Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Sustained High-Threat Status: RF forces executed a second immediate re-launch of MiG-31K aircraft (00:58Z, Air Force/Ванёк, HIGH), enforcing continuous nationwide high-speed missile alert status and maximizing UAF Air Defense/C2 fatigue.
• Kinzhal Strike Effects: Explosions were confirmed in Kropyvnytskyi (00:45Z, РБК-Україна, HIGH), corroborating previous targeting vectors toward C2/logistics nodes. Localized claims of widespread Kinzhal intercepts/misses were reported but remain UNCONFIRMED (00:38Z, Ванёк, LOW).
• Expanded UAV Offensive: The RF significantly broadened its UAV targeting, confirming groups aimed at Myrhorod (Poltava Oblast), Kaniv (Cherkasy Oblast), and a maritime vector targeting Chornomorsk/Odesa (00:38Z - 01:04Z, Air Force, HIGH). This indicates aggressive targeting of deep Central and Southern strategic infrastructure.
• Mykolaiv UAV Activity: Low-flying UAVs were tracked over Mykolaiv city, vectoring toward Trykhaty (00:46Z - 00:54Z, Ванёк, MEDIUM), suggesting reconnaissance against forward operational reserves or logistics nodes near the Inhul river line.
• GRAU Barrage Window Opened: The previously assessed critical window for the initiation of the 260th GRAU preparatory fire (NLT 0100Z) has been reached without confirmed ignition. This delay increases uncertainty regarding the ground assault timeline.

Operational picture (by sector)

Donetsk Axis (SKDH)

Status: CRITICAL / PREPARATORY PHASE

The anticipated tactical synchronization (Deep Strike + Artillery Barrage) has been partially realized by the continuing deep strike effort, but the most critical component—the 260th GRAU saturation fire—is delayed past the estimated NLT time of 0100Z. This delay may indicate logistical friction or intentional operational hold to maximize C2 fatigue before the ground push. UAF forces in the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka sector must maintain maximum readiness (P-1) for immediate counter-battery execution.

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv/Central)

Status: KINETIC SATURATION

The Southern Operational Command continues to absorb high-tempo, multi-layered attacks (Kinzhal, maritime and northern UAV vectors). The confirmed targeting of Kropyvnytskyi, coupled with the new precedent of Kinzhal use against Odesa Oblast, reinforces the assessment that RF is prioritizing the neutralization of deep rear logistics and Western reinforcement corridors. The UAV detection near Trykhaty suggests RF is also seeking granular targeting information on forward UAF tactical staging areas.

Central Axis (Poltava/Cherkasy)

Status: HIGH THREAT / ASSET FIXATION

The targeting of Myrhorod and Kaniv (a key Dnieper crossing and potential hydro-electric facility) demonstrates an RF strategy to force the dispersion of scarce UAF AD assets away from the Eastern operational theater, compounding resource constraints against the primary SKDH threat.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: EXTREME (Delayed Synchronization, Sustained Kinetic Effort)

1. C2 Fatigue Strategy: The continuous MiG-31K presence signals an aggressive intent to sustain cognitive pressure and exhaust UAF Air Defense crews, aiming to ensure reduced efficacy during the critical phase of the SKDH ground assault.
2. UAV/Kinetic Targeting Shift: RF is effectively utilizing combined Kinzhal and UAV strikes to expand its target geography (Mykolaiv forward zones, Central infrastructure like Kaniv). This adaptation requires a highly decentralized and responsive UAF AD response.
3. Imminent Ground Assault: The delay in the GRAU barrage (now 130108Z) suggests the MLCOA timing must be adjusted, but the intent to execute the SKDH pincer movement (Pokrovsk and Siversk axes) remains HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF forces are holding their mass fire initiation until the optimal perceived moment of UAF C2 distraction and exhaustion.
4. Logistical Adaptation: The new UAV vector from the Black Sea toward Odesa/Chornomorsk indicates a continued push to degrade maritime logistics, potentially preparatory to the next round of strikes on commercial port infrastructure.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense is demonstrating sustained tracking capability against simultaneous Kinzhal and multiple Shahed vectors across three operational sectors (South, Central, East rear). UAF ground forces in the East must maintain the highest state of readiness, utilizing the current lull in the anticipated preparatory fire to conduct final checks and position counter-battery systems for immediate decentralized execution.

Information environment / disinformation

RF sources continue to amplify claims of tactical success in deep strikes, potentially exaggerating the BDA or impact of the Kinzhal salvo, while minimizing reports of internal disruptions (e.g., Neryungri incident). This serves to sustain the narrative of overwhelming kinetic superiority ahead of the projected ground operation.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook is dominated by the uncertainty surrounding the GRAU initiation. The period between 0130Z and 0600Z is the new point of maximal operational risk.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

SKDH Assault under Delayed, Maximal Suppression (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will sustain kinetic pressure (MiG-31K orbits/UAVs) NLT 0300Z. The 260th GRAU saturation fire is now projected to initiate between 0300Z and 0600Z on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis, followed by a mechanized exploitation attack aiming for a breakthrough NLT 1200Z.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Operational Paralysis via Critical Strike (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, CRITICAL IMPACT): RF achieves a successful, coordinated missile strike on a strategic Central asset (e.g., Kaniv HPP or a primary rail junction in Poltava/Kirovohrad), degrading national infrastructure confidence and simultaneously forcing UAF leadership to divert critical resources (AD/Engineering) away from stabilizing the deteriorating situation in the SKDH.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/OC EAST): MAINTAIN COUNTER-BATTERY READINESS.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Maintain P-1 readiness for the full, pre-planned Counter-Battery fire plan. Utilize the current delay to conduct immediate final readiness checks and disperse command elements further to mitigate the anticipated GRAU saturation effect.
   • Action B (IMMEDIATE): Institute decentralized fire control NLT 0300Z. Forward counter-battery units must engage immediately upon detection of mass signatures, prioritizing speed of response over centralized approval.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC SOUTH/CENTER): PRIORITY DEFENSE FOR CENTRAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

   • Action A: Immediately deploy SHORAD/Medium-Range AD reserves to defend the Kaniv HPP/Dnieper crossing region to counter the newly detected UAV vector (01:02Z).
   • Action B: Re-task existing rotary AD (Gepard, etc.) to actively hunt low-flying UAVs detected near Mykolaiv/Trykhaty (00:51Z) to deny RF forward reconnaissance success on UAF maneuver elements.

3. COMMAND INTEGRITY (J6/J3): C2 HARDENING.

   • Action A: Due to the sustained MiG-31K pressure and Kropyvnytskyi targeting, mandate shifting primary C2 functions to hardened alternate sites or mobile platforms for all operational commands in the Southern/Central regions until 1200Z.