Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 04:08Z, Dec 13, 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Confirmed Kinetic Strikes (Odesa/Mykolaiv): Confirmed explosions have occurred in both Odesa (03:42:47, RBK-Ukraine, HIGH) and Mykolaiv (04:00:14, RBK-Ukraine/Mayor Senkevych, HIGH), indicating the RF UAV saturation operation achieved kinetic success against critical urban centers and potentially logistics nodes.
• Central UAV Trajectory Refined: The broad central UAV groups previously observed are continuing a defined southwest trajectory (03:56:16, Air Force, HIGH), with specific activity confirmed over Cherkasy (03:51:06, Air Force, HIGH) and Poltava Oblast (Myrhorod, Khorol axis). This sustains pressure on UAF central AD reserves.
• Northeast Tactical Aviation Activation: RF tactical aviation (TacAir) is actively operating in the Northeastern sector (04:01:31, Air Force, HIGH), posing a potential threat of Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) deployment or heightened reconnaissance against UAF forward positions and C2 in the Sumy/Kharkiv operational zone.
• GRAU Initiation Window Tightening: The critical 0300Z-0600Z window for the 260th GRAU preparatory fire remains active. The confirmed culmination of the deep strike campaign (04:00Z) suggests a high probability of initiation within the next two hours, following RF deep strike Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
• RF Staging near Huliaipole: RF sources displayed imagery of a specialized "Guliai-Gorod" (armored staging/fortification) near the front line (04:03:01, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM), indicating potential heavy vehicle concentration or defensive hardening on the Zaporizhzhia axis.
• RF Information Operation (Lyman): RF state media claims UAF military casualties near Lyman due to hypothermia (03:41:25, TASS, LOW). This is an UNCONFIRMED narrative aimed at portraying UAF forces as poorly equipped and demoralized.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv)

Status: SUCCESSFUL KINETIC PENETRATION / CRITICAL LOGISTICS THREAT

RF forces have successfully penetrated UAF local AD in two key port cities. Confirmed explosions in Mykolaiv and Odesa (04:00Z) necessitate immediate BDA to determine the status of high-value infrastructure (port facilities, rail connections, energy grids). The threat is sustained, with UAVs still approaching Mykolaiv from the North (03:39:29).

Central Axis (Cherkasy/Poltava)

Status: CONTINUED FIXING OPERATIONS

RF forces are maintaining AD fragmentation pressure. The identified UAV trajectory toward the southwest from Poltava (03:56:16) and direct engagement near Cherkasy (03:51:06) confirms the RF intent to fix mobile AD units far from the critical Eastern ground theater and the Southern logistics hubs.

Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Lyman/Zaporizhzhia)

Status: WATCH STATE (GRAU IMMINENT) / FLANK POSTURING

The operational tempo is currently defined by the anticipation of the mass artillery barrage (260th GRAU). The delay past the initial 0300Z estimate aligns with the completion of the deep strike phase. In the Lyman sector, RF IO is attempting to degrade UAF morale via unconfirmed claims (03:41:25). The potential staging of "Guliai-Gorod" (04:03:01) near the Zaporizhzhia front (Huliaipole area) suggests RF may be preparing for either a local limited offensive or, more likely, hardening their positions against anticipated UAF counter-fire or counter-attacks on the flanks of the main Donetsk thrust.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Ground Offensive Trigger Imminent)

1. Synchronization Culmination: The successful kinetic strikes on Odesa and Mykolaiv (04:00Z) confirm RF C2 has achieved the necessary prerequisite (AD degradation/fixation) to proceed with the primary Eastern ground offensive.
2. Air Domain Expansion (Northeast): The activation of RF TacAir in the Northeast (04:01:31) introduces a secondary, potentially highly dangerous air threat vector, likely involving precision-guided glide bombs (KABs) against UAF operational reserves or concentration areas north of the Donbas front.
3. Enemy Courses of Action (COA) Confirmation: The current UAV actions (strikes and fixing maneuvers) confirm the MLCOA outlined in the previous report: maximizing AD fragmentation followed by mass fire.
4. Logistics Hardening: The imagery of the "Guliai-Gorod" armored staging suggests RF is ensuring its local logistical staging points are hardened ahead of initiating the offensive, reinforcing the belief (0.041075) of troop concentration near Huliaipole.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense forces are maximally committed, facing confirmed kinetic success in Odesa and Mykolaiv. Immediate focus must be on BDA to rapidly reroute logistics if key junctions were hit. UAF C2 must now shift all focus to surviving the imminent GRAU barrage and neutralizing the new TacAir threat in the Northeast, potentially diverting AD assets that were fixing the central UAV threat.

Information environment / disinformation

RF continues its multi-vector IO campaign:

1. Hypothermia Narrative (Tactical IO): The UNCONFIRMED claim of UAF deaths due to hypothermia near Lyman (03:41:25) is a classic demoralization tactic aimed at undermining UAF confidence in logistical support.
2. Diplomatic Distraction (Strategic IO): High-level commentary focusing on the perceived injustice of Latvia’s expulsion of Russian citizens (04:05:18) attempts to shift global dialogue toward human rights violations by NATO states, distracting from the ongoing large-scale kinetic operation against Ukrainian infrastructure.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The next six hours represent the transition from the preparatory deep strike phase to the initiation of the decisive ground assault in Donetsk.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Immediate GRAU Initiation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF Command, having achieved kinetic success in the South (Odesa/Mykolaiv strikes) and confirmed AD saturation, will initiate the 260th GRAU preparatory fire against the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis before the end of the 0300Z-0600Z window (projected NLT 0600Z). This fire will cover the initial mechanized thrusts towards Kramatorsk.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Coordinated Air/Artillery Strike (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The newly detected RF TacAir activity in the Northeast (04:01:31) is a precursor to a coordinated strike. RF launches a high-density KAB/missile strike against UAF C2 centers or major logistics hubs in the Kharkiv/Sumy operational zone, simultaneous with the GRAU initiation in Donetsk. This would attempt to achieve regional C2 paralysis, preventing effective resource movement to counter the main thrust in the East.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC NORTHEAST/EAST): MITIGATE TACAIR THREAT.
   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately increase AD readiness (SAM/MANPADS) and electronic surveillance in the Northeastern Operational Zone (Kharkiv/Sumy) to intercept the newly detected TacAir activity and mitigate potential KAB strikes (04:01:31).
   • Action B: Re-prioritize remaining mobile AD assets following BDA of Odesa/Mykolaiv strikes. If logistics nodes are functional, assets previously covering them should be considered for rapid redeployment eastward, anticipating the imminent ground assault.
2. C2/MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): INITIATE COUNTER-GRAU PROTOCOLS.
   • Action A: Based on the current MLCOA (GRAU initiation NLT 0600Z), maneuver forces must finalize dispersal and hardening procedures immediately. All vehicles should be sheltered or dispersed, and personnel in trenches/bunkers.
   • Action B: Pre-planned counter-battery fire (CBF) assets must be placed on hair-trigger alert (P1 CRITICAL) to engage RF gun positions immediately upon detecting mass ignition signatures, maximizing attrition before the preparatory fire can be completed.
3. STRATCOM (MFA/J7): COUNTER DEHUMANIZATION NARRATIVES.
   • Action A: Rapidly deploy media assets to the Lyman sector to debunk the TASS hypothermia claims (03:41:25) with documented evidence of UAF troop welfare and winter gear, turning the narrative against RF disinformation.