Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121200Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: PAVLOHRAD AD CRISIS CONTINUES; CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION THREAT EMERGES; RF UTILIZES LOGISTICS DRONES; 260TH GRAU PREP STAGE COMPLETE.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA). RF forces are actively consolidating positions achieved by the Siversk breach (North) and maintaining intense urban combat in Konstantinovka (South). The anticipated preparatory artillery fire remains the most immediate kinetic threat.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Ground conditions remain stable. Low-visibility fog continues to favor low-altitude penetration by RF reconnaissance and strike assets in the deep operational rear (Dnipropetrovsk/Sumy/Kharkiv sectors).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense (AD) assets are deployed under critical stress, responding to the ongoing multi-vector UAS threat targeting Pavlohrad (Tier 1 Priority). Reserves in OC East are holding defensive lines west of Siversk, preparing for the predicted armored breakthrough NLT 130000Z DEC.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF strategy is demonstrating effective multi-domain synchronization, linking the kinetic collapse of the SKDA with enhanced logistical redundancy and an aggressive diplomatic information campaign aimed at conditional Western support.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed operational deployment of the Mangas heavy lift drone system for forward logistics (Colonelcassad report) is a key adaptation. It directly addresses the previously identified vulnerability of RF ground transport routes to UAF interdiction near the contact line. This enhances RF sustainment capability during the anticipated offensive.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The 260th GRAU cargo remains untracked but mobile, indicating a state of readiness for deployment. The new reliance on heavy lift drones suggests RF is hedging against UAF efforts to interdict the forward dispersal of ammunition arriving from the 260th GRAU loadout. RF sustainment is highly prioritized and increasingly robust against localized UAF strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective across strategic, operational, and tactical domains, demonstrated by the simultaneous execution of multi-vector UAS attacks, preparation for the kinetic offensive, and immediate deployment of advanced tactical logistics (Mangas drones). Management of internal IO friction (Two Majors incident) continues to demonstrate centralized control over narrative.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains high, but overall operational capacity is strained by the critical AD prioritization decision forced by the RF multi-vector attack. UAF morale receives a tactical boost from official communications celebrating key unit anniversaries (e.g., 95th DShV Brigade), countering the relentless RF pressure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (IO): Effective use of unit anniversaries to reinforce esprit de corps and maintain high internal morale.
• Setback (AD): The requirement to prioritize AD defense across three separate operational areas (Pavlohrad, Sumy, Kharkiv) risks mission failure in secondary sectors, potentially resulting in localized supply line disruption.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

P1 Requirement: Immediate, flexible, and sustained allocation of mobile AD systems (Gepard/Shilka) to protect critical infrastructure in the Sumy and Kharkiv areas while maintaining Tier 1 protection over the Pavlohrad rail hub. P2 Constraint: Manpower capacity, particularly regarding the readiness and integration of SZCh-reassigned personnel into existing assault formations under fire.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO strategy is converging on two mutually reinforcing themes:

1. Normalization of Annexation: Using narratives of refugee return (Moskalkova) and 'DMZ Sovereignty' to internationally legitimize the seizure of Ukrainian territory.
2. Internal Cohesion: Utilizing private military bloggers (VDV, Colonelcassad) to solicit public aid, thus projecting the image that the military operates in concert with civilian support, masking institutional resource shortcomings.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stable due to continued deep strike capability (Tver) and official messaging. However, the external diplomatic pressure arising from key third-party statements (Turkey) poses a significant risk to long-term national resolve if perceived as a prelude to forced territorial concessions.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT: The statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, suggesting "Europe must help Ukraine make a difficult choice," validates the RF strategic objective of diplomatic isolation and conditional aid. This introduces significant uncertainty into NATO/EU support timelines and provides immediate leverage to RF IO campaigns targeting Western unity. Confidence: HIGH (Based on direct source confirmation of high-level diplomatic signaling).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Kinetic Surge: RF will initiate the planned high-volume preparatory fire, including TOS-2 thermobaric systems, across the Siversk-Konstantinovka axis NLT 130000Z DEC, followed by heavy mechanized assaults.
2. Persistent Interdiction: RF will sustain simultaneous, multi-vector UAV strikes (Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv) until at least one critical logistics node (Pavlohrad) is neutralized or UAF AD capacity is depleted.
3. Diplomatic Exploitation: RF will immediately leverage the Turkish FM statement to push for formal negotiations based on the "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative, applying maximum political pressure on key Western capitals.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA/Logistics Collapse Fusion: A successful RF kinetic strike on the Pavlohrad rail hub (leading to logistical paralysis) coincides with the Turkish/European diplomatic initiative gaining traction. This creates a perception of immediate, irreversible military failure, leading to a major NATO ally publicly conditioning future military aid on Kyiv entering territorial concession negotiations (normalizing RF claims).
2. C2 Disruption: RF successfully uses EW/UAV strikes to neutralize key UAF C2 centers in the North/East (Sumy/Kharkiv), preventing coordinated Counter-Battery Fire (CBF) and reserve mobilization during the critical 13 DEC preparatory fire, resulting in catastrophic loss of the forward defensive line.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS