Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 120900Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA PREPARATORY PHASE INITIATED; ODESA INFRASTRUCTURE CRITICALLY DEGRADED; GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW CLOSING.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA). The capture of Siversk is confirmed (Fact - Rybar IO confirmed) and RF exploitation efforts are intensifying toward Slovyansk from the North. Ongoing urban combat in Konstantinovka persists. RF operational focus has expanded the scope of deep-strike kinetic activity, confirmed by the impact on essential services in Odesa (Fact - Partial loss of water and power confirmed).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes in weather. Low visibility conditions continue to support nocturnal RF UAS and kinetic strike penetration, as demonstrated by the Odesa attack.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

Ukrainian Air Defense (AD) assets are operating under maximum strain. The confirmed kinetic strike on Odesa utilities necessitates the immediate diversion of mobile AD resources to the Southern sector, further thinning defenses over the critical Pavlohrad logistics hub and the SKDA rear area. RF command elements, including V. Putin, are engaged in high-profile diplomatic events (Turkmenistan), signaling perceived operational confidence and decoupling strategic leadership from tactical crises.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: achieve decisive operational victory in the SKDA sector supported by high-volume preparatory fire and concurrent strategic disruption (Odesa).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift in targeting methodology to strike key urban utilities (water pumping, power distribution) far from the frontline confirms a successful adaptation to maximize civilian impact and administrative complexity with minimal kinetic resources. This expands the RF strategic target set beyond fuel and rail.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL LOGISTICS GAP (P1): The location of the 260th GRAU cargo remains the single most critical intelligence gap. Failure to interdict this mass transit asset before dispersal will guarantee the high-volume preparatory fire anticipated for 13 DEC. RF sustainment elsewhere remains robust.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is assessed as highly effective. The simultaneous execution of the preparatory phase in Donbas, the complex deep strike in Odesa, and high-level diplomatic signaling (Turkmenistan) demonstrates mature, coordinated multi-domain operations.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is elevated but stretched across multiple axes. UAF forces are maintaining strategic initiative in the deep battle, forcing significant RF AD expenditure (90 claimed intercepts). Defensive resilience in the SKDA sector hinges on successfully delaying the RF advance until strategic reserves can be committed.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Infrastructure Defense): The confirmed partial degradation of water and power infrastructure in Odesa creates immediate political and logistical pressure on the Southern Command, validating RF targeting choices.
• Setback (Maneuver): The operational gap created by the confirmed loss of Siversk remains the primary tactical crisis point, requiring immediate fortification toward Slovyansk.
• Observation: High concentration of RF strikes (590 reported) on the Zaporizhzhia front confirms RF pressure aimed at preventing the orderly completion of Plan PHOENIX retrograde and pinning "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserves.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

P1 Requirement: Immediate AD resource reallocation and engineering support to the Odesa region to protect critical utilities (water pumping stations, power substations) from follow-on strikes. P2 Constraint: The commitment of AD assets to static defense in Odesa directly compromises the ability to provide adequate air cover for forward maneuver units or logistics centers in the SKDA area of responsibility.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is focused on establishing two key narratives:

1. Military Dominance: Rybar and other milbloggers are confirming the "liberation" of Seversk, providing operational credibility to the SKDA advance.
2. Strategic Competence: The high-level diplomatic activity in Turkmenistan projects an image of Russia as a stable, strategic leader, insulating the international community from the perceived brutality of the Odesa strikes and the kinetic escalation in Donbas.
3. Defensive Success: Claiming 90 UAV intercepts is a clear attempt to minimize the morale and material impact of the sustained UAF deep-strike campaign.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stable, bolstered by clear leadership communication (Syrskyi’s address) and high enemy loss estimates. However, the confirmed loss of essential services in Odesa risks rapid localized morale decay and civil unrest if repair efforts are not immediately visible and successful.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Putin's engagement in Turkmenistan may be leveraged by RF StratCom to reinforce the "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative by projecting a statesman-like pursuit of "peace" while simultaneously achieving military gains. The lack of NATO counter-signaling remains a strategic vulnerability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Decisive Fire Saturation (SKDA): RF will execute the full, high-volume preparatory fire utilizing the 260th GRAU cargo mass NLT 130000Z DEC, followed by synchronized mechanized assaults across the Siversk-Konstantinovka axis aimed at isolating Kramatorsk.
2. Sustained Pressure on Odesa Utilities: RF will conduct follow-on kinetic strikes on vulnerable Odesa infrastructure (e.g., port facilities, fuel depots, or secondary power/water systems) within the next 24 hours (NLT 130900Z DEC) to maximize the AD fragmentation achieved by the initial strike.
3. IO Leverage: RF media will continue to use the Turkmenistan diplomatic events to promote narrative victory, suggesting military reality (Seversk) mandates diplomatic concession on current frontlines.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Paralysis Fusion (MDCOA 1): A successful, catastrophic strike on the Pavlohrad rail hub or high-capacity ammunition depot, synchronized with follow-on strikes that prevent the restoration of Odesa’s critical services (power/water NLT 130900Z DEC). This creates a critical lack of combat power sustainment coinciding with the RF 13 DEC SKDA offensive peak.
2. Strategic Reserve Misallocation: The critical resource strain in Odesa forces UAF High Command to commit operational reserves from the SKDA or Zaporizhzhia (PHOENIX) sectors prematurely, leading to a collapse of the main defensive line west of Siversk, allowing RF forces to bypass Slovyansk and threaten the rear of Kramatorsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS