Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121130Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW CRITICAL (H-4); SKDA AXIS FACES IMMINENT SATURATION FIRE; UAF CONFIRMS 200+ RF ENCIRCLEMENT IN KUPIANSK; RF SOLIDIFIES IRANIAN STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT AND AD REACH.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is stable but strategically precarious. The key terrain remains the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA), which is under immediate and severe threat of breakthrough predicated on RF logistical success.

• SKDA Axis (Krasnoarmeysk/Konstantinovka): RF advances continue to pressure UAF defensive positions. Success of the counter-engagement near Pokrovsk (previous report) has provided only temporary kinetic relief.
• Northern Axis (Kupiansk): UAF 2nd Corps of the National Guard (Khartiia) confirms the encirclement of over 200 RF personnel within the city limits. This confirms a significant tactical victory and secures the northwestern flank, freeing up resources for potential reassignment if the encirclement is rapidly resolved.
• Deep Battle/Kharkiv Rear: Confirmed RF strike activity against the Novovodolazka community (Kharkiv Oblast) resulted in increased casualties. This suggests RF is maintaining high-tempo fire against the rear areas supporting the Kupiansk/Northern axis, attempting to disrupt UAF exploitation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Cold, clear weather continues across the theater, optimizing conditions for high-altitude ISR, air operations (KAB/UAV), and deep strike capabilities for both sides. RF weather services (TASS) report yellow-level warnings for Moscow, but this is assessed as having negligible impact on current front-line operations or logistics in Ukraine.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF is maximizing local superiority in Kupiansk to destroy the encircled RF grouping while simultaneously bracing for the anticipated saturation fire phase in the SKDA sector. RF forces are deploying strategic AD assets (Buk-M3) and leveraging diplomatic alignment (Iran) to secure long-term kinetic advantage.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF strategic intent remains maximalist (securing Donbas, degrading UAF long-term capacity). New intelligence confirms strengthening capabilities in air defense and strategic supply chain stability.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF tactical units are showcasing small-scale improvements to infantry weapons (e.g., "Viper DTK" muzzle brake on DPM, 10:52:38), suggesting continued investment in localized force modernization and soldier feedback integration.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The GRAU interdiction window is now critically short: less than three hours remaining (NLT 121800Z DEC). The cargo must be targeted in transit via rail choke points (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha). RF continues to prosecute deep economic targets, confirming the strategic importance of denying UAF long-term industrial capacity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust at the strategic level (synchronizing diplomacy, IO, and deep strikes). The successful mobilization and movement of the 260th GRAU cargo demonstrates effective logistical C2 despite UAF deep battle pressure.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are positioned defensively but retain localized offensive momentum in the Kupiansk sector, which is being effectively managed by the National Guard. The deployment of drone units like the Ivan Franko Group (IFG) continues to demonstrate decisive tactical air superiority over logistics routes in Donetsk Oblast ("roads of death").

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Major Success (Kupiansk): Confirmed encirclement and neutralization operations against a significant RF grouping (200+ personnel).
• Sustainment Success: NATO confirmed $5 billion in weapon support via PURL, significantly boosting mid-to-long term UAF resupply and modernization efforts (10:57:56).
• Wounded Care Improvement: MoD procurement of 600,000 units of adaptive clothing addresses a critical welfare and sustainment vulnerability (10:55:04).
• Setback: Continued civilian casualties in the Kharkiv region (Novovodolazka) underscore the failure to completely suppress RF medium-range strike capability in the rear.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. LRPF Systems: Must be committed immediately against the GRAU cargo.
2. Anti-AD Capability: Requirement for SEAD/DEAD planning must be accelerated to counter the confirmed deployment of new, advanced RF SAM systems (Buk-M3).
3. Exploitation Assets: Rapid resolution of the Kupiansk pocket (200+ troops) is necessary to free up mobile forces for redeployment to the critical SKDA axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• EU Asset Seizure Narrative: RF media is amplifying internal EU discord regarding frozen Russian assets, leveraging Hungarian PM Orbán's objections to delegitimize the EU collective security position (11:09:40; 11:17:19). RF frames this as an "EU swindle."
• Transnistria Disinformation: RF sources are actively pushing a narrative that Moldova denied UAF claims of an impending RF operation in Transnistria, attempting to neutralize UAF IO efforts aimed at stretching RF forces (11:00:27).
• Internal Stability: RF continues high-tempo domestic IO, celebrating Constitution Day and managing optics for Putin’s upcoming Direct Line, projecting domestic cohesion amidst the conflict (11:08:20; 11:12:01).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF morale is reinforced by the tangible success in Kupiansk and confirmed international support.
• RF internal pressure remains high, evidenced by confirmed casualty figures (155,000+ fatalities) despite RF efforts to mask attrition. Economic strain on the Russian population (lack of funds for non-essential goods) suggests persistent domestic economic pressure.
• RF forces are using harsh sentencing (12.5 years for a 65-year-old woman in Melitopol) to enforce internal security and suppress civilian resistance in occupied territories.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed $5B PURL commitment (NATO) is a major diplomatic victory, ensuring mid-term materiel stability. The strategic alignment meeting between Putin and the Iranian President requires immediate monitoring, as it likely formalizes long-term access to critical military technology (drones, guided weapons) for the RF.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Immediate SKDA Fire Mission: RF will execute the Krasnoarmeysk breakthrough attempt, beginning with a massive preparatory barrage immediately upon the deployment of the 260th GRAU cargo (NLT 140000Z DEC).
2. Kupiansk Withdrawal/Suppression: RF forces will utilize air power (KABs/UAVs) to degrade UAF consolidation efforts in Kupiansk, enabling the remaining 200+ encircled troops to either exfiltrate or be destroyed with minimal further commitment of mobile reserves.
3. AD Escalation: RF will aggressively integrate new/mobile AD assets (Buk-M3) across the Donbas axis to counter UAF drone dominance and protect forward logistics routes from LRPF interdiction attempts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Collapse and Operational Retreat: Failure to interdict the GRAU cargo allows RF to establish overwhelming fire superiority, forcing UAF units to conduct a catastrophic operational retreat from the SKDA, exposing Kramatorsk and Slovyansk to direct fire and subsequent seizure.
2. Deep Strike/AD Denial Combination: RF utilizes Iranian support to surge long-range UAVs/missiles simultaneously with Buk-M3 SAM systems, achieving temporary airspace denial over key operational areas and critical industrial infrastructure, effectively blinding UAF ISR and degrading defensive maneuverability.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS