Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121100Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: GRAU INTERDICTION CRITICAL; ACTIVE STRATEGIC MISSILE THREAT; DMZ IO CAMPAIGN PEAK AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE REQUIREMENT.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA) has intensified following the validated seizure of Siversk (North) and continued high-intensity urban fighting within Konstantinovka (South). This confirms the RF operational goal of a pincer movement to isolate the SKDA.

• Kinetic Axes: Fighting is at maximum intensity on the Siversk-Slovyansk and Konstantinovka axes. RF claims of control inside Konstantinovka (45% claimed) are treated as operational reality until verified by ground forces.
• Deep Strike Zone: A new, active threat is confirmed. UAF Air Force reports Tu-95MS strategic bombers have executed launch maneuvers from the Penza region, posing an immediate cruise missile threat to multiple regions (Chernihiv, Sumy, and central Ukraine). A high-speed target is specifically tracked toward Khotiń, Sumy region. This signals a renewed, coordinated air campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous reporting. Low cloud ceiling continues to limit the effectiveness of high-altitude ISR needed for real-time logistics tracking, which negatively impacts the P1 GRAU interdiction mission.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense (AD) is currently operating at maximum readiness (DEFCON 2) to intercept the confirmed cruise missile launch wave. Ground forces maintain integrity in the SKDA, focusing on stabilizing the northern flank exposed by the Siversk loss. The confirmation of Akhmat-Chechnya 1434th MRR activity in the Sumy direction suggests RF is increasing pressure on the Northern Operating Zone (NOZ) potentially to fix reserves or facilitate cross-border sabotage/hybrid operations.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent remains focused on kinetic victory in the SKDA synchronized with cognitive collapse via information operations.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has executed a rapid, two-pronged IO escalation:

1. Re-weaponization of WMD/Radiological Threat: The Rtishchev briefing reintroduces the "dirty bomb" narrative, likely aimed at distracting from RF atrocities and adding an element of international panic to the existing diplomatic DMZ pressure.
2. Immediate Denial/Reinterpretation of UAF Counter-Narrative: RF propaganda immediately reinterpreted Kyiv's necessary counter-narrative (conditional DMZ based on mutual withdrawal) as a forced capitulation by "military dictator Zelensky," demonstrating agile information defense.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL LOGISTICS INTERDICTION WINDOW: The deadline for striking the 260th GRAU cargo is NLT 121800Z DEC (Less than 7 hours). Failure to interdict this specific cargo is assessed as the single greatest threat to preventing RF fire superiority from overwhelming the SKDA defenses in the next 36 hours.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in synchronizing strategic kinetic threats (cruise missiles) with active front-line pressure (SKDA) and aggressive information operations (DMZ/WMD).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF is currently reacting to two high-priority threats: strategic missile defense and the SKDA defensive collapse. The morale is generally sustained (evidenced by the celebration of Ground Forces Day and Southern Command BDA) but is at high risk of rapid erosion if the DMZ narrative is not decisively refuted. Manpower challenges are confirmed by the previously reported policy of reassigning Unauthorized Absence (SZCh) personnel to assault units.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Battle): Confirmed BDA on the Yaroslavl industrial target demonstrates continued capacity for strategic depth strikes. Southern forces achieved high attrition against RF personnel and assets.
• Setback (Strategic Defense): Confirmed active cruise missile threat necessitates resource diversion from the front line to the rear defense.
• Setback (Diplomatic): Slovakia's public blocking of the EU reparations loan signals successful RF diplomatic influence operations against EU cohesion.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. LRPF systems remain prioritized for the GRAU interdiction (P1).
2. AD/EW assets must be rapidly reallocated to intercept the current cruise missile launch and address potential hybrid incursions in the Sumy direction.
3. STRATCOM assets require immediate authorization to issue a government-wide, unified counter-narrative to the DMZ claims.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF is executing an optimized hybrid IO campaign:

1. Narrative Amplification (DMZ): Reports, sourced globally (Le Monde) and domestically (Stermenko, Kotsnews), claiming Kyiv has agreed to territorial concessions. RF propaganda attempts to lock in this narrative by twisting Kyiv’s inevitable counter-statement (conditional withdrawal) into proof of capitulation.
2. Fear Generation (WMD): The reintroduction of the radiological incident (dirty bomb) scare by Maj. Gen. Rtishchev aims to increase diplomatic friction and pressure for intervention/ceasefire.
3. Diplomatic Sabotage: Slovakia's block on EU financial support is leveraged by RF media to portray Western support as collapsing and unreliable.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal political cohesion is under severe stress due to the DMZ reports (DS belief confirms this is the primary current cognitive vulnerability). UAF must move rapidly to ensure the public, especially frontline troops, understands that any proposed buffer zone is conditional on mutual, complete withdrawal to pre-war borders, not a recognition of current losses.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The diplomatic landscape is fractured. While US PURL aid is confirmed, the successful RF influence operation against Slovakia (blocking EU reparations credit) demonstrates vulnerability within the European consensus. RF closely monitors any potential US/EU/Ukraine diplomatic tracks (Peskov's comment).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. GRAU Saturation & Assault (Kinetic Peak): If uninterdicted (NLT 121800Z DEC), RF forces will commence maximum artillery fire NLT 130000Z DEC, followed immediately by mechanized exploitation aimed at breaching the Konstantinovka western defenses or the northern Slovyansk approach.
2. Strategic Missile/UAV Strike Wave: The confirmed launch of Tu-95MS cruise missiles will be followed by a saturation UAV attack (likely Shaheds) targeting energy distribution and major logistics rail yards (Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Sumy) to maximize the dispersal of UAF AD and halt the incoming PURL aid flow.
3. Northern Fixation: RF will utilize claimed Akhmat activity in Sumy to conduct high-profile, shallow incursions (e.g., raiding border towns) to fix UAF reserve units in the NOZ.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Collapse & Diplomatic Isolation (The "Perfect Storm"): The GRAU fire surge enables a decisive breakthrough, forcing UAF units to withdraw from Kramatorsk. This kinetic defeat coincides with the successful propagation of the radiological/WMD scare, causing key NATO members to publicly demand an immediate, UN-monitored ceasefire based on the current LOC under the guise of the alleged "DMZ agreement." Kyiv is simultaneously deprived of critical EU financial support due to Slovakian/other member blockages, severely compromising long-term sustainment.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS