Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121500Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA DEFENSE CRITICAL; KRASNOARMEYSK THREAT PERSISTS; UAF ACHIEVES OPERATIONAL BREAKTHROUGH AT KUPIANSK; RF TARGETS LONG-TERM SUSTAINMENT.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational situation remains defined by the severe and immediate threat to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA), specifically the operational artery through Krasnoarmeysk (Myrnohrad).

• SKDA Axis: RF forces continue offensive pressure. UAF forces (Skelet 425th Separate Assault Battalion) confirm a successful counter-engagement near Pokrovsk (west of Krasnoarmeysk), resulting in the destruction of an RF ground convoy (multiple vehicles and personnel). This kinetic success provides a momentary tactical delay but does not alleviate the strategic threat.
• Northern Axis (Kupiansk): UAF forces have achieved a localized operational victory. Confirmed reports indicate the complete clearance of the northwestern perimeter of Kupiansk and the potential encirclement of over 200 RF personnel within the city limits. This tactical success frees up defensive depth in Kharkiv Oblast.
• Deep Battle Axis: RF deep strike activity has intensified, focusing on critical economic and logistical sustainment nodes far from the front. The confirmed, prolonged attack on the Pavlohrad coal mine (Dnipro region) demonstrates a clear shift toward infrastructure denial aimed at Ukraine's long-term industrial capacity.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist, facilitating uninterrupted high-altitude ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) for both sides and supporting continued RF employment of Guided Air Bombs (KABs) and hypersonic munitions (Kinzhal). Cold weather aviation procedures are confirmed on the RF side (Fighterbomber 10:46:40).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are successfully leveraging local superiority in Kupiansk to transition from defense to limited offensive action (encirclement) while simultaneously defending the critical SKDA axis. RF forces maintain air dominance, evidenced by the reported mass strike utilizing Kinzhal missiles against high-value targets across the deep rear. UAF Air Defense (AD) remains stretched across three critical sectors: SKDA, Kharkiv, and the deep industrial rear (Pavlohrad/Odesa).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed to be maximalist: securing the Donbas and degrading Ukraine’s strategic depth.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF MoD is increasingly providing highly detailed (though often inflated) accounts of large-scale, deep missile strikes, underscoring the shift in emphasis to air-delivered precision munitions to achieve strategic objectives.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW REMAINS: The logistical surge (260th GRAU cargo) remains mobile and its interdiction window closes NLT 121800Z DEC (less than 3 hours remaining). Failure to neutralize this capability before dispersion will enable the predicted RF saturation fire required for the Krasnoarmeysk operation.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective at the strategic and political level (synchronizing deep strikes with IO messaging). However, the publication of serious allegations of corruption, combat failure, and potential murder by an RF serviceman (10:26:30) highlights localized failures in C2, discipline, and troop morale within specific formations.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces have successfully executed an operational block in the Kupiansk sector, significantly boosting morale and securing the northern flank. Readiness remains high, but strategic reserves are critically allocated to defend Krasnoarmeysk, which will face overwhelming fire if the GRAU interdiction fails.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Major Success (Kupiansk): Local operational encirclement and clearance confirmed. This demonstrates effective integration of mechanized, drone, and ground assets.
• Tactical Success (SKDA): Confirmed destruction of an RF ground convoy near Pokrovsk slows forward momentum on the critical Krasnoarmeysk axis.
• Asymmetric Success (Deep Strike): Confirmed joint SSO/“Black Spark” operation resulting in damage to two RF vessels in the Caspian Sea. This confirms UAF capability to project influence far outside established theaters, complicating RF naval and energy security.
• Setback (Infrastructure): Sustained and concentrated attack on the Pavlohrad coal mine confirms continued vulnerability of deep industrial targets to RF strategic air assets.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. LRPF Systems: Absolute critical priority for the GRAU interdiction mission (P1). The failure to interdict has exponentially higher military cost than the expenditure of the LRPF assets.
2. AD/EW Assets: The complexity of managing deep strike threats (Kinzhal/UAVs targeting Pavlohrad/Odesa/Dnipro) simultaneous with front-line AD requirements (SKDA/Kupiansk) is severely stressing existing capacity.
3. Manpower: Internal UAF messaging regarding the success in Kupiansk must be maximized to counter RF propaganda and maintain force cohesion following recent reports of disciplinary policy changes (SZCh to Assault Units - noted in previous Daily Report).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• DMZ Sovereignty Refinement (KEY SHIFT): RF official Ushakov has softened the previous maximalist claim. The new narrative proposes that a potential demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Donbas would be managed by Rosgvardia and Russian police, not military forces. (10:40:26). This aims to present a less aggressive, quasi-civilian solution while retaining Russian jurisdictional control over the claimed territory, still fundamentally rejecting Ukrainian sovereignty.
• RF Casualty Disclosure: Open source monitoring (Mediazona/BBC) confirms over 155,000 RF losses, maintaining internal domestic pressure on the RF regime despite efforts to mask these figures.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The operational success in Kupiansk provides a major morale boost. Conversely, the documented allegations of systemic failure and corruption within RF ranks (10:26:30) serve as excellent UAF Information Operations material to degrade enemy cohesion. Ukrainian financial stability remains volatile (USD weakening, EUR strengthening), which requires monitoring for potential economic anxiety.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF continues diplomatic efforts to normalize its international position (e.g., International Volleyball Federation decision to readmit youth teams NLT January 2026). Strategic diplomatic messaging must pivot immediately to counter the refined RF DMZ narrative, framing Rosgvardia control as a continued military occupation under a civilian label.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Breakthrough Attempt: RF will initiate a synchronized, multi-echelon attack on Krasnoarmeysk NLT 140000Z DEC. The operation hinges on the arrival and deployment of the 260th GRAU cargo, enabling fire density required to suppress UAF defensive lines and capitalize on previous breaches (Siversk, Konstantinovka).
2. Sustainment Degradation Focus: RF will maintain a high tempo of deep strike operations against UAF strategic industrial and energy facilities (e.g., Pavlohrad, infrastructure supporting SKDA/Kharkiv), prioritizing long-term attrition over immediate battlefield gains.
3. Kupiansk Counter-Attack: RF forces will attempt to relieve the encircled troops and repel UAF exploitation in Kupiansk within the next 48 hours, likely utilizing high-precision air assets (KABs/UAVs) to suppress UAF maneuverability.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Collapse via Fire Superiority: Failure to interdict the 260th GRAU cargo results in the RF achieving overwhelming fire superiority. This surge, combined with the successful consolidation of Siversk and Konstantinovka advances, forces a disorganized UAF operational retreat from the SKDA, sacrificing large quantities of materiel and enabling the RF to project the conflict well into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS