Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121200Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA DECISIVE POINT IMMINENT; GRAU INTERDICTION CRITICAL; RF DEEP STRIKE AND IO SYNCHRONIZATION CONFIRMED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA) remains the primary focus. RF maneuver forces are consolidating gains while preparing for the decisive phase of the assault, utilizing confirmed deep strike capabilities to isolate the battle space.

• Pincer Movement Confirmation: Intense kinetic pressure persists on the northern (Siversk-Slovyansk) and southern (Konstantinovka) axes (GS ZSU confirmation). RF forces (3rd Army) are actively exploiting the Siversk breach toward Slovyansk.
• Operational Objective Shift (CRITICAL): RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) claim of civilian evacuation from Krasnoarmeysk (Myrnohrad) signals that this major UAF logistics node and industrial hub is the likely next operational objective after Konstantinovka. Krasnoarmeysk sits directly on the main supply route (MSR) from Pokrovsk and must be considered under immediate, high-priority threat of kinetic and maneuver interdiction.
• Deep Strike Activity: Confirmed Kinzhal (aero-ballistic) missile usage by RF forces in recent days (Dec 6-12 period) confirms high-value strike asset commitment to suppress UAF strategic rear capability. Active UAV groups detected inbound to Pavlohrad, Odesa/Vilkove, and South Kharkiv, confirming continued multi-axis deep reconnaissance and strike preparation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear enough visibility for continued use of guided munitions (KABs confirmed East Kharkiv) and persistent UAV operations. Forecast strong winds in Bryansk (RF rear area) may disrupt RF short-range ISR capabilities near the border tomorrow, though this offers minimal tactical advantage to UAF defense in the Donbas.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense is engaged in dynamic C-UAS operations across multiple regions (Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk). UAF Ground Forces are engaged in high-intensity defense, successfully repelling multiple assaults in the North Slobozhansky and Kursk directions (GS ZSU). UAF StratCom continues the effort to contain the "DMZ" narrative.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is systemic collapse: kinetically through SKDA destruction enabled by massive fire superiority, and strategically by crippling UAF long-term industrial capacity and diplomatic standing.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The sustained and highly targeted attack on the coal mine (6+ hours) indicates a tactical adaptation aimed not just at denying power, but at denying the critical industrial output and worker base necessary for long-term state function. This is a deliberate shift from broad energy grid attacks to targeted economic denial.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW REMAINS: The deadline for striking the 260th GRAU cargo is NLT 121800Z DEC. Failure to interdict will enable the massive fire superiority surge expected NLT 130000Z DEC, which will be synchronized with the push toward Krasnoarmeysk.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of: 1) high-level strategic strikes (Kinzhal/deep UAVs), 2) tactical maneuver (Konstantinovka/Siversk exploitation), and 3) immediate IO signaling (Myrnohrad evacuation claim).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are successfully holding localized lines against heavy mechanized and artillery pressure (e.g., Kursk/North Slobozhansky repulsions). However, assets are strained by the requirement to defend critical rear areas (Pavlohrad UAV alert, Odesa) while maintaining high-intensity combat in the Donbas. Readiness remains high due to internal morale operations (Ground Forces Day observance).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Defense): Repelled 6 assaults in the North/Kursk directions, preventing new breakthroughs outside the SKDA.
• Success (IO): Presidential Office (OP) issued a necessary and timely refutation of the Le Monde buffer zone claim, reinforcing the rejection of the "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative.
• Setback (Kinetic/Infrastructure): Confirmed use of Kinzhals by RF, underscoring the severity of the deep strike threat. Sustained drone attack on critical industrial (coal) infrastructure confirms difficulty in achieving 100% C-UAS protection for dispersed economic targets.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. LRPF systems remain prioritized for the GRAU interdiction (P1).
2. SHORAD/MRAD allocation must rapidly shift to protect logistics routes and military infrastructure leading into Krasnoarmeysk (Myrnohrad), which is now explicitly targeted by RF operations and deep strikes (UAV alerts on Pavlohrad/Dnipro increase risk to central logistics).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF is employing sophisticated synchronization:

• Judicial Weaponization: The high-profile judicial sentencing of ICC officials serves as a powerful signal of RF defiance, intended to deter future international legal actions against RF leadership. (HIGH confidence)
• Containment Response: UAF OP’s refutation of the DMZ/buffer zone is immediately met by RF media questioning Kyiv’s sincerity and readiness for the "Korean Option." This maintains pressure on Western partners to accept the RF-defined negotiation framework.
• Fragmentation Narrative: RF propaganda continues to push the idea of Western fracture, claiming U.S. intent to break up the EU by encouraging sovereignist factions (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland). Intention: Degrade Western cohesion and slow down aid/financial packages.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF morale benefits from the official celebration of Ground Forces Day and the honoring of fallen defenders in Zaporizhzhia. However, the sustained strategic missile/UAV attacks and the rapid kinetic deterioration in the SKDA region (Konstantinovka/Myrnohrad) require continuous, stabilizing communication.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF judicial action against the ICC may complicate future legal cooperation efforts among Western partners. The success of the UAF OP in refuting the DMZ leak must be leveraged immediately to counteract the ongoing RF narrative of diplomatic inevitability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Logistics Severance: RF forces will utilize artillery saturation (enabled by the 260th GRAU cargo) and simultaneous maneuver pressure to seize control of Krasnoarmeysk (Myrnohrad) NLT 140000Z DEC, effectively cutting the primary UAF supply line to the SKDA from the West.
2. Sustained Deep Strike Campaign: RF will continue targeted Kinzhal/UAV strikes against high-value military industrial targets (e.g., defense plants, large repair/staging depots) across central and southern Ukraine (Pavlohrad, Dnipro, Odesa) to degrade UAF ability to absorb Western aid (PURL).
3. Maximum IO Pressure: RF StratCom will synchronize the imminent fall of Konstantinovka and the assault on Krasnoarmeysk with maximal amplification of the "Minsk III/US-forced negotiations" narrative to paralyze external decision-makers.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Triple Interdiction Success: Failure to interdict the 260th GRAU cargo coincides with a successful Kinzhal strike on a crucial PURL aid reception center (e.g., railway intermodal hub near Dnipro/Pavlohrad) and the RF mechanized capture of Krasnoarmeysk. This confluence would lead to immediate logistical collapse across the SKDA, forcing an operational retreat into defensive lines that are not yet fully prepared, potentially losing control of Kramatorsk within 96 hours.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS