Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 120600Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA PREPARATORY FIRE IMMINENT; RF ADVERSARY EXPANDS DEEP BATTLE INTERDICTION; UAF STRIKE ON TVER CONFIRMED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis remains centered on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA). RF operational pincer continues to tighten, exploiting the northern breach at Siversk and maintaining urban combat inside Konstantinovka (RF claim 45% control).

KEY DEVELOPMENT (Deep Battle Escalation): The deep battle zone has broadened substantially. UAF strikes are confirmed to have impacted targets in Tver Oblast (RF). Simultaneously, RF deep interdiction efforts are expanding, with confirmed hostile UAV tracks detected simultaneously in Dnipropetrovsk (Pavlohrad focus), North Kharkiv, and North Sumy regions.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Low visibility in the morning hours (fog/haze) continues to facilitate low-altitude UAV infiltration and reconnaissance missions across the deep operational rear.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces in the SKDA remain at high alert (DEFCON 2) against the anticipated artillery barrage NLT 130000Z DEC. Critical AD assets are currently tasked with tracking and intercepting the UAV targeting Pavlohrad. The detection of two additional northern tracks (Kharkiv, Sumy) requires immediate reallocation of limited regional AD assets.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to collapse the SKDA through kinetic saturation while maximizing logistical disruption in the UAF rear and achieving simultaneous hybrid warfare objectives.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed shift to simultaneous, multi-regional UAV interdiction (Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk) is a crucial tactical adaptation. This tactic forces UAF AD to either prioritize critical national infrastructure (Kyiv/Caspian response) or front-line sustainment (Pavlohrad), significantly complicating the Defensive Decision Cycle.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The 260th GRAU cargo remains the central logistical threat. The fact that it is mobile but untracked represents the highest operational risk. RF is managing to sustain this massive logistical surge while simultaneously responding to UAF deep strikes (Tver).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating effective synchronization across the domains (kinetic barrage timeline, multi-vector UAV deployment, and global IO launch). Internal C2 appears focused on morale stabilization (VDV/milblogger incident), suggesting localized PSYOP targeting by UAF or internal friction is being managed.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high but severely tested by the multi-domain threat. AD resources are nearing saturation levels due to the simultaneous tracks. Frontline troops in the SKDA are prepared for counter-battery fire but remain critically exposed to the predicted TOS-2 threat.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Strike): Confirmed BDA of the UAV strike on Tver demonstrates continued UAF capability to hold strategic Russian infrastructure at risk, compelling RF to allocate AD resources to the far rear.
• Setback (AD Strain): The three active, separate UAV tracks in the East/Northeast impose a critical strain on AD allocation, increasing the risk of mission failure at the most critical logistics node (Pavlohrad).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is Air Defense capability vs. target density. A rapid prioritization matrix is required to allocate AD assets (Shilka/Gepard/NASAMS) between the Pavlohrad, Kharkiv, and Sumy threats. Strategic StratCom resources are constrained by the simultaneous need to counter the 'Tribunal' and the 'DMZ Sovereignty' narratives.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF hybrid campaign remains focused on dual-track demoralization:

1. External: Discrediting Western military aid systems (e.g., the high cost of US PRO systems) to sow doubt and reduce enthusiasm for long-term military support. (HIGH Confidence)
2. Internal/Factional: Dealing with internal dissent/criticism among key RF nationalist voices (Milbloggers "Two Majors"), confirming internal political friction that UAF PSYOP efforts should exploit.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF deep strike successes (Tver) are vital for maintaining national morale amidst the SKDA crisis. Failure to intercept the Pavlohrad UAV, however, would be a major psychological and logistical blow. The successful management of the SZCh-reassigned personnel remains a critical internal cohesion factor under intense fire.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF strategy is to frame Ukraine as financially and militarily unsustainable (via cost narratives) and politically illegitimate (via the Tribunal/DMZ narrative). The convergence of these narratives aims to prompt conditional aid or forced negotiations from Western capitals NLT the New Year.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Pre-Fire: RF will initiate the anticipated high-volume preparatory artillery and rocket fire (including TOS-2) across the Konstantinovka-Siversk axis beginning NLT 130000Z DEC.
2. AD Saturation Strike: RF will execute simultaneous UAV strikes (or reconnaissance followed by higher-yield strikes) on multiple critical rear areas (Pavlohrad, Sumy area) aiming to guarantee mission success against at least one key logistics hub.
3. Political Posturing: RF Foreign Ministry will issue a major diplomatic statement leveraging the nuclear stability narrative while pushing the 'Tribunal' proceedings forward to create pressure on Kyiv ahead of the kinetic offensive.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. C2/Logistics Paralysis: Simultaneous successful kinetic strikes by RF UAVs on the Pavlohrad rail interchange and a Sumy area command post. The resultant logistical and C2 disruption prevents the timely mobilization of UAF reserves or successful CBF execution, leading directly to the operational collapse of the SKDA.
2. Strategic Isolation: A key NATO ally conditions future long-range support (LRPF systems) on Kyiv's willingness to engage in the RF-mandated "Truth Commission" (Tribunal), immediately neutralizing Ukraine's leverage and normalizing RF territorial claims (DMZ Sovereignty).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS