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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-13 00:38:47Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-13 00:08:41Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 130038Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: HYPERSONIC STRIKE RE-ESCALATION // SKDH GRAU WINDOW CRITICAL


Key updates since last sitrep

  • Hypersonic Strike Re-initiation: RF forces immediately re-launched MiG-31K aircraft (00:24, Air Force/KMVA, HIGH), quickly negating the previous assessment of a reduced threat over Kyiv and initiating a renewed high-speed missile alert nationwide.
  • Multiple Kinzhal Salvo Tracked: At least four high-speed targets (assessed Kh-47M2 Kinzhal) were tracked from Kropyvnytskyi region, shifting courses toward Mykolaiv and ultimately converging on key nodes within Odesa Oblast, including Balta/Podilsk and Usatovo areas (00:28Z - 00:37Z, Air Force/Vanek, HIGH).
  • Odesa Port Infrastructure Hit Again: A confirmed follow-on attack damaged port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, resulting in fire (00:26, ASTRA, HIGH). This confirms sustained RF intent to neutralize Black Sea logistics capacity.
  • Northern/Eastern Rear UAV Activity: Enemy UAV groups were detected expanding reconnaissance and targeting profiles into Chernihiv (Nizhyn) and Poltava (Hadyach) regions (00:08Z, 00:18Z, Air Force, MEDIUM), potentially targeting logistics routes feeding the Eastern sector.
  • High-Level Diplomatic Engagement: US official Whitkoff is scheduled to meet European leaders and President Zelenskyy in Berlin this weekend (00:33, TASS, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv/Central)

The Southern Operational Command (OC South) is under immediate, critical stress due to the sustained, high-tempo hypersonic strike campaign. RF has denied UAF AD/C2 personnel a recovery cycle, forcing them back into full alert status minutes after the previous wave concluded. The shift of Kinzhal targets from initial central positioning (Kropyvnytskyi) toward western Odesa Oblast (Balta/Podilsk) indicates an operational objective to disrupt logistical arteries extending out of Odesa toward the SKDH and Moldova border region, while simultaneously neutralizing port capacity.

Donetsk Axis (Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub - SKDH)

The threat associated with the RF mass artillery preparatory fires utilizing the 260th GRAU payload remains CRITICAL AND IMMINENT (Expected NLT 130100Z DEC). RF is achieving optimal synchronization by initiating the most stressful deep strike campaign concurrently with the final countdown to the ground assault, aiming to maximize C2 confusion and operational paralysis.

Central/Kyiv Axis

The environment has reverted to high threat status due to the MiG-31K re-launch. While the current focus of the hypersonic missiles is South, the re-activation of the threat demands the retention of critical AD assets in the Central sector, compounding resource constraints against the SKDH counter-battery priority.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: EXTREME (Synchronized Kinetic Saturation)

  1. Phase Synchronization: RF forces are executing Phase 1 (Deep Kinetic Disruption) at a maximal operational tempo, refusing to allow UAF forces a respite. The goal is to ensure the imminent Phase 2 (SKDH GRAU Saturation) hits a UAF force already distracted, degraded, and physically exhausted by constant threat response.
  2. Kh-47M2 Kinzhal Employment: The use of multiple Kh-47M2 missiles in rapid succession demonstrates a willingness to expend highly valuable assets to sustain strategic pressure. Their vectoring toward Odesa’s logistical depth (Balta/Podilsk rail lines) suggests the disruption of Western supply corridors is a high-priority RF objective.
  3. UAV Probing: The detection of UAV groups in Poltava and Chernihiv simultaneously with the missile strikes confirms RF is utilizing hybrid methods to stress the UAF AD network and gather BDA/targeting data on logistics hubs situated deep in the operational rear.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense forces are actively tracking and attempting to engage the complex high-speed missile targets across multiple oblasts. The ability to track multiple Kinzhal vectors simultaneously is a testament to the integrated AD C2, but system saturation is critical. UAF ground forces in the East must maintain the highest state of readiness to execute the preemptive counter-battery fire plan despite the intense distraction from the deep battle.

Information environment / disinformation

RF milbloggers immediately claimed successful hits in the Central sector (Kirovohrad/Kropyvnytskyi), attempting to amplify the psychological impact of the hypersonic strikes (00:34, Операция Z). The confirmation of the US official (Whitkoff) meeting with UAF leadership and European allies in Berlin underscores the strategic importance of stabilizing the front and securing renewed military aid in the immediate aftermath of this intense strike wave.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The next hour (NLT 0130Z) is the point of maximal operational risk due to the confluence of the continuing deep strike and the expected initiation of the GRAU barrage.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

SKDH Assault under Deep Strike Cover (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

  1. 0045Z - 0130Z: RF Deep Strike continues, utilizing Kinzhals/UAVs to maintain pressure on C2/Logistics centers (Kropyvnytskyi, Odesa).
  2. 0100Z - 0300Z: RF initiates the 260th GRAU saturation barrage on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis. UAF C2 distraction combined with mass fire achieves a localized suppression effect.
  3. 0300Z - 0600Z: RF mechanized units commence the exploitation attack from the Pokrovsk salient toward Kramatorsk/Konstantinovka.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Operational Paralysis via Combined Strike (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, CRITICAL IMPACT): RF achieves significant damage to a key logistical hub (e.g., Balta rail junction or a strategic fuel depot) via the Kinzhal salvo, severely hampering the reinforcement capabilities into the SKDH. Simultaneously, the GRAU barrage achieves an optimal suppression/neutralization effect on UAF counter-battery systems, allowing RF ground forces to execute a rapid penetration of the Southern SKDH flank.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence Assessment
P1 (CRITICAL)Real-time confirmation of the 260th GRAU preparatory fire initiation (Expected NLT 130100Z DEC).CRITICAL SIGINT/ELINT monitoring for massive artillery ignition signatures on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka line. Prioritize SAR/IMINT tasking over Ilovaisk/Volnovakha rail lines immediately.HIGH
P2 (URGENT)BDA/Impact assessment of the latest Kinzhal strikes in Odesa Oblast.OC South Post-Strike Assessment of functional capacity loss regarding Balta/Podilsk rail infrastructure and Usatovo C2/logistics nodes.HIGH
P3 (URGENT)Specific movement and intent of UAV groups detected in Poltava and Chernihiv.AD Radar/EW monitoring to determine if these UAVs are precursors to follow-on cruise missile or air operations targeting rear logistics infrastructure in the Eastern supply chain.MEDIUM

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

  1. PRIORITY KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/OC EAST): FULL COUNTER-BATTERY EXECUTION.

    • Action A (CRITICAL - TIME SENSITIVE): Execute the pre-planned full P1 Counter-Battery fire plan against high-probability GRAU staging areas immediately. Time sensitivity dictates preemptive action.
    • Action B (IMMEDIATE - OC EAST): Institute decentralized fire control for the next two hours (NLT 0230Z). Forward counter-battery units must engage immediately upon detection of mass signatures, prioritizing speed of response over centralized approval due to anticipated C2 disruption.
  2. AIR DEFENSE (J3/OC SOUTH/CENTER): SYSTEM PRESERVATION.

    • Action A: Reposition limited high-speed interceptor assets (Patriot/SAMP/T) to exclusively defend C2/AD Nodes (e.g., Kropyvnytskyi/Vinnytsia) to ensure command integrity. Accept increased risk to lower-priority infrastructure targets until the immediate Kinzhal threat passes.
    • Action B: Deploy mobile air defense units (Gepard/Shilka/Short-Range AD) to the vicinity of the Poltava/Chernihiv logistics routes to actively hunt the detected enemy UAV groups (00:08Z, 00:18Z), mitigating further deep reconnaissance success.
Previous (2025-12-13 00:08:41Z)

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