Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Targeted Poltava UAV Convergence: RF forces have shifted the focus of Central Axis UAV operations, with confirmed groups approaching Poltava from the north and northwest (Kharkiv/Sumy vector) (01:52Z, 02:00Z, Air Force, HIGH). This suggests high-priority targeting against regional infrastructure or the Myrhorod airbase complex.
• Tactical Air Activity in the East: Enemy tactical aviation activity has been confirmed in the Eastern operational theater (02:02Z, Air Force, HIGH). This introduces a new kinetic threat element, likely preparatory for Close Air Support (CAS) or the use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) against the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub (SKDH).
• Sustained UAV Pressure: General confirmation of widespread "moped" (Shahed/Gerbera) activity indicates RF intent to maintain nationwide kinetic pressure despite the MiG-31K stand-down (01:40Z, Ванёк, HIGH).
• Disinformation Targeting Leadership: RF state media (TASS) launched a new Information Operation (IO), utilizing former Ukrainian official Nikolai Azarov to criticize President Zelenskyy regarding territorial referendums, aiming to undermine domestic unity (02:05Z, TASS, HIGH - as a confirmed IO effort).

Operational picture (by sector)

Donetsk Axis (SKDH)

Status: CRITICAL / PREPARATORY FIRE IMMINENT

The confirmation of RF tactical aviation activity (02:02Z) increases the immediate kinetic threat level in this sector. This air presence is likely intended to suppress UAF observation posts, anti-tank positions, and C2 nodes immediately preceding the expected initiation of the 260th GRAU barrage. UAF ground forces must immediately integrate low-altitude air defense and electronic countermeasures against tactical aircraft. The operational window for maximum readiness remains open but is rapidly closing.

Southern Axis (Mykolaiv/Odesa)

Status: FOCUSED RECONNAISSANCE

Low-level UAV reconnaissance over Mykolaiv (Raketnu Roshchu/Solyani) continues (based on the previous report, no new data received post-01:40Z). The threat remains centered on localized intelligence gathering for subsequent precision strikes against forward logistical or staging areas.

Central Axis (Poltava/Cherkasy)

Status: PRIORITY TARGETING

The multi-vector convergence of UAVs onto Poltava (01:52Z, 02:00Z) indicates a clear targeting shift. RF is prioritizing the neutralization or fixation of UAF AD assets protecting this strategic zone. Key targets likely include the Myrhorod Air Force Base, major rail infrastructure, or central logistical depots, vital for reinforcing the Eastern front. (DS Belief: Recon/Strike in Poltava 0.034).

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: HIGH (Impending Ground Assault Support and AD Fixation)

1. Integrated Assault Precursor: RF forces are actively utilizing tactical aviation in the East (02:02Z) to fix UAF attention and degrade forward defenses. This is assessed as the initial kinetic phase of the highly anticipated SKDH assault, designed to maximize the impact of the pending artillery barrage.
2. AD Resource Dispersion: The concentrated UAV attack vectors targeting Poltava are assessed as an effort to force UAF Air Defense Command to disperse resources away from the primary assault axes or the Southern maritime hubs, achieving local air superiority for reconnaissance and future deep strikes.
3. Synchronization Status: The critical intelligence gap remains the initiation status of the 260th GRAU. The introduction of tactical air activity suggests RF C2 is executing pre-planned assault steps, even if the artillery component is slightly delayed.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF command must prioritize real-time AD synchronization between OC East and OC Center. Mobile air defense units are required to aggressively counter the new Poltava vector, while ground forces in the East must employ passive measures (cover, concealment, dispersion) immediately in response to the tactical air activity.

Information environment / disinformation

The RF IO machine is actively working to undermine political stability (02:05Z). The use of former PM Azarov to question the legitimacy of President Zelenskyy’s territorial policies aims to sow discord regarding war aims and diplomatic strategy ahead of anticipated international meetings. This narrative supports the broader RF goal of positioning Ukraine as politically fractured and incapable of unified negotiation.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook is dominated by the expectation of maximal RF kinetic intensity supporting the SKDH breach attempt.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

SKDH Assault under Tactical Air and Delayed Artillery Suppression (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will sustain and potentially increase tactical air operations (CAS/KAB) over the Donetsk Axis until the 260th GRAU barrage is initiated (projected 0300Z-0600Z). This combination is designed to achieve a rapid, highly destructive effect, enabling mechanized forces to exploit weaknesses on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka line.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

CONVERGED DEEP STRIKE (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, CRITICAL IMPACT): RF launches a sophisticated, coordinated deep strike utilizing newly acquired Poltava reconnaissance (01:52Z, 02:00Z) against the Myrhorod AF Base and Dnieper logistical/hydro-electric infrastructure. The objective is to simultaneously cripple UAF aviation capabilities and critical supply flow, forcing a strategic defensive shift away from the threatened Eastern front.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC EAST): COUNTER-TAC AIR INTEGRATION.
   • Action A (CRITICAL): Elevate immediate AD readiness and establish rapid reporting links to identify and engage RF tactical aviation entering the Eastern theater. Prioritize SHORAD and ManPADS coverage for identified tactical CAS ingress/egress routes.
2. COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE (J3/OC CENTER): DENY POLTAVA TARGETING.
   • Action A: Immediately divert mobile EW and SHORAD assets to the northern and northwestern approaches to Poltava (01:52Z, 02:00Z vectors). Aggressively jam and neutralize the converging UAV groups to deny the RF target verification data required for subsequent precision missile strikes.
3. MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): MITIGATE AIR/ARTILLERY FUSION.
   • Action A: All forward units on the SKDH must immediately maximize dispersion and utilize all available hard cover against expected CAS munitions (KAB) and heavy artillery fire. Implement decentralized, pre-planned movement protocols to shift out of known target areas immediately upon GRAU initiation.