Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• MiG-31K Stand Down: The high-threat MiG-31K alert, sustaining nationwide stress, was canceled (01:23Z, Ванёк/РБК, HIGH). This temporarily removes the immediate threat of Kh-47M2 Kinzhal strikes and reduces C2 fatigue.
• Sustained Central UAV Targeting: RF forces immediately shifted UAV vectors along the Central Axis, tracking assets over the Kremenchuk Reservoir toward Lysianka and Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi (01:35Z, Air Force, HIGH). This maintains pressure on UAF AD in Central Ukraine.
• Mykolaiv Reconnaissance Confirmed: Low-level UAV activity continues over Mykolaiv, tracking specific intra-city terrain (Raketnu Roshchu toward Solyani) (01:16Z, Ванёк, HIGH), confirming RF intent to acquire granular targeting data on potential operational staging areas or logistics hubs.
• GRAU Barrage Status: The critical synchronization window for the 260th GRAU preparatory fire remains uninitiated past 0100Z, suggesting a continued delay or a change in RF attack synchronization planning now that the deep kinetic distraction has ceased.

Operational picture (by sector)

Donetsk Axis (SKDH)

Status: CRITICAL / HOLDING PHASE

The operational pause created by the delay of the 260th GRAU and the cessation of the MiG-31K orbit provides a brief, critical window for UAF forces. RF has failed to achieve the planned simultaneous deep strike and preparatory fire synchronization. Forces on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka line must maintain P-1 readiness, utilizing this unexpected lull to perform final readiness checks and reinforce field defenses before the expected revised GRAU initiation.

Southern Axis (Mykolaiv/Odesa)

Status: FOCUSED RECONNAISSANCE

RF continues low-level UAV operations (Shahed/Gerbera/Delta types) over Mykolaiv. The specific urban transit vectors (Raketnu Roshchu towards Solyani) suggest target acquisition for subsequent precision strikes against forward operational staging areas, logistical depots, or specialized UAF units in the vicinity of the Inhul River crossings. The immediate high-speed missile threat (Kinzhal) is mitigated, but the localized drone threat is high.

Central Axis (Cherkasy/Poltava)

Status: ASSET FIXATION AND DIVERGENCE

RF maintains pressure on key Dnieper crossings and aviation infrastructure. The new UAV vectors targeting the Kremenchuk Reservoir and Lysianka reinforce the assessment that RF is forcing UAF AD resource dispersion along a north-south line to prevent reinforcement or supply flow towards the Eastern front. Myrhorod remains under surveillance.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: HIGH (Re-synchronization Phase)

1. Strategic Decoupling (RF C2): The immediate cessation of the continuous MiG-31K orbit (01:23Z), despite the lack of GRAU initiation, suggests a failure in RF synchronization efforts. The RF command is now likely adjusting the time-on-target for the SKDH ground assault.
2. Reconnaissance Priority: RF is utilizing the kinetic lull to maximize real-time UAV intelligence acquisition over critical UAF rear areas (Mykolaiv, Cherkasy). This high-value reconnaissance precedes the next wave of coordinated strikes.
3. MLCOA Synchronization Shift: The primary threat remains the initiation of the 260th GRAU barrage. The operational pause merely shifts the expected initiation window later, likely aimed at catching UAF forces during a perceived relaxation of high alert status.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense forces demonstrated resilience against the simultaneous, multi-domain attack profile. The immediate priority is leveraging the MiG-31K stand-down to conduct rapid AD asset resupply and re-positioning, especially in the Central Command, and maximizing the combat readiness of SKDH ground forces.

Information environment / disinformation

External RF IO messaging focused on an alleged US maritime interdiction operation (01:11Z, ТАСС, LOW confidence in direct relevance to UA). This suggests RF is attempting to maintain an external narrative of Western aggression, possibly to deflect attention from domestic issues or to set conditions for future maritime escalation in the Black Sea theater.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook centers on the expected RF re-synchronization of the SKDH preparatory fire. The UAF must anticipate a renewed, intense kinetic effort post-0300Z.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

SKDH Assault under Delayed, Maximal Suppression (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF operational C2 will attempt to re-synchronize the 260th GRAU barrage, now projected to initiate between 0300Z and 0600Z. This saturation fire will be followed by a mechanized exploitation attack aiming for a breakthrough on the Pokrovsk/Konstantinovka axis NLT 1200Z.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

FEINT AND SHIFT (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, CRITICAL IMPACT): If logistics delay the GRAU barrage significantly beyond 0600Z, RF shifts the main effort focus, utilizing the acquired reconnaissance data (Mykolaiv/Cherkasy) for a major, decisive deep strike against a critical infrastructure asset (e.g., Kaniv HPP or rail/logistics hub), designed to induce strategic panic and force UAF operational reserves to the rear, away from the collapsing SKDH line.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY MANEUVER (J3/OC EAST): OPTIMIZE LULL UTILIZATION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): UAF forces must exploit the current lull (0130Z - 0300Z) to conduct immediate final dispersion, position counter-battery systems for maximum effectiveness, and ensure all decentralized fire control protocols are confirmed operational.
   • Action B: Utilize the AD reprieve to conduct secure, rapid repositioning of forward logistical caches that may have been identified or targeted by earlier Kinzhal strikes.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC SOUTH/CENTER): IMMEDIATE UAV INTERDICTION.

   • Action A: Deploy immediate, aggressive, mobile Counter-UAV patrols (utilizing SHORAD and EW systems) specifically to deny RF the acquisition of terminal guidance data in the Mykolaiv target zones (Raketnu Roshchu, Solyani). Do not allow repeat reconnaissance runs.
   • Action B: Reinforce EW capabilities protecting the Kremenchuk Reservoir/Dnieper line to degrade the newly tracked south-southwest UAV groups before they reach sensitive logistics or hydro infrastructure near Lysianka.