SITREP UPDATE 121419Z DEC 25
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)
A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
The operational situation remains critical, defined by the RF objective to isolate the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub before the 16 DEC Rammstein meeting.
- Southern Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL DETERIORATION): RF seizure of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiysk) is now highly probable. RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) footage validates the previous aggressive Russian Information Operation (IO) claims. This creates a significant breach on the southern flank, exposing the high-mobility routes leading directly to Kramatorsk.
- Central Donetsk Axis: Urban defense remains fierce in Konstantinovka, supported by elite UAF units (3 OSHB). However, RF specialized drone units are actively interdicting UAF armored transport in the area, degrading maneuver capacity.
- Kupyansk Sector (CONTESTED STABILIZATION): Ukrainian President Zelensky's physical presence in the Kupyansk sector, coupled with confirmed clearance operations by the "Skela" Assault Regiment in Yuvileiny district, strongly counters RF claims of encirclement, stabilizing the immediate northern flank of the operational theater.
- Deep Operations (ESCALATION): Multiple, sustained waves of ballistic missiles and Shahed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are targeting Odesa and Chornomorsk port infrastructure (New Fact). This confirms a critical RF intent to disrupt Rammstein logistics and Black Sea maritime operations.
B. Weather and Environmental Factors (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
No change from previous reporting. Cold temperatures and potentially frozen ground continue to favor RF mechanized exploitation in areas south of Slovyansk now that Pokrovsk is compromised.
C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF forces are consolidating control over Pokrovsk and transferring emphasis to exploiting the resultant gap. UAF forces are maintaining highly strained defenses while simultaneously managing internal friction arising from critical personnel policies (SZCh/AWOL).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RED CELL)
A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Primary Intent: Achieve operational isolation of Kramatorsk, leveraging the confirmed breakthrough at Pokrovsk, supported by overwhelming artillery saturation enabled by the incoming 260th GRAU ordnance.
- Hybrid Warfare Adaptation (NEW): There is a confirmed threat (Belief: 0.152) that RF forces are actively utilizing non-military infrastructure (e.g., civilian residences) to deploy radio repeaters for Shahed drones, enhancing the depth and reliability of their UAV strikes.
- Targeted Interdiction: RF deployment of specialized drone units (oOSpN “Ohotnik”) to specifically hunt and destroy UAF armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) suggests a tactical shift toward pre-assault attrition of UAF maneuver elements in the Konstantinovka direction.
B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF has demonstrated accelerated Information Warfare (IO) integration with kinetic operations, immediately producing high-quality MoD footage from captured cities (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk) to amplify tactical gains and influence international diplomatic response ahead of Rammstein.
C. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL UNKNOWN)
- 260th GRAU Cargo: The precise location of the high-volume artillery ordnance remains the single most critical intelligence gap (P1). The projected arrival time (NLT 130000Z DEC) is imminent. Confidence in ability to interdict the convoy is rapidly diminishing.
- Air Defense Posture: Enhanced RF air defense readiness continues across the operational depth (531st Guards AA Missile Regiment high activity) in reaction to previous UAF deep strikes.
D. Command and Control Effectiveness (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF strategic C2 is robust, evidenced by coordinated deep strikes on coastal targets. However, conflicting internal narratives within the pro-Russian media sphere (disputing official reports) suggest potential localized command confusion or tactical misinformation regarding claims in contested areas (e.g., Kupyansk).
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF forces are under extreme strain. While resilience is high (Kupyansk counter-operations), the recently implemented policy of reassigning Unauthorized Absence (SZCh) personnel to assault units is generating significant internal Command and Control (C2) friction. Reports indicate "systemic sabotage" (Belief: 0.014) of transfer orders by units, risking internal disciplinary issues and reducing the efficiency of planned manpower rotation.
B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Successes: Successful UAF defensive hold and counter-operations in Kupyansk (demonstrated by Presidential presence and "Skela" operations). Maintenance of air strike capability (Caspian Sea strike, previous Lipetsk alerts).
- Setbacks: Highly probable loss of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiysk), significantly weakening the southern flank of the Kramatorsk defense. Confirmed multiple ballistic missile impacts on the Odesa/Chornomorsk area.
C. Resource Requirements and Constraints (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Immediate acquisition and deployment of assets capable of locating and neutralizing the highly mobile 260th GRAU rail cargo.
- Urgent requirement for short-range air defense (SHORAD) and counter-UAV systems for point defense against ballistic/Shahed attacks in Black Sea coastal areas.
- Immediate requirement for C2 intervention to resolve internal friction regarding the SZCh personnel assignment policy.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IO)
A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- RF Focus: Asserting control over captured territory (Pokrovsk), denying UAF operational success (Kupyansk), and linking Western suppliers (German companies) to UAF deep strike systems to generate diplomatic pressure.
- UAF Focus: Leveraging Presidential battlefield visibility (Kupyansk) to project control and high morale. Asserting the ambitious 2027 EU accession target as a counter-narrative to RF claims of "DMZ Sovereignty," though this timeline faces international scrutiny (TASS report).
B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF domestic security concerns are rising (St. Petersburg retail regulations). UAF morale is supported by external diplomatic progress but is challenged by high casualties and internal controversy surrounding the use of SZCh personnel, which is heavily amplified by both domestic and RF sources.
C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Rammstein: The confirmation of the Rammstein meeting on 16 DEC establishes a clear operational timeline. RF attempts to secure significant territorial gains are directly tied to influencing outcomes of this conference.
- EU Accession: The UAF 2027 goal remains a critical strategic communication tool, despite reports of disagreement from EU partners regarding the rigid deadline.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF forces will fully exploit the Pokrovsk breach, shifting focus from urban combat in Konstantinovka to mechanized exploitation around the city toward Kramatorsk. Artillery preparation will intensify sharply NLT 130000Z DEC upon deployment of the 260th GRAU cargo. RF will maintain high-tempo deep strikes on coastal infrastructure (Odesa/Chornomorsk) to disrupt anticipated Rammstein logistics flows.
Expected Timeline: Critical isolation of Kramatorsk road network NLT 150000Z DEC.
B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
The 260th GRAU cargo is successfully deployed and utilized in a massive saturation strike against UAF reserve assembly areas (North of Kramatorsk/Slovyansk) and rear logistics nodes. Simultaneously, RF achieves a rapid, successful maneuver from the Pokrovsk axis, bypassing Konstantinovka urban defenses, resulting in the operational isolation of Kramatorsk NLT 141200Z DEC, forcing a chaotic UAF retrograde under heavy fire.
C. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements
| Priority | Gap/Requirement | Collection Task (IMINT/SIGINT/HUMINT) | Confidence |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | 260th GRAU Cargo Location. (Mobile/Rail Assets) | IMINT/SAR: Rail choke points (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha). | HIGH |
| P2 (URGENT) | Confirmation/Location of RF Shahed Repeaters. | SIGINT/EW: Focused sweeps in Sumy/Kharkiv rear areas; analysis of drone flight deviations. | MEDIUM |
| P3 | Assessment of UAF C2 Friction (SZCh Policy). Scope of non-compliance and impact on assault unit readiness. | HUMINT: Detailed reporting from OC East command structure and forward units. | LOW |
| P4 | BDA on Odesa/Chornomorsk Ballistic Strikes. Infrastructure impact on port capacity and operational throughput. | IMINT/OSINT: Satellite imagery confirmation of pier/storage damage. | MEDIUM |
6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Targeting and Deep Strike (J2/J3 – IMMEDIATE PRIORITY)
- INTERDICTION PROTOCOL (260th GRAU): Shift deep-strike asset deployment to immediately cover rail depots and logistical chokepoints in the Ilovaisk-Volnovakha corridor. Assign SCALP/Storm Shadow/HIMARS priority to this target NLT 121800Z DEC.
- COUNTER-REPEATER OPERATIONS (NEW): Task specialized EW and SSO units to actively hunt, locate, and neutralize identified or suspected RF drone radio repeaters in contested areas, prioritizing zones near high-value infrastructure.
B. Maneuver and Force Protection (OC East – URGENT PRIORITY)
- EXPEDITE KRAMATORSK DEFENSE: Utilize the current window to reinforce the immediate western approaches to Kramatorsk, focusing on deep anti-tank obstacle belts and preparing fire zones to neutralize RF mechanized exploitation efforts from the Pokrovsk breach.
- AIR DEFENSE REDEPLOYMENT: Reallocate one battery of SHORAD/MANPADS from static defenses in non-critical cities to the Odesa/Chornomorsk port area to provide immediate point defense against sustained ballistic and UAV threats.
C. Command and Personnel Management (J1/J6 – URGENT PRIORITY)
- C2 AUTHORITY ASSERTION: General Staff must issue immediate, direct orders—via secure, verifiable channels—to all subordinate commands clarifying the SZCh transfer protocol, threatening disciplinary action for non-compliance. Centralized personnel assignment authority should be considered temporarily to stabilize the situation.
- LEVERAGE KUPYANSK VISIBILITY: Ensure that the President's visit to Kupyansk is internally promoted to offset the negative morale impact resulting from the Pokrovsk setback and the SZCh policy controversy.
//END OF REPORT//