Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121400Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA MANEUVER CRISIS: KRASNOARMEYSK UNDER IMMINENT THREAT; UAF KUPYANSK TACTICAL SUCCESS CONFIRMED; GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW CLOSING.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA). The RF push to seize Krasnoarmeysk (Myrnohrad) to sever the main western supply line (MSR Pokrovsk) is underway and must be treated as the immediate critical threat.

• SKDA Axis: RF forces continue deep urban fighting in Konstantinovka. Pro-RF sources are amplifying claims of localized UAF surrender and vehicle destruction near Dymytrov/Myrnohrad, synchronizing IO with maneuver preparation.
• Northern Axis (Kupiansk): UAF Defense Forces have achieved a confirmed significant tactical success, blocking RF forces and clearing the entire northwestern perimeter of Kupiansk. This temporarily stabilizes the Northern Kharkiv Oblast line and frees up resources, but RF counter-attacks are anticipated.
• Deep Strike / Interdiction: Air Command confirms continued Kinzhal/UAV preparation (Vilkove/Odesa) and active KAB (Guided Air Bomb) usage against targets in the Kharkiv region, reinforcing the RF strategy of air superiority and infrastructure denial.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Current weather allows for persistent high-altitude ISR and continued use of guided munitions (KABs confirmed, UAVs active). No immediate weather-based advantage for UAF maneuverability.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are successfully executing a localized counter-offensive in Kupiansk while managing a critical retrograde/defense in the SKDA. UAF AD is engaged in managing multi-domain threats across the front and deep rear. RF forces are postured for a decisive thrust toward Krasnoarmeysk.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent has expanded to include immediate operational seizure of Krasnoarmeysk coupled with a maximalist political/IO campaign to justify further escalation (CBRN threat).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed use of KABs in the Kharkiv sector, synchronized with deep UAV flights toward Vilkove (Odesa maritime entry), suggests an ongoing focus on suppressing UAF counter-offensive capabilities (Kharkiv) and interdicting potential Western maritime or air corridors (Odesa). This high-tempo air threat is now confirmed on multiple axes.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW REMAINS: Failure to interdict the 260th GRAU cargo before dispersion (est. NLT 121800Z DEC) will guarantee the RF fire superiority surge required for the Krasnoarmeysk operation.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing strategic political signaling (Ushakov Donbas claim), IO escalation (CBRN threat), deep strike planning (KABs/UAVs), and immediate tactical maneuver (Krasnoarmeysk push).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness remains high, buoyed by the significant tactical success in Kupiansk. However, the confirmed attack that injured coal mine workers (MinEnergo) highlights the continued difficulty in defending dispersed critical civilian infrastructure against targeted RF kinetic denial operations.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Kupiansk): UAF tactical units achieved operational block and cleared the NW outskirts of the city. This is a critical local victory preventing a flanking maneuver in the north. (HIGH confidence)
• Success (Deep Battle): Confirmed destruction of RF armored assets near Dymytrov/Myrnohrad, slowing RF forward movement.
• Setback (Infrastructure/Defense): Sustained pressure on industrial targets and continued KAB strikes in Kharkiv prove the inability to fully mitigate RF air superiority and deep strike capability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. LRPF systems are critically required immediately for the GRAU interdiction (P1).
2. AD/C-UAS assets are severely constrained by the need to cover three major kinetic threats simultaneously: SKDA front, Kharkiv/Kupiansk counter-offensive, and deep logistics (Pavlohrad/Odesa/Dnipro).
3. Political Cohesion: Reports of imminent leadership change within the ruling party (Servant of the People) introduce a layer of domestic political friction that must be monitored closely to prevent it from undermining national unity messaging.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The Information Environment has significantly escalated:

• CBRN Weaponization (CRITICAL): The introduction of the "Dirty Bomb/Bio-lab" narrative is highly alarming. It signals potential RF preparation for a major, non-conventional justification for military escalation or the use of specific long-range assets. (HIGH Confidence).
• Maximalist Claim: RF official Ushakov's definitive rejection of a referendum and claim that "The entire Donbas is Russian" reinforces the hardline RF position, undermining negotiation viability and sustaining the "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative.
• EU Fragmentation: Orbán's publicized critique of the EU asset seizure procedure feeds the RF narrative that the West lacks cohesion and is susceptible to pressure.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The tactical success in Kupiansk provides a necessary morale boost. However, the looming threat to Krasnoarmeysk and the increasing severity of RF deep strike (KABs, industrial targeting) require robust and confident communication from UAF StratCom to prevent public anxiety regarding industrial/economic collapse.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF leadership (Putin) meeting with Turkish leadership (Erdogan) suggests continued diplomatic maneuvering to influence international mediation efforts. The planned Zelensky-Polish meeting is crucial for demonstrating continued strategic coordination with key partners, especially in light of RF efforts to fragment NATO/EU.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Collapse Thrust: RF forces will utilize concentrated fire (enabled by the 260th GRAU cargo arrival NLT 130000Z DEC) to initiate a full-scale mechanized assault on Krasnoarmeysk (Myrnohrad) NLT 140000Z DEC, aiming to sever the operational supply line.
2. Targeted Infrastructure Denial: RF will sustain and increase deep strike velocity (Kinzhal/KABs) against high-value military and economic infrastructure in central Ukraine (Dnipro/Pavlohrad) and the newly active Kharkiv sector to limit UAF maneuver and long-term sustainment.
3. CBRN Narrative Utilization: RF StratCom will flood international channels with the CBRN threat narrative, possibly leading to demands for UN inspections or creating diplomatic friction to complicate future military aid deliveries.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Logistical & IO Perfect Storm: The successful arrival and deployment of the 260th GRAU cargo coincides with the RF mechanized capture of Krasnoarmeysk, forcing a disorderly retreat from the SKDA. This kinetic success is immediately followed by a synchronized IO operation leveraging the CBRN narrative to either justify a massive escalation or successfully pressure Western partners into a freeze on PURL aid or a premature negotiated cease-fire on RF terms.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS