Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 03:08Z, Dec 13, 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• RF Targeting Shift (Critical Infrastructure): UAV groups previously assessed on a trajectory toward the Yuzhnoukrainsk (SUNPP) critical zone have been confirmed diverting southwest into Northwestern Mykolaiv Oblast, explicitly setting course for the Odesa region (02:42:43, Air Force, HIGH).
• Odesa Zone Under Immediate Threat: UAV activity is confirmed targeting the Bilyaivka/Mayaky axis in Odesa Oblast (02:57:14), indicating a high probability of strikes against western Odesa infrastructure, potentially targeting bridges, maritime logistics, or communications relays.
• Sustained Central Pressure: Persistent UAV saturation is confirmed around Kropyvnytskyi (Kirovohrad region), maintaining pressure on Central UAF Air Defense resources (02:40:06, 02:54:54, Air Force, HIGH).
• Intensified Diplomatic Signaling: Concurrently with the kinetic pressure, former US President Trump stated that "significant progress" had been achieved regarding peace in Ukraine, reinforcing the RF strategy of maximizing battlefield leverage simultaneous with diplomatic efforts (02:53:15, RBK-Ukraine, HIGH).
• Zaporizhzhia Alert: A high-level air alert was issued for Zaporizhzhia Oblast (03:05:20), indicating new kinetic threats (missile, UAV, or mass artillery) possibly related to preparatory fire for the Eastern ground assault.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Mykolaiv/Odesa/Kirovohrad)

Status: HIGH KINETIC PRESSURE / TARGETING SHIFT

The immediate, high-priority threat to the Yuzhnoukrainsk Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP) identified in the previous sitrep has temporarily subsided as tracked UAV groups diverted SW toward Odesa (02:42:43). This shift suggests a possible tactical decision by RF C2 to prioritize disruption of key UAF logistics/export hubs (Odesa ports/rail) over the high strategic risk associated with the SUNPP. New targeting vectors confirm UAV ingress toward Bilyaivka/Mayaky (02:57:14), key areas for Odesa's communications and coastal access. Persistent UAV activity continues in Kropyvnytskyi (02:40:06).

Central Axis (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk)

Status: SUSTAINED FIXING OPERATIONS

RF continues its campaign to fix UAF AD resources, demonstrated by repeated confirmed activity in Kropyvnytskyi. This maintains the conditions necessary for the potential initiation of the Eastern ground operation without major AD interference.

Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia)

Status: WATCH STATE (PREPARATORY PHASE CULMINATION)

The high alert issued for Zaporizhzhia (03:05:20) is noted. While the nature of the threat is unconfirmed, this activity occurs within the projected window (0300Z-0600Z) for the initiation of the 260th GRAU preparatory barrage against the SKDH (Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub). No direct confirmation of mass artillery ignition has been received in the new reporting cycle. The focus remains on the expected RF pincer maneuver from Siversk and Pokrovsk.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Ground Assault Imminent / Deep Strike Fragmentation)

1. Targeting Adaptation: RF forces successfully employed the SUNPP threat as an immediate information/kinetic coercion tactic, but appear to have opted for the less escalatory but strategically significant targeting of Odesa infrastructure (02:42:43, 02:57:14). This diversion forces UAF C2 to redeploy AD assets away from the Central/Eastern theaters to protect maritime and logistics nodes.
2. Kinetic Synchronization: The multi-vector UAV saturation is designed to fragment UAF AD resources across multiple operational commands (OC South, OC Center) precisely when the prerequisite conditions for the major ground assault in OC East (SKDH) are culminating.
3. Logistics Threat (CRITICAL): Targeting Bilyaivka/Mayaky places pressure on critical logistical supply lines and potentially disrupts Black Sea export capacity following the strike on the Turkish vessel identified in the previous daily report.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense forces remain heavily engaged against widespread UAV activity across the Central and Southern sectors. UAF C2 successfully managed the immediate SUNPP threat (no confirmed strike damage or breach of the protective perimeter), but now must rapidly reallocate mobile AD assets to cover the new priority target matrix (Odesa/Mykolaiv infrastructure). UAF forces in the East must maintain maximum readiness for the projected GRAU barrage (previous sitrep P1).

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment is now characterized by Simultaneous Kinetic Coercion and Diplomatic Overdrive. Trump’s statement regarding "significant progress" (02:53:15) directly supports the broader RF IO campaign aiming to portray Ukraine as under existential military pressure, thereby establishing a maximalist negotiating posture ahead of the Berlin meetings (Previous Sitrep). The primary RF narrative aims to force Ukraine into accepting unfavorable conditions under the guise of "peace progress" facilitated by external partners, while RF forces attempt to achieve irreversible operational gains in the East.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook is defined by the expected culmination of the RF deep strike campaign and the initiation of the decisive ground operation in Donetsk.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU INITIATION UNDER ODESA DIVERSION (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces will complete the existing UAV wave, maximizing the disruption to Odesa and surrounding logistical nodes (02:57:14). Immediately following the current wave's impact, the 260th GRAU preparatory fire will commence against the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis (projected 0300Z-0600Z). This fragmentation tactic aims to ensure local air superiority for tactical air support (KABs) and mechanized thrusts targeting the SKDH.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

OVERSATURATION AND OPERATIONAL BREAKTHROUGH (CRITICAL IMPACT, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The combined deep strike pressure on Poltava, Kropyvnytskyi, and Odesa successfully draws sufficient UAF AD density away from the Eastern operational theater, permitting unmitigated RF tactical air support over the SKDH. Under cover of the massive GRAU barrage (if initiated successfully), RF mechanized units achieve a rapid, deep penetration (5-10 km) on the Konstantinovka axis, leading to the early collapse of key UAF forward defenses before reinforcement can arrive.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC SOUTH): DEFEND ODESA INFRASTRUCTURE.
   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately divert previously allocated SUNPP AD reserves (P4, previous sitrep) to establish a high-density protective zone over the Odesa Bilyaivka/Mayaky axis and critical infrastructure associated with maritime logistics and communications (02:57:14).
2. C2/MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): IMPLEMENT GRAU IMMINENT STRIKE PROTOCOLS.
   • Action A: The 0300Z-0600Z window is active. All forward C2 elements and maneuver units on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis are to immediately implement pre-planned dispersion, hardening, and communication redundancy measures in anticipation of mass artillery ignition (P1 CRITICAL).
3. STRATCOM/DIPLOMACY (MFA): COUNTER DIPLOMATIC COERCION.
   • Action A: Prepare public and diplomatic responses to neutralize the impact of Trump’s "progress" statement (02:53:15). Emphasize that RF continues escalating kinetic actions (Odesa targeting) simultaneously with diplomatic signaling, demonstrating bad faith and forcing a narrative of RF seeking terms of surrender, not peace.