Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 05:08Z, 13 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Strategic Missile Strike Initiated: RF forces commenced a deep-strike missile operation targeting Central Ukraine, following the sustained UAV attacks in the South. Targets included Kyiv (air alert, 04:39Z), Poltava (04:42Z), Cherkasy (04:51Z), and Kirovohrad/Kropyvnytskyi (04:58Z). (Air Force, HIGH)
• Kirovohrad/Odesa Rear Logistics Targeted: Cruise missile trajectories confirm active targeting of the deep rear, specifically Kropyvnytskyi and Balta (northern Odesa Oblast) (04:58Z - 05:05Z). This aims to isolate the Southern Operational Command (OC South) logistics from central reserves. (Air Force/Vanek, HIGH)
• Mykolaiv UAV Pressure Sustained: Confirmed presence of two UAVs over Mykolaiv city center, specifically near the Inhulsky Bridge (04:41Z). This reinforces kinetic pressure on critical city infrastructure and logistics nodes. (Vanek, MEDIUM)
• RF Claims Exploitation West of Pokrovsk: RF sources claim operational success against UAF 5th Assault Brigade personnel west of Dobropillya (05:00Z). This is UNCONFIRMED but aligns with the anticipated RF exploitation vector following the collapse of the Pokrovsk defensive line, pushing toward Konstantinovka/Kramatorsk. (Воин DV, LOW)
• Odesa Port Flank Pressure Continues: New UAV groups are approaching from the Black Sea toward Chornomorske/Ovidiopol (04:47Z), maintaining suppression on Odesa maritime logistics access points. (Air Force, HIGH)

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Operational picture (by sector)

Strategic Operational Zone (Deep Rear)

Status: CRITICAL ROCKET/MISSILE THREAT

The RF has shifted from UAV fixation to coordinated Cruise Missile penetration. The simultaneous alerts in Kyiv, Poltava, Cherkasy, and Kirovohrad indicate a maximal effort to paralyze high-level C2 and operational reserves. The targeting of Kropyvnytskyi and Balta (Northern Odesa) represents a critical escalation aimed at pre-emptively severing key rail and road logistics nodes supporting UAF forces in the East and South, ahead of the impending ground assault.

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv)

Status: HIGH KINETIC PRESSURE / ISOLATION EFFORT

RF forces are maintaining UAV saturation on Mykolaiv (Inhulsky Bridge area confirmed) and Odesa maritime access (Chornomorske/Ovidiopol). The current deep missile strike (targeting Balta) is intended to finalize the operational isolation of this sector, preventing large-scale resupply via Western or Central Ukraine.

Central Axis (Poltava/Cherkasy/Kirovohrad)

Status: AD FRAGMENTATION COMPLETE

The dispersal of UAF mobile air defense assets is confirmed by the successful penetration of missiles deep into this area, utilizing complex, meandering trajectories (Romodan -> Hadyach -> Lubny -> Chyhyryn). The missiles are maneuvering to maximize target concealment and challenge UAF AD response times.

Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Lyman/Zaporizhzhia)

Status: IMMINENT GROUND ASSAULT TRIGGER

No confirmation of the 260th GRAU preparatory fire initiation has been received. However, the completion of the coordinated deep kinetic strike strongly suggests the necessary prerequisites are being met. RF claims of engaging UAF 5th Assault Brigade west of Dobropillya (LOW confidence) suggest localized maneuvering is already underway to exploit the Pokrovsk breach, potentially ahead of or concurrent with the mass artillery barrage.

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Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Decisive Phase Execution)

1. Kinetic Synchronization: The integration of the deep missile strikes into the ongoing UAV operations confirms HIGH-LEVEL C2 effectiveness. The enemy's intent is no longer harassment but operational paralysis of the UAF strategic rear. The specific designation of targets like Kropyvnytskyi and Balta suggests intelligence collection confirmed these nodes as vital logistics bottlenecks.
2. MLCOA Refinement: The timing of the deep strike wave indicates the RF leadership is preparing to pull the trigger on the ground assault in the East. The missile strikes constitute the final phase of the operational shaping effort. The window for the GRAU initiation has narrowed to NLT 0630Z.
3. Ground Exploitation: While UNCONFIRMED, the RF claim of contact west of Dobropillya is militarily significant. Dobropillya lies on a crucial road network supporting UAF forces holding the line at Konstantinovka. If confirmed, this indicates RF mechanized units are already moving to cut the supply lines into the Slovyansk/Kramatorsk hub from the southwest.

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Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Force is actively tracking and issuing timely warnings regarding the complex missile and UAV movements, maximizing the time available for forces to seek shelter and for AD units to attempt interception. The dispersion of AD assets is now mandatory due to the multi-directional threats across eight oblasts. UAF General Staff issued a standard combat loss report (05:04Z), intended to maintain domestic morale amidst the kinetic strikes.

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Information environment / disinformation

1. Exaggeration of UAF Losses: RF sources continue to propagate the figure of 41 intercepted UAF UAVs over RF territory (04:39Z, 05:04Z). This narrative attempts to mitigate the psychological impact of successful Ukrainian deep strike capabilities by framing the operations as costly failures. (HIGH confidence of IO intent, LOW confidence in claims).
2. Historical/Ideological Messaging: The dissemination of historical military commemoration (04:45Z) and religious/militaristic greetings (05:06Z) by RF channels serves to boost internal morale and reinforce the ideological basis for the current offensive phase.
3. Domestic Policy Distraction: TASS reporting on domestic education policy (04:48Z) attempts to normalize the situation within Russia, distracting from the ongoing high-intensity conflict.

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Outlook (next 6-12h)

The current kinetic activity is the culmination of the RF preparatory phase. The transition to ground operations is imminent.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU Initiation & Ground Thrust (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Confirmation of BDA on deep logistics nodes (Kropyvnytskyi/Balta) will trigger the mass artillery barrage (260th GRAU) on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis NLT 0630Z. This will immediately be followed by synchronized mechanized thrusts attempting to breach UAF lines near Dobropillya and establish fire control over the main supply route to Kramatorsk.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Deep C2 Decapitation Strike (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The continued missile activity toward Kyiv (04:39Z) and Kropyvnytskyi (critical center) suggests RF may attempt a simultaneous, high-precision kinetic strike targeting senior UAF C2 facilities or key national infrastructure (energy grid, main communications hubs) during the GRAU preparatory fire phase, aiming for systemic collapse of the UAF defense effort rather than just localized tactical gains.

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Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY C2/MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): EXECUTE PRE-PLANNED COUNTER-STRIKES.
   • Action A (CRITICAL): Assume GRAU initiation NLT 0630Z. UAF C2 must authorize immediate preparatory long-range fires (HIMARS, etc.) against known RF staging areas/GRAU offload sites (Volnovakha/Ilovaisk, per previous reports) BEFORE the RF artillery reaches saturation, potentially trapping munitions in transit.
   • Action B: Rapidly reinforce the sector west of Konstantinovka/Pokrovsk breach, specifically the Dobropillya area, to prevent RF forces from cutting the north-south logistics artery.
2. AD & LOGISTICS (J4/OC CENTRAL & SOUTH): IMMEDIATE HARDENING OF CRITICAL NODES.
   • Action A: Redirect mobile AD reserves (if available) to provide point defense for the Kropyvnytskyi and Balta areas immediately, protecting key rail infrastructure and depots from secondary strikes.
   • Action B: Disperse any remaining sensitive logistical materiel (fuel, ammunition) currently stored near Kropyvnytskyi and Balta, assuming kinetic impact is probable within the next 90 minutes.
3. FORCE PROTECTION (J3/OC ALL): DETERMINE MISSILE TYPE.
   • Action A: P4 CR must be prioritized. Confirmation of the specific cruise missile variant (e.g., Iskander-K vs. Kh-101/Caliber) will inform remaining RF inventory and immediate threat to hardened structures vs. area targets. All forces should assume high-precision warheads.