Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121000Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL DMZ/BUFFER ZONE IO EXPLOSION; GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW CLOSING; SUSTAINED DEEP STRIKE ON ENERGY GRID.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA) is at its kinetic and cognitive peak. RF forces are sustaining high-intensity combined arms assaults targeting the collapse of the defensive perimeter.

• Kinetic Axis: High-tempo fighting continues in Konstantinovka and along the immediate approaches to Slovyansk (confirmed by RF propaganda video of strikes near Slovyansk and confirmed KAB usage in Donetsk region). RF efforts are focused on rapid exploitation of the Siversk and Konstantinovka axes.
• Deep Strike Zone: RF deep battle targeting remains focused on systemic national resilience. Confirmed mass drone attacks (likely Shaheds) caused power outages in the Odesa and Donetsk regions. New UAV incursions detected toward Odesa (South) and Sumy (North), confirming multi-vector saturation strategy.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Previous reporting holds: Low cloud ceiling continues to limit the effectiveness of high-altitude ISR needed for real-time logistics tracking. The GRAU interdiction remains time-critical.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense (AD) remains engaged in high-volume kinetic defense in the deep rear. Ground forces maintain defensive integrity under extreme pressure in the SKDA. A critical new force measure is the urgent requirement for a cohesive strategic communications response to the DMZ narrative (see Section 4).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed as achieving a major operational breakthrough in the Donbas NLT 130000Z DEC, synchronized with a strategic IO campaign designed to generate internal friction and international pressure for a ceasefire on RF terms.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF has executed a rapid, flexible pivot in its strategic IO campaign, immediately shifting from the WMD/Nuclear fear vector (Rtishchev briefing) to the political/diplomatic vulnerability vector (DMZ agreement reports). This demonstrates agile synchronization between military-political objectives.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL LOGISTICS WINDOW: The interdiction window for the 260th GRAU cargo is hours away from closing (NLT 121800Z DEC). Failure to locate and strike this cargo is assessed as the single greatest threat to operational stability in the SKDA.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in linking operational momentum (SKDA advance) with strategic political messaging (DMZ pressure). UAF must assume RF will escalate kinetic activity simultaneously with the IO campaign peak.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are successfully holding the line kinetically but are under extreme pressure both at the front (SKDA) and in the deep rear (infrastructure defense). Morale is bolstered by the announcement of the substantial US PURL aid package, but may be undermined by the unrefuted DMZ narrative.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Logistics Support): Confirmation of a $5B US PURL aid package (AD, munitions, parts) is a major strategic success, confirming continued robust foreign assistance.
• Setback (Infrastructure): Confirmed power outages in Odesa and Donetsk regions due to drone saturation attacks.
• Setback (Information): The widespread reporting (domestic and international) of UAF agreement on a DMZ creates severe political/strategic vulnerability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. LRPF systems remain prioritized for the 260th GRAU interdiction (P1).
2. Urgent requirement for clear, unified strategic messaging to counter the DMZ narrative, preventing political erosion and internal dissent.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF is executing an accelerated, multi-axis IO offensive:

1. DMZ Pressure: Leveraging reports from Le Monde and subsequent domestic/allied media (TASS, Turkey) to signal that Kyiv is capitulating and is ready to accept territorial losses, putting pressure on UAF forces to halt operations.
2. Leadership Degradation: Highlighting Trump’s statement that President Zelensky is the primary obstacle to peace, targeting his legitimacy both domestically and internationally.
3. Local Attrition Claims: Using footage (e.g., Dimitrov surrender, Leopard destruction) to generate a feeling of localized military defeat and collapse.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal cohesion is at risk. While the US aid announcement is positive, the DMZ reports—especially the critique by figures like Butusov—suggest potential fracturing between the military/patriotic community (pushing for victory) and the political leadership (perceived willingness to negotiate under pressure).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF IO aims to shift the international focus from military support to diplomatic negotiation based on the current LOC. Turkey's public call for territorial concession reinforces this pressure. The large PURL aid package serves as a crucial counter-signal, demonstrating continued US commitment to Kyiv's security goals.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. GRAU Fire Initiation (If Uninterdicted): Following the closure of the interdiction window (NLT 121800Z DEC), RF artillery saturation will commence NLT 130000Z DEC, enabling mechanized exploitation toward Kramatorsk/Slovyansk.
2. DMZ IO Peak: RF will flood information channels with narratives amplifying the 'agreement' to a buffer zone, potentially using this as a pretext to declare a localized "humanitarian ceasefire" based on the current line of control, thus attempting to legitimize their territorial gains.
3. Sustained Deep Strike: Continuation of mass UAV attacks targeting key rail hubs and repair facilities in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk (Pavlohrad), and Sumy regions to disrupt the flow of the newly confirmed US PURL aid package.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Kinetic Collapse & Diplomatic Isolation: The combination of overwhelming GRAU artillery saturation and successful RF maneuver (e.g., isolation of Kramatorsk) coincides with a loss of strategic control over the DMZ narrative. Key NATO partners (e.g., France/Germany) publicly pressure Kyiv to enter immediate negotiations under the umbrella of the alleged DMZ agreement, jeopardizing the operational continuity of the war effort and forcing negotiation from a position of kinetic weakness.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated)

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS