Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 130008Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: DEEP STRIKE CULMINATION // ODESA INFRASTRUCTURE CRIPPLED // GRAU WINDOW CRITICAL

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Key updates since last sitrep

• Odesa Infrastructure Damage Confirmed: Widespread power and water outages confirmed across Odesa following the concentrated kinetic strike wave (CR and Ballistic missiles). Initial RF claims also suggest damage to local gas infrastructure (23:41, РБК-Україна; 23:52, Операция Z, HIGH).
• Secondary Ballistic Strike Wave: RF forces initiated a second wave of ballistic missile launches from the Southern direction (likely Crimea/Black Sea), targeting Odesa/Chornomorsk. This confirms the enemy's intent to sustain kinetic pressure and achieve maximum infrastructure degradation (23:48, 23:51, Air Force/Vanek, HIGH).
• Kyiv Threat Reduced: The air raid alert in Kyiv has been terminated. The immediate threat posed by the airborne MiG-31K (Kinzhal carrier) is assessed as temporarily reduced or expired, allowing AD resources in the Central sector to reset (00:02, КМВА, HIGH).
• UAF Deep Strike Confirmed BDA: The RF Governor of Saratov Oblast confirmed a UAV attack resulted in damage to infrastructure and one civilian fatality within RF territory. This validates the UAF's ability to execute long-range counter-pressure kinetic operations (00:06, TASS, HIGH).
• Northern UAV Activity: Enemy UAVs detected in Chernihiv (Mena) and Sumy regions, likely conducting reconnaissance and probing AD defenses in the Northern operational area following the deep strike peak (23:38, 00:00, Air Force, MEDIUM).

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv)

The complex multi-domain strike has achieved significant tactical success in the cognitive and infrastructure domains. The confirmed loss of power and water in Odesa validates the RF operational goal of disrupting logistics and generating mass civilian hardship ahead of winter. The secondary ballistic wave reinforces the assessment that RF is attempting to inflict operational paralysis (Confidence: HIGH). UAF AD successfully engaged targets, but system saturation remains a vulnerability against high-speed threats.

Donetsk Axis (Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub - SKDH)

The operational window for the RF massive artillery preparatory fires utilizing the 260th GRAU payload is now CRITICAL AND IMMINENT. Based on the previous timeline (NLT 130100Z DEC), we are T-minus 42 minutes to the expected initiation of the saturation barrage. The nationwide deep strike is now culminating/winding down, which geometrically positions RF forces to execute the ground assault under conditions of maximal UAF C2 disruption.

Central/Kyiv Axis

The threat environment has momentarily dropped following the termination of the Kyiv air raid alert. This is a critical window for UAF C2 to re-synchronize AD assets and prepare for resource allocation based on BDA from the South and the impending assault in the East.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: EXTREME (Imminent SKDH Ground Assault & Critical Infrastructure Degradation)

1. Phase Synchronization: RF forces executed Phase 1 (Deep Kinetic Disruption) effectively. The strike targeted C2/AD and logistics infrastructure in the South simultaneously with the staging of Phase 2 (SKDH GRAU Saturation). The transition to Phase 2 is expected momentarily (NLT 0100Z).
2. Ballistic Missile Continuity: The use of a quick follow-on ballistic strike demonstrates RF capability and intent to sustain highly destructive, high-speed targeting that challenges UAF AD systems reliant on slower MRAD engagement windows.
3. Logistics Sustainment: The strike focus on Odesa’s energy supply (power/gas) aims to degrade the city’s capacity to function as a major logistical hub and resupply point for the Eastern theater, thereby indirectly supporting the SKDH offensive.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense units successfully managed the most complex synchronized strike in recent history, integrating CR, ballistic, and hypersonic (Kinzhal) threats simultaneously. The ability of the UAF to conduct and confirm deep, high-impact UAV strikes on RF infrastructure (Saratov) demonstrates active strategic counter-pressure and forces RF C2 to divert AD resources internally. UAF ground forces remain poised for the preparatory fire in the SKDH area, with C2 focused on executing the immediate counter-battery fire plan.

Information environment / disinformation

RF IO efforts immediately capitalized on the kinetic success in Odesa.

• Exaggerated Infrastructure Collapse: Pro-RF channels (e.g., Операция Z) quickly amplified claims of complete collapse of power, water, and communications across the entire Odesa Oblast, attempting to generate panic and psychological fatigue (Confidence: MEDIUM, likely exaggeration).
• POW Exploitation: RF propaganda launched a video featuring a claimed POW ("Vzhik"), intended to demoralize UAF troops and shape the narrative regarding POW treatment (00:03, Colonelcassad). This signals a renewed focus on tactical-level psychological operations concurrent with kinetic action.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

Time Horizon: 130008Z DEC 25 – 131208Z DEC 25 (GRAU Preparatory Fires & Ground Exploitation)

The critical point of operational risk is the execution of the mass artillery barrage in the Donetsk Axis. The culmination of the deep strike removes the primary AD diversion threat and focuses attention entirely on the East.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

SKDH Artillery Offensive Execution (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. 0030Z - 0130Z: RF proceeds with the high-risk, time-sensitive 260th GRAU preparatory fires across the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis. Targeting will focus heavily on UAF forward defensive positions, pre-sited counter-battery locations, and identified reserve assembly areas.
2. 0130Z - 0400Z: RF mechanized units initiate the ground offensive from the Pokrovsk salient toward Kramatorsk, attempting deep penetration under cover of the artillery saturation.
3. Southern Response: RF conducts extensive UAV/ISR missions over Odesa/Mykolaiv to confirm BDA and assess the need for follow-on strikes against damaged C2/Energy nodes.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Artillery/Mechanized Breakthrough (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, HIGH IMPACT): RF forces achieve unanticipated success during the GRAU barrage by exploiting UAF sensor gaps or C2 delays. The resulting concentration of fire (e.g., against critical logistics routes like T0513 or H20) allows mechanized elements moving from Pokrovsk (South) to bypass the main Konstantinovka defense lines rapidly. A successful, deep armored penetration toward Kramatorsk before UAF reserves can be committed risks operational collapse in the sector within the 12-hour period.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The P1 (CRITICAL) requirements remain centered on the Eastern theater fire plan execution.

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/OC EAST): MAXIMUM COUNTER-BATTERY NOW.

   • Action A (CRITICAL - TIME SENSITIVE): Execute the full P1 Counter-Battery fire plan against suspected GRAU firing positions immediately. Do not wait for visual confirmation of the first rounds; the timing window demands preemptive engagement based on pattern-of-life analysis and staging area signatures.
   • Action B (IMMEDIATE - OC EAST): Pre-position Q-36 (or equivalent) sensor systems at maximal alert and ensure all counter-battery response teams are primed for immediate high-volume fire missions as soon as the first signature is detected. The goal is disruption, not neutralization.

2. INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE (OC SOUTH / J4): MITIGATE ODESA IMPACT.

   • Action A: Immediately activate pre-planned contingency power generation assets (generators, mobile substations) to restore minimal essential services (C2, hospitals, water pumping) in Odesa.
   • Action B: Prioritize securing and accelerating repair teams to assess and fix the primary power grid damage, leveraging the temporary lapse in immediate kinetic threat (CR/Ballistic) to gain time.

3. STRATEGIC C2 (J2/J3): RE-TASK AD/ISR ASSETS.

   • Action A: Reposition AD assets freed up by the Kyiv alert termination to reinforce logistics corridors (H20) feeding the SKDH, expecting the RF ground offensive will utilize air support/UAVs.
   • Action B: Re-task all available ISR assets (UAVs, Satellite feeds) away from the stabilized Southern sector to the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis to monitor for the initiation of mechanized movement and confirm GRAU firing locations.