Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

OP AREA: Eastern Ukraine / Donbas Strategic Theater DTG: 121500Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The operational situation remains defined by the imminent threat to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub. RF forces are actively consolidating the breakthrough on the Southern Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk).

• Donetsk Central Axis: RF is integrating Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) into preparation fires against UAF defensive positions and forward logistics nodes in the Konstantinovka/Kramatorsk approaches. This signals an increased reliance on fixed-wing CAS/Interdiction in the decisive sector.
• Odesa/Black Sea: Sustained deep strikes utilizing UAVs (Geran/Shahed) and ballistic missiles have achieved kinetic effect, resulting in confirmed damage and a burning cargo vessel in Odesa port (Validated via multi-source imagery). This confirms RF intent to disrupt maritime trade and Rammstein logistics.
• Kupyansk Sector (Stabilized): The Presidential and CinC visit to the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade's forward command post confirms UAF control and stability on the northern operational flank, countering RF Information Operations (IO) claiming encirclement.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Conditions remain cold, potentially favoring mechanized movement off-road in areas where the Pokrovsk breach facilitates exploitation, pending ground freezing consistency.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF is posturing mechanized and armor assets to exploit the southern approach to Kramatorsk via the Pokrovsk breach. UAF forces are utilizing the stability in Kupyansk to reinforce the critical Kramatorsk sector, though these efforts are under stress from KAB strikes and anticipated artillery saturation.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RED CELL)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Primary Intent: Achieve operational isolation of Kramatorsk NLT 150000Z DEC, leveraging the Pokrovsk breach and overwhelming artillery saturation enabled by the 260th GRAU ordnance. Simultaneously, RF aims to degrade UAF logistics and international perception via sustained deep strikes on Black Sea ports.
• Hybrid Adaptation (Confirmed Threat): RF forces are actively seeking to utilize non-military infrastructure (specifically civilian residences, potentially using vulnerable population subsets like pensioners) to deploy radio repeaters for Shahed UAVs. This enhances the depth, reliability, and precision of RF drone attacks while shielding command nodes.
• FPV Integration: The Rubikon Centre video confirms high-proficiency use of decentralized FPV drone units for targeted destruction of UAF maneuver elements (AFVs, vehicles, robotic systems) and communication nodes, indicating a shift toward advanced pre-assault attrition.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Fixed-Wing Integration: The confirmed use of KABs in Donetsk Oblast indicates the RF Air Force is prioritizing high-precision fixed-wing strikes to collapse UAF defensive lines ahead of the mechanized assault, circumventing local air defenses where possible.
• Maritimes Interdiction: RF deep strikes are now definitively targeting commercial cargo vessels in addition to port infrastructure, aiming to halt humanitarian and military supply flows entirely.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

(CRITICAL UNKNOWN)

• 260th GRAU Cargo: The critical intelligence gap remains the mobile location of the high-volume artillery ordnance (P1). The expected arrival (NLT 130000Z DEC) is approximately 12 hours away, leading to a high probability of massive saturation fires commencing tomorrow. Confidence in achieving interdiction is LOW and diminishing rapidly.
• Homeland Security: The "Bespilotnaya opasnost" signal and airport restrictions in Udmurtia confirm that deep UAF kinetic strikes are forcing RF to divert air defense resources internally, creating temporary windows of opportunity at the front.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF strategic C2 is effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of frontal pressure (Donetsk) with diplomatic leverage (Odesa strikes before Rammstein). However, the decentralized and often sensitive nature of the new hybrid repeater deployment scheme (using civilian homes/pensioners) introduces potential C2 vulnerabilities if discovered and exploited by UAF EW/SSO teams.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) UAF forces are stretched but maintaining defensive integrity in the critical Kupyansk sector. Readiness remains constrained by the highly sensitive and friction-inducing policy of reassigning Unauthorized Absence (SZCh) personnel to assault units, requiring immediate C2 stabilization.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Successes: Successfully held and stabilized the Kupyansk sector, reinforced by high-level leadership visibility (Zelenskyy/Syrskyi). Maintained deep strike capability forcing RF internal defense alerts (Udmurtia).
• Setbacks: Highly probable loss of Pokrovsk leading to a major flank breach. Confirmed kinetic damage to commercial maritime logistics in Odesa port.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Anti-Artillery/Deep Strike: Immediate deployment of assets to target and destroy the 260th GRAU rail cargo before dispersion.
2. Counter-UAV/Hybrid Threat: Urgent requirement for specialized teams (EW/SSO) to locate and neutralize civilian-based drone repeaters.
3. Air Defense: Urgent need for theater ballistic missile and KAB defense systems, particularly around Kramatorsk and Odesa port infrastructure.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IO)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• RF Focus: Maximizing the visual impact of the Odesa maritime strike to generate fear and disrupt shipping insurance/international aid delivery prior to Rammstein. Continuing to deny losses in the North and project sophisticated FPV dominance (Rubikon Centre). RF strategic rhetoric explicitly rejects updated peace plans.
• UAF Focus: Leveraging Presidential/CinC visibility in Kupyansk to project resolute morale and territorial control, stabilizing internal and international narratives following the Pokrovsk setback. Publicizing anti-corruption efforts (Odesa prosecutor/Zakarpattia judge) to project institutional resilience.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) UAF morale benefits from leadership visibility on the front lines, but the critical manpower/AWOL policy remains a major point of internal friction and potential RF IO exploitation. RF domestic narrative is increasingly focused on internal social and security issues (Udmurtia alerts, internal religious/social tensions).

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF kinetic and IO operations are directly timed to influence the upcoming Rammstein meeting (16 DEC). The explicit rejection of US-backed peace plans reinforces the intent to achieve military objectives before engaging in diplomacy. European divergence on the 2027 EU accession goal provides RF with diplomatic friction points.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Deployment of 260th GRAU: Artillery saturation strikes commence NLT 130000Z DEC targeting UAF rear areas and prepared defenses in the Konstantinovka/Kramatorsk corridor.
2. Mechanized Assault: RF will initiate a large-scale mechanized thrust utilizing KAB air support to breach UAF reserve lines, exploiting the Pokrovsk axis toward Kramatorsk.
3. Sustained Deep Strikes: RF will maintain high-tempo Shahed/ballistic strikes against Odesa/Chornomorsk and other logistics hubs until the Rammstein meeting concludes.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The 260th GRAU cargo is successfully deployed and achieves fire superiority, resulting in the rapid disintegration of UAF layered defenses around Konstantinovka. Simultaneously, RF hybrid teams successfully deploy civilian-based repeater networks, enabling highly effective, precision FPV/Shahed coordination that cripples UAF tactical C2 and forces the rapid operational isolation of Kramatorsk NLT 141200Z DEC.

C. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Targeting and Deep Strike (J2/J3 – IMMEDIATE PRIORITY)

1. EXECUTE INTERDICTION (GRAU): All long-range precision assets (SCALP/Storm Shadow/HIMARS) must be reserved and prioritized for the P1 target. Target acquisition must be validated NLT 121800Z DEC with a pre-planned kinetic solution ready for execution upon confirmation of railhead deployment or major transit choke point.
2. IMMEDIATE COUNTER-REPEATER TASKING: Immediately task Special Operations Forces (SSO) and EW assets to the P2 requirement. Develop and disseminate tactical warnings to local populations near the front lines regarding the risk of unknowingly hosting RF radio equipment.

B. Maneuver and Force Protection (OC East – URGENT PRIORITY)

1. KRAMATORSK AIR DEFENSE SHIFT: Immediately reallocate one battery of SHORAD/MANPADS from the Kupyansk/Northern sector (now stabilized by the 14th Mech BDE/Presidential visit) to reinforce point defense against KABs and ballistic strikes in the Kramatorsk urban area.
2. OBLIGATE SHORAD: Expedite the transfer of one available SHORAD battery or mobile counter-UAV team (Vampire/C-AUDS) to the Odesa/Chornomorsk port to mitigate future maritime interdiction efforts.

C. Command and Personnel Management (J1/J6 – URGENT PRIORITY)

1. C2 FRICTION MITIGATION: General Staff must issue a highly visible, direct communication (leveraging the Kupyansk visit imagery) to all subordinate commanders, formally acknowledging the friction regarding the SZCh policy while reasserting the critical need for manpower redistribution. Simultaneously, deploy inspection teams to major commands to enforce compliance and report on internal disciplinary status (P3).
2. FPV COUNTER-STRATEGY: Use FPV attrition data (Rubikon Centre footage) to immediately update force protection protocols, emphasizing decentralized C2, camouflage discipline, and enhanced counter-drone screening for all maneuver elements entering the Donetsk combat zone.

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