Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121130Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA GRAU INTERDICTION CRITICAL; DEEP INTERDICTION RISK EXPANDED; DMZ NARRATIVE CONTAINMENT AND DIPLOMATIC FRAGMENTATION CONFIRMED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA) is accelerating toward a decisive point.

• Axis Convergence: Kinetic pressure is maximized on the Siversk-Slovyansk and Konstantinovka urban fighting axes. RF forces confirmed seizure of Siversk and are exploiting aggressively.
• Deep Strike Zone Expansion (CRITICAL): Recent RF long-range kinetic action near Vozdvizhivka (8km SW of Dobropillya) confirms that RF assets (likely long-range loitering munitions or artillery guided by ISR/UAVs) now possess the reach to successfully interdict UAF rear-echelon logistics and high-value assets (HVA) operating behind the primary SKDA defensive hub (Kramatorsk/Druzhkivka). This poses a direct and immediate threat to the secure staging of incoming US PURL aid.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low cloud ceiling persists, degrading UAF high-altitude ISR capabilities necessary for real-time logistics tracking (P1 GRAU interdiction). RF successfully leveraged the night environment for strategic air attacks (confirmed power outages in three regions).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense (AD) remains at DEFCON 2 following confirmed night attacks, resulting in power outages in three regions. UAF STRATCOM has rapidly deployed a counter-narrative to the DMZ reports. UAF Ground Forces are actively commemorating Ground Forces Day, serving as a critical internal morale operation amid kinetic and cognitive crises.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to collapse the SKDA through overwhelming kinetic force (GRAU surge) while simultaneously fracturing UAF resolve and international support using hybrid operations.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has immediately adapted its information campaign. Following Kyiv's refutation of the DMZ rumors, RF IO channels instantly pivoted to framing the denial as evidence that the US/Trump administration is forcing Kyiv into peace talks ("Minsk III"). This rapid counter-counter-narrative demonstrates high agility and synchronization between military bloggers and state media.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW REMAINS: The deadline for striking the 260th GRAU cargo is NLT 121800Z DEC. Failure to interdict will enable fire superiority that UAF East Command cannot absorb.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, synchronizing kinetic aggression (SKDA assault, deep strikes) with immediate, effective information operations aimed at achieving diplomatic friction.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are under maximum stress, fighting high-intensity urban combat while simultaneously conducting strategic AD and combating a critical information attack. The morale operation (Ground Forces Day) is necessary to stabilize internal psychological defense.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Battle): Confirmed BDA at the Orsk mechanical plant (artillery shell production) represents a significant strike against RF long-term military production capacity.
• Success (Information Warfare): The Presidential Office (OP) delivered an immediate and effective denial of the DMZ reports, successfully blunting the initial phase of the RF narrative attack.
• Setback (Kinetic): Confirmed loss of high-value UAF armor (Leopard MBT) near Konstantinovka. Confirmed power outages in three regions following night attacks.
• Setback (Diplomatic): Slovakia publicly confirmed it will block EU reparations loan, confirming successful RF influence operation against EU financial cohesion.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. LRPF systems remain prioritized for the GRAU interdiction (P1).
2. Mobile AD/EW assets must be urgently allocated to protect logistics routes receiving PURL aid (Kramatorsk/Druzhkivka rear areas) due to the expanded RF deep strike threat (Vozdvizhivka model).
3. STRATCOM assets must sustain the counter-narrative against the "Minsk III" bargaining spin.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The IO focus has shifted from initial panic generation to narrative manipulation:

1. "Minsk III" Spin: RF military and state media (Colonelcassad, Kotyonok) are now framing Kyiv's necessary DMZ refutation as being forced into negotiations by the U.S., specifically the Trump administration ("Spirit of Anchorage"). Intention: Undermine UAF sovereignty and portray Kyiv as subservient to external pressures while justifying continued methodical RF advance.
2. Diplomatic Victory Amplification: RF media is amplifying the Slovakian block as definitive proof of collapsing Western financial support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The immediate government refutation (OP/Litvin) has provided critical short-term cognitive stability, but the rapid "Minsk III" counter-spin, combined with ongoing strategic losses (Siversk, power outages), threatens long-term morale. Sustained, credible communication (including the Ground Forces Day messaging) is required to stabilize the internal narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Slovakian block on EU financial support is a confirmed success for RF diplomatic influence operations. Simultaneously, RF C2 is monitoring and publicly commenting on perceived shifts in the U.S. peace plan (Ushakov's statement), indicating preparedness to react to (or derail) any international diplomatic initiatives that do not favor Russia's current gains.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Deep Logistics Interdiction: RF assets will actively exploit the demonstrated deep strike capability (Vozdvizhivka pattern) targeting major UAF logistics hubs, rail heads, and HVA (e.g., armor concentrations, LRPF launchers) in the UAF rear area (Druzhkivka, Dobropillya) to preempt the integration of PURL aid into the SKDA defense.
2. GRAU Saturation & SKDA Exploitation: If the 260th GRAU cargo is not interdicted by 121800Z DEC, the ensuing fire surge will be synchronized with maximal mechanized assault, likely targeting the weakened northern Slovyansk flank or attempting to split Konstantinovka’s western perimeter.
3. Sustained IO Pressure: RF StratCom will maintain maximum pressure on the "Minsk III/US-forced negotiation" narrative, utilizing every tactical gain (Konstantinovka BDA, Siversk consolidation) to reinforce the perception of inevitable UAF collapse.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Collapse via Logistics Failure: Failure to interdict the 260th GRAU cargo coincides with a successful RF deep strike on a critical PURL aid depot or rail node, creating a logistical famine at the front. This combination enables a decisive breakthrough, forcing UAF operational-level retreat from Kramatorsk/Druzhkivka. The retreat is then framed globally as a de facto acceptance of the DMZ, locking in diplomatic isolation and accelerating partner fatigue.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS