Nightwatch logo
'Nightwatch' text with white and gray letters
Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-13 04:39:06Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-13 04:09:06Z)

Situation Update (UTC 04:38Z, Dec 13, 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • Southern AD Penetration Sustained: RF UAV operations continue to penetrate UAF local Air Defense, maintaining kinetic pressure on key logistics hubs, necessitating shelter warnings for Mykolaiv and Odesa (04:10:32, Air Force, HIGH).
  • Targeting Odesa Strategic Infrastructure: UAV trajectory refinement indicates multiple groups targeting critical Black Sea logistics. New vectors identified targeting Vylkove/Tatarbunary (Danube logistics, 04:25:09, Air Force, HIGH) and Chornomorske/Hryhorivka (Odesa Port access, 04:36:01, Air Force, HIGH).
  • Mykolaiv Threat Geometry Refined: Local sources confirm specific UAV threats approaching Mykolaiv suburbs, including Solyany and Varvarivka (04:32:58, Vanek, MEDIUM), requiring localized defensive prioritization.
  • Deep Central Penetration: The Central UAV fixing operation has extended westward into Vinnytsia Oblast, with a UAV observed heading south past Teplyk toward Bershad (04:37:43, Air Force, HIGH), forcing UAF AD reserves to commit deeper into the operational rear.
  • RF Claims Massive UAF Drone Losses: RF Ministry of Defence claims 41 Ukrainian UAVs were intercepted over RF territory overnight (04:34:55, TASS, LOW). This is an UNCONFIRMED figure intended to minimize the success of UAF deep strike operations.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv/Black Sea)

Status: CRITICAL KINETIC STRIKE CULMINATION

The RF deep strike campaign is culminating with high-density UAV attacks focused on establishing Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on UAF strategic logistics. The primary threat now encompasses three specific vectors:

  1. Odesa North: UAVs approaching Odesa city center from the North (04:22:51).
  2. Odesa Southwest/Danube: UAVs targeting riverine logistics hubs near Vylkove/Tatarbunary (04:25:09).
  3. Odesa Port/Mykolaiv Flank: UAVs targeting major port facilities/access points at Chornomorske/Hryhorivka (04:36:01).

The synchronization of these strikes suggests RF intent to maximally disrupt both rail/road logistics (previous strikes) and sea/river logistics (current strikes) immediately prior to the Eastern ground offensive.

Central Axis (Vinnytsia/Poltava/Cherkasy)

Status: MAXIMAL AD FIXATION

The adversary has successfully executed deep penetration, extending the UAV trajectory into the western part of the Central Operational Zone (Vinnytsia Oblast, 04:37:43). This forces UAF mobile AD assets to redeploy westward, guaranteeing their non-participation in supporting Eastern defensive operations during the imminent ground assault initiation.

Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Lyman/Zaporizhzhia)

Status: WATCH STATE (GRAU WINDOW CLOSING)

No new kinetic facts contradict the anticipation of the 260th GRAU preparatory fire. The delay past 04:00Z is likely connected to the finalization of the AD fragmentation and BDA phase in the South. The critical window of 0300Z-0600Z is nearly closed; initiation is expected imminently, likely within the next two hours, following the completion of the coordinated UAV effort.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Synchronization Complete)

  1. UAV Operational Objective Shift: RF forces have transitioned from general area saturation to high-value, pinpoint strikes (Chornomorske, Vylkove). This transition phase indicates that RF C2 is receiving real-time BDA on their earlier strikes and is attempting to finalize the paralysis of strategic resupply before committing ground forces.
  2. GRAU Trigger: The comprehensive nature of the current UAV operations (Southern port infrastructure + Deep Central AD fixation) suggests all preconditions for the GRAU mass fire initiation are nearing completion. The window for the ground offensive trigger is now defined by the time required for C2 confirmation that the Southern logistics nodes are adequately suppressed.
  3. Command and Control (C2) Effectiveness: RF C2 is demonstrating highly effective multi-domain synchronization, using the UAV swarm to fix AD while simultaneously achieving specific kinetic and BDA objectives in the deep rear, reinforcing the HIGH confidence of a coordinated large-scale ground offensive trigger.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense is demonstrating high responsiveness via timely public alerts (Air Force warnings, 04:10Z-04:37Z), but is increasingly dispersed across vast geographic areas (Odesa, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia). The critical tactical decision point is now whether to pull AD assets from the Central/Southern axes to reinforce the East against the imminent GRAU threat, despite the ongoing deep strike risk. Focus remains on surviving the deep strike phase and maintaining preparedness for the ground assault.

Information environment / disinformation

RF IO activities are highly active across multiple vectors:

  1. Strategic Ambiguity (TASS): Propagation of an attributed statement from former US President Trump regarding a "free economic zone" in Donbas (04:20:41). This narrative is UNCONFIRMED (LOW confidence) but aims to signal potential future policy shifts in the West, influencing decision-makers and creating domestic doubt within Ukraine about long-term Western support.
  2. Dehumanization/Coalition Undermining (TASS): The claim by ex-SBU employee Prozorov that Polish and Georgian citizens comprise the majority of mercenary casualties (04:34:02) is a standard RF information operation designed to:
    • Exaggerate reliance on foreign fighters.
    • Sow discord between Kyiv and its key European partners (Poland, Georgia).
  3. Counter-UAF Deep Strikes (RF MoD/TASS): The high claim of 41 intercepted UAF UAVs (04:34:55) aims to mitigate the psychological and material impact of successful Ukrainian kinetic operations deep within RF territory.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook remains dominated by the transition to the decisive phase of the RF offensive.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Immediate Coordinated Assault (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF Command confirms adequate AD suppression and BDA on Odesa/Danube logistics nodes (projected completion NLT 0600Z). The 260th GRAU preparatory fire will commence immediately thereafter (NLT 0700Z), followed by synchronized ground thrusts on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Strategic Isolation Strike (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Following the kinetic strikes on Odesa port access (Chornomorske/Hryhorivka, 04:36Z), RF launches follow-on precision missile strikes (Iskander/Caliber) specifically targeting the identified Danube (Vylkove/Tatarbunary) logistics infrastructure. This would achieve near-total operational isolation of the Southern Operational Command from sea resupply simultaneously with the ground assault in the East, severely limiting UAF ability to sustain protracted high-intensity fighting.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence Assessment
P1 (CRITICAL)Real-time confirmation of the 260th GRAU preparatory fire initiation status.CRITICAL SIGINT/ELINT monitoring (24/7) for mass artillery ignition signatures on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka line.HIGH
P2 (CRITICAL)Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on newly targeted port/logistics nodes (Chornomorske/Hryhorivka, Vylkove/Tatarbunary).IMINT/Ground Recon/Local Police reporting to assess damage to grain terminals, port access, and Danube river logistics.HIGH
P3 (URGENT)Status and engagement success rate of UAF AD against the deep penetration vector into Vinnytsia (Bershad vector, 04:37Z).UAF AD reporting/AWACS to confirm neutralization rate and expenditure of AD munitions.MEDIUM
P4 (UPDATE)Confirmation of specific target selection (military vs. civilian infrastructure) in the Odesa/Mykolaiv strikes.Ground Recon/Local Source reporting to confirm if critical rail, energy, or C2 nodes were struck, vs. general urban infrastructure.MEDIUM

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

  1. PRIORITY C2/MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): GROUND DEFENSE IMMINENT.
    • Action A (CRITICAL): Assume GRAU initiation NLT 0700Z. All maneuver units must be in hardened defensive positions or dispersed immediately.
    • Action B: Re-verify pre-planned counter-battery fire (CBF) targets for RF artillery concentrations. Ensure long-range fires (HIMARS/ATACMS equivalent) are pre-loaded and prepared to strike RF staging areas behind the primary assault axis upon initiation of the ground thrust.
  2. LOGISTICS & AD (J4/OC SOUTH): MITIGATE BLACK SEA ISOLATION.
    • Action A: Immediately activate damage control teams and implement alternative shipping/rail routes in the Odesa region. Prioritize BDA (P2 CRITICAL) to determine functionality of Chornomorske port facilities and Vylkove/Tatarbunary river hubs.
    • Action B: If any mobile AD assets remain in the Vinnytsia/Central AO, they must prioritize interception of the deep penetration UAVs to protect rear-area logistics and national C2 nodes.
  3. STRATCOM (J7/MFA): COUNTER FOREIGN LEGION NARRATIVE.
    • Action A: Rapidly issue a coordinated statement with Polish and Georgian diplomatic missions, flatly refuting the TASS casualty claims (04:34Z). Highlight the professionalism and integration of all foreign volunteers and confirm adherence to international law regarding combatant status.
Previous (2025-12-13 04:09:06Z)

We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.

Learn more in our Privacy Policy.