks. The 46th Separate Air Mobile Brigade (DShV ZSU) released a combat report, indicating continued effective resistance and successful engagements on key sectors (06:04Z, DShV ZSU, HIGH).

UAF deep strike capability remains effective, with the Saratov Oil Refinery confirmed as a target. This sustains pressure on RF strategic economic assets and forces resource allocation decisions away from the front (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

Information environment / disinformation

1. Turkish MFA Response Amplified: RF sources are immediately leveraging the diplomatic consequences of the maritime strike, claiming Turkey called for an "immediate cessation of war" (05:56Z, Operation Z, MEDIUM). This narrative aims to sow division among NATO allies and reduce international pressure on the RF.
2. Propaganda Focus on Gains: The dissemination of aerial footage of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) serves as high-impact propaganda aimed at demoralizing UAF forces and demonstrating unstoppable RF momentum ahead of the anticipated main offensive (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
3. Domestic Diversion in RF: RF state media (TASS) continues to push trivial domestic news (e.g., Fendi trademarks, Christmas tree laws) amidst confirmed fatalities from UAF strikes in Saratov (05:46Z, 05:58Z, TASS, HIGH), suggesting a strategy to minimize the perceived impact of UAF deep operations on the domestic audience.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The focus remains on the expected initiation of the ground offensive in the East. However, the confirmed targeting of Artsyz/Sarata adds a critical threat vector to the Southern logistics chain.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU Initiation & Coordinated Ground Thrust (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF offensive synchronization timeline remains critical. The operational shaping phase is complete. Expect initiation of the mass artillery barrage (260th GRAU) on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis NLT 0630Z, followed by immediate mechanized exploitation, leveraged by the confirmed RF consolidation around Pokrovsk.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Deep Logistics Neutralization & Operational Isolation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF will continue the multi-domain attack (UAV/CR) to achieve total isolation of OC South. The MDCOA is now highly focused on neutralizing the Artsyz/Sarata logistics rail/road hub (near Danube Delta) and confirming the denial of movement over the Southern Bug (Mykolaiv area). Successful neutralization of these points within the next 12 hours would critically delay UAF reinforcement and logistics sustainment for the entire Southern front.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY C2/MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): PREPARE FOR GRAU BREACH.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Authorize immediate counter-battery fire initiation (Phase 1) against identified RF artillery staging points (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) to disrupt the GRAU supply chain, regardless of final initiation time.
   • Action B: Prepare reserve units in Konstantinovka for immediate counter-attack operations to disrupt RF mechanized thrusts exploiting the Pokrovsk line breach.

2. LOGISTICS & INFRASTRUCTURE (J4/OC SOUTH): HARDEN DEEP REAR LOGISTICS.

   • Action A: Immediately establish mobile air defense point defenses (SHORAD/VSHORAD) around the Artsyz and Sarata rail yards and primary storage areas. Assume these nodes are primary high-value targets for the next 6 hours.
   • Action B: Expedite deployment of engineer assets to Mykolaiv to assess and initiate repairs on power infrastructure critical to maintaining C2 and operational readiness, prioritizing the restoration of redundancy for the Southern Bug crossings.

3. AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC SOUTH/CENTRAL): COUNTER UAV SWARMING TACTICS.

   • Action A: Allocate additional EW assets to the Odesa coastal sector to disrupt the large incoming UAV swarms, focusing on disrupting C2 links for the sea-borne groups targeting Chornomorsk/Odesa.
   • Action B: Maintain continuous AD alert for potential secondary CR strikes aimed at neutralizing confirmed damage sites, particularly in Mykolaiv and Pervomaisk.