Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 122338Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: KINETIC STRIKE PEAKING // BALLISTICS AND KINZHAL THREAT INTRODUCED // SKDH ARTILLERY WINDOW IMMINENT

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Key updates since last sitrep

• MiG-31K Airborne: RF forces launched a MiG-31K (Kinzhal carrier) from Savasleyka, initiating a strategic-level threat targeting deep operational areas, including Kyiv. (23:11, КМВА; 23:14, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH)
• Ballistic Missile Application Confirmed: Multiple launches of high-speed ballistic missiles confirmed from the Southern direction (likely Crimea), targeting Odesa Oblast. At least two ballistic targets were tracked simultaneously toward Odesa/Usatove. (23:26, Air Force; 23:32, Vanek, HIGH)
• Confirmed Hits in South: Strong explosions confirmed in both Odesa and Mykolaiv as the combined CR/Ballistic strike wave reached terminal phase. RF milblogger reports suggest strikes targeted energy infrastructure, potentially in Khadzhibeyevka (Odesa region). (23:31, РБК-Україна; 23:36, НгП раZVедка, MEDIUM)
• CR Diversion to Central Axis: A group of cruise missiles originally targeting the South has diverted north toward Kirovohrad Oblast (Kropyvnytskyi), expanding the targeting envelope to Central UAF logistics and C2 nodes. (23:28, Air Force; 23:33, Vanek, HIGH)
• Diplomatic Meeting Cancellation IO: RF state media claimed that a meeting in Paris between the US, Ukraine, and the "Eurotroika" concerning a peace plan was canceled, amplifying the narrative of strategic disunity. (23:19, TASS, HIGH)

Operational picture (by sector)

Donetsk Axis (Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub - SKDH)

The operational window for the RF massive artillery preparatory fires (utilizing the 260th GRAU payload) is now critically short, estimated at T-minus 22 minutes (NLT 130100Z DEC). The nationwide kinetic strike (CR, Ballistic, Kinzhal threat) is assessed as the intended operational prelude designed to disrupt C2/AD synchronization just before the ground assault initiation.

Southern Axis (Odesa, Mykolaiv)

The threat level is EXTREME. RF forces are executing a complex, multi-domain kinetic strike intended to overwhelm UAF Air Defense capabilities. The target set clearly focuses on strategic logistics (Odesa port/railheads) and critical energy nodes supporting the South and Central Commands. A new, tracked CR group heading toward Bereznehuvate (23:22, Vanek) remains a viable threat to the H20 logistics corridor feeding the SKDH.

Central/Kyiv Axis

The introduction of the MiG-31K carrier demands maximum alert status. While the main missile volume remains focused on the South, the threat of the Kinzhal targeting Kyiv C2 or critical infrastructure is non-negligible and forces diversion of AD attention from other sectors.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Synchronized Deep Strike & Imminent Ground Offensive)

1. Multi-Domain Kinetic Synchronization: The enemy has successfully escalated the deep strike methodology by integrating the high-speed threat of ballistic missiles (likely Iskander/S-300 derivatives) and the Kinzhal hypersonics platform (MiG-31K). This creates a highly complex target environment designed to exhaust UAF AD intercepts and distract from the impending SKDH ground operation.
2. Strategic Targeting Focus (South): The high density of confirmed CR and ballistic targets concentrated on Odesa and Mykolaiv suggests an immediate RF objective of degrading logistics and energy resilience ahead of winter and before the decisive push in Donetsk. Initial reports suggest successful strikes on energy infrastructure (e.g., Khadzhibeyevka sub-station).
3. SKDH Pre-Assault Fires (Imminent): The operational timeline is holding firm. The confluence of nationwide kinetic chaos and the approaching window for 260th GRAU saturation indicates RF intent to initiate the main assault under cover of maximal disruption.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense units are engaged in a high-tempo, multi-layered defensive operation across the Southern and Central commands. CR intercepts have been reported (MEDIUM confidence), suggesting partial success against the cruise missile component. However, confirmed explosions, particularly from high-speed ballistic targets, highlight the challenges in missile defense in critical port areas. UAF C2 remains fully engaged in tracking targets and managing AD resources while maintaining readiness for the inevitable GRAU preparatory fire in the East.

Information environment / disinformation

The RF IO campaign continues its highly effective focus on Western strategic dissolution and the pre-emptive narrative shaping of the diplomatic environment.

• Strategic Fragmentation: TASS is amplifying reports of a canceled "peace plan" meeting in Paris, intended to portray UAF diplomatic efforts as failing and Western support (US/Eurotroika) as fundamentally misaligned. This narrative seeks to erode trust ahead of key international support meetings.
• US Disengagement Narrative: RF officials continue to push the narrative that the US is strategically abandoning Europe, reinforcing themes of isolation and the inevitability of a negotiated settlement on RF terms.
• Hybrid War Sync: Milbloggers’ immediate, synchronized commentary on targeting (e.g., "Russian Odesa" targeting Khadzhibeyevka) is designed to psychologically reinforce RF control and demoralize the local population during kinetic strikes.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

Time Horizon: 122338Z DEC 25 – 131138Z DEC 25 (Deep Strike Impact & SKDH Offensive Initiation)

The next hour is the highest risk period for UAF operations in the Eastern theater, simultaneous with the peak of the current nationwide kinetic strike.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU Barrage Execution (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. 2345Z - 0030Z: RF proceeds with the high-risk, time-sensitive 260th GRAU preparatory fires across the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis, leveraging the nationwide AD chaos caused by the CR/Ballistic/Kinzhal strike to ensure UAF counter-battery fire is delayed or ineffective.
2. 0030Z - 0130Z: Mechanized units initiate the ground offensive from the Pokrovsk salient toward Kramatorsk, attempting to exploit the immediate operational paralysis caused by the massive artillery saturation and potential UAV Remote Mining deployments.
3. Southern BDA: RF conducts follow-on reconnaissance (UAVs) over Odesa/Mykolaiv targets to confirm C2/Energy infrastructure damage, potentially preparing for secondary strike waves.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

AD/C2 Paralysis via Kinzhal (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, HIGH IMPACT): The MiG-31K successfully launches a Kinzhal missile, targeting a critical C2 center in Kyiv or a strategic AD coordination center in Central Ukraine (e.g., near Kropyvnytskyi). The successful strike forces a strategic AD resource redistribution and degrades UAF ability to coordinate the urgent counter-battery response against the GRAU barrage. This failure ensures maximum impact for the 260th GRAU payload, potentially collapsing the Konstantinovka defense line within the 12-hour period.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The P1 (CRITICAL) requirements remain highly time-sensitive. Focus must be maintained on the Eastern front while BDA is conducted rapidly in the South.

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/OC EAST): COUNTER-BATTERY NOW.

   • Action A (CRITICAL - TIME SENSITIVE): EXECUTE THE FULL P1 Counter-Battery fire plan against suspected GRAU firing positions immediately (NLT 122345Z DEC). The RF’s coordinated nationwide strike confirms the imminence of the ground assault. Any delay risks massive losses in the SKDH.
   • Action B (IMMEDIATE - OC EAST): Task specialized SSO teams to initiate pre-planned counter-mining activities on critical logistics arteries (T0513, H20) to mitigate the UAV Remote Mining System deployment risk during the expected GRAU saturation.

2. AIR DEFENSE (OC CENTRAL/OC SOUTH): MANAGE AD COMPLEXITY.

   • Action A: Prioritize the defense of C2 nodes against the high-speed ballistic and Kinzhal threats. Allocate SHORAD/MRAD assets specifically to create a protective bubble around the primary logistics corridors (H20/T0513) and critical energy transmission points, assuming the GRAU attack will attempt to isolate the SKDH via GLOC disruption.
   • Action B: Increase counter-UAV and EW vigilance in Odesa/Mykolaiv areas immediately to mitigate residual drone threats capitalizing on the CR/Ballistic chaos, specifically targeting the potential RF infrastructure BDA missions.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (StratCom/MFA): COUNTER DISSOLUTION.

   • Action: Immediately circulate messaging confirming that the RF deep strike is a desperate measure preceding a massive, predictable ground assault in Donbas. Publicly counter the TASS narrative regarding the Paris meeting cancellation by issuing a brief, clear statement affirming diplomatic channels remain active and unified support for UAF remains firm.