Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Threat to Nuclear Infrastructure: A new, high-priority UAV vector has been confirmed moving from Kirovohrad region toward/past Yuzhnoukrainsk (Pivdennoukrainsk), signaling RF intent to target critical nuclear or associated power grid infrastructure in the Southern sector (02:25:36, Air Force, HIGH).
• Sustained Multi-Layer UAV Pressure Confirmed: Mykolaiv Oblast Head Kim explicitly warned of the anticipation of an additional strike wave against infrastructure, confirming RF intent to prolong the current kinetic saturation period (02:17:22, Operatyvny ZSU, HIGH).
• Expanded Central Targeting: UAV activity has been confirmed targeting Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk region), extending RF deep strike focus eastward from Poltava toward Dnipro industrial capacity (02:08:45, Air Force, MEDIUM).
• Imminent Diplomatic Maneuvering: Multiple sources corroborate that a US/RF-linked envoy (Witkoff) will meet Ukrainian and European leaders in Berlin this weekend to discuss conflict resolution, signaling high-level diplomatic pressure simultaneous with kinetic peaks (02:11:08, 02:32:05, Operatyvny ZSU/RBC, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

Central Axis (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk)

Status: HIGH KINETIC PRESSURE / EXPANDING TARGET LIST

RF UAV operations remain concentrated on fixing UAF Air Defense resources around Poltava, with continued movements confirmed toward Myrhorod/Romodan from the north (02:27:20). Concurrently, the enemy has expanded its targeting matrix, now confirming UAV ingress toward Kamianske (02:08:45). This pattern suggests RF C2 is attempting to hit multiple secondary logistical and industrial nodes across the central theater while primary AD attention is fixed on high-value targets (Myrhorod AFB).

Southern Axis (Mykolaiv/Kirovohrad)

Status: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREAT

The most significant immediate threat is the UAV trajectory confirmed toward Yuzhnoukrainsk (02:25:36). This places the Southern Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP) complex and its associated energy infrastructure under immediate threat. This targeting choice is assessed as highly escalatory and designed to achieve strategic effects beyond mere kinetic damage. UAF AD systems in OC South are required to immediately prioritize the defense of this zone.

Eastern Axis (Donetsk/SKDH)

Status: WATCH STATE (PREPARATORY PHASE)

No new kinetic activity or changes in disposition have been confirmed since the previous reporting of RF tactical air activity (02:02Z, previous sitrep). The overall operational assessment remains Critical: RF forces are likely executing preparatory steps designed to optimize conditions for the imminent 260th GRAU barrage. The nationwide UAV saturation is assessed as a tactic designed to distract UAF C2 and fragment AD coverage away from the primary assault axis.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Simultaneous Strategic Targeting and Ground Assault Preparation)

1. Strategic Targeting Intent: The confirmed UAV trajectory toward Yuzhnoukrainsk elevates the threat from conventional deep strikes to high-risk strategic coercion. Targeting a nuclear facility is designed to induce panic, force UAF resource diversion, and provoke immediate international diplomatic outcry (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
2. Kinetic Synchronization: The confirmed anticipation of another wave of UAV attacks (02:17:22) suggests RF C2 is executing a phased kinetic operation intended to maintain continuous pressure until either AD resources are depleted, or the optimal timing for the 260th GRAU initiation is reached.
3. Information-Kinetic Fusion: RF is strategically timing maximum kinetic pressure with the initiation of high-level diplomatic efforts (Witkoff mediation), aiming to impose conditions for negotiation favorable to Moscow by demonstrating operational dominance (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense forces are engaged across multiple theaters against persistent UAV swarms (02:08Z, 02:25Z, 02:27Z). UAF C2 faces a critical dilemma regarding resource allocation: diverting assets to protect the SUNPP (P2 CRITICAL) may compromise AD density required to mitigate the projected tactical air/GRAU fusion strike on the SKDH (P1 CRITICAL). Immediate, decisive synchronization of SHORAD and mobile AD resources is required.

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment is now dominated by the intersection of military action and high-level diplomatic signaling. The confirmation of the Witkoff meetings (02:11:08, 02:32:05) suggests Moscow is attempting to define the negotiation framework while maximizing battlefield leverage. This narrative is supported by RF state media shifting focus to positive domestic themes (02:28:06), portraying an image of stable internal governance while external pressure mounts. The underlying RF IO campaign against UAF political unity remains active (Previous Sitrep: Azarov targeting Zelenskyy).

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook is dominated by the expectation of the strategic kinetic culmination point, likely preceding the decisive ground operation in the East.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU INITIATION UNDER AD SUPPRESSION (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces will launch the confirmed secondary wave of UAV strikes to saturate AD in the Central/Southern theaters, distracting resources away from the East. Simultaneously, the 260th GRAU preparatory fire will commence (projected 0300Z-0600Z) against the SKDH, immediately followed by the initiation of ground assault operations designed to exploit the breach on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

SUNPP ATTACK AND STRATEGIC ESCALATION (CRITICAL IMPACT, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF achieves a successful, damaging strike against the Yuzhnoukrainsk Nuclear Power Plant complex (02:25:36), causing substantial international panic and diverting international diplomatic focus away from the Eastern ground assault. This facilitates a rapid, decisive penetration of the SKDH by RF mechanized forces, supported by unconstrained tactical air cover (KABs), leading to the operational isolation of Kramatorsk/Slovyansk.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC SOUTH): DEFEND NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE.
   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately divert all available mobile AD assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, ManPADS teams) to establish a high-density protective zone over the Yuzhnoukrainsk (SUNPP) complex. Authorize proactive, aggressive engagement based on confirmed trajectory tracking (02:25:36).
2. C2/MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): MAINTAIN GRAU IMMEDIATE REACTION POSTURE.
   • Action A: Despite the critical AD pressure in OC South/Center, forward C2 in the SKDH must maintain maximum readiness. Implement pre-planned decentralized movement and dispersion protocols to execute immediately upon confirmation of mass artillery ignition (P1 CRITICAL).
3. STRATCOM/DIPLOMACY (MFA): LEVERAGE SUNPP THREAT.
   • Action A: Prepare public and diplomatic briefs outlining the specific threat against the SUNPP complex utilizing the confirmed UAV vectors (02:25:36). Engage the IAEA, G7, and negotiating partners (Berlin) to preemptively frame RF actions as deliberate strategic escalation, increasing diplomatic costs simultaneous with the kinetic peak.