Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121800Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA PREPARATORY FIRE IMMINENT; RF DEPLOYS THERMOBARIC ASSETS; CRITICAL STRATCOM RESPONSE REQUIRED TO MITIGATE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT NARRATIVE THREAT.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational gravity remains the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA). The dual-axis pincer threatens operational encirclement following the validated RF seizure of Siversk and continued urban penetration into Konstantinovka (RF claims 45% control). The RF operational goal is kinetic fire saturation to precede mechanized breakthrough.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility conditions continue to offer kinetic protection for RF long-range UAS reconnaissance, particularly in the northern sectors, and impede UAF deep interdiction. A recent UAV detection was confirmed in Northern Chernihiv region, tracking West, indicating reconnaissance or strike intent outside the immediate Donbas theater.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces in the SKDA are prepared for sustained, high-volume preparatory fire. Control measures prioritize force dispersal and hardened positions. RF Forces are actively engaging with high-impact specialized munitions, confirmed by the use of the TOS-2 “Tosochka” heavy flamethrower system near the Krasnoarmiyske direction. This signals RF prioritization of neutralizing key UAF strongpoints prior to the main mechanized assault.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is the operational collapse of the SKDA, leveraging guaranteed fire superiority and strategically coordinated international information operations (IO).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

Introduction of TOS-2 Systems: The documented use of the advanced TOS-2 system indicates a willingness to commit high-value thermobaric assets to critical breakthrough points. This requires immediate adjustment to UAF strongpoint resilience measures and counter-artillery targeting priority.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The failure to interdict the 260th GRAU cargo dictates that RF fire capacity is at maximum operational readiness. Confirmed Grad MLRS use in Zaporizhzhia suggests that logistic support is robust across multiple operational commands, enabling simultaneous pressure on the SKDA and the Plan PHOENIX retrograde.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, particularly in synchronizing battlefield operations (TOS-2 deployment) with high-level strategic IO (Diplomacy/TASS).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are postured defensively against imminent fire saturation. The critical policy of reassigning Unauthorized Absence (SZCh) personnel directly to Assault Units (confirmed in previous reports) highlights severe manpower strain and necessitates careful management to mitigate internal cohesion risks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Kinetic): The confirmed use of TOS-2 systems against UAF strongpoints necessitates immediate revision of strongpoint defense protocols, increasing dispersion and hardening.
• Setback (Strategic): The emerging RF-leveraged diplomatic narrative concerning US/RF/China nuclear talks poses an immediate, severe threat to international aid continuity and UAF diplomatic credibility.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Immediate resource requirements focus on:

1. Counter-Battery Munitions: Maximizing available long-range precision fire (LRPF) for preemptive CBF missions.
2. Thermobaric Mitigation: Urgent requirement for engineering/sapper assets to improve strongpoint fortification against high-heat/pressure ordnance.
3. Strategic Communication Assets: Need for high-level diplomatic and StratCom engagement capacity to counter the nuclear disarmament narrative immediately.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (CRITICAL SHIFT)

RF IO has achieved a major strategic shift by injecting the "nuclear disarmament" narrative into the diplomatic space via the Trump statement (RBC-Ukraine, 121459Z DEC).

• Impact: This narrative shifts the focus of Western policy discussions from defending Ukrainian sovereignty to the broader, existential issue of global nuclear security, potentially allowing RF to frame itself as a responsible partner and sideline the Ukrainian conflict.
• Secondary Target: TASS is actively highlighting internal US/EU friction (Von der Leyen vs. Trump), aiming to fracture Western political unity during the critical aid decision window.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The simultaneous pressure from the impending major RF offensive and the confusing, high-level diplomatic signals (suggesting US engagement with Russia) risks significant erosion of internal confidence in long-term Western commitment.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (CRITICAL THREAT)

The US/RF/China denuclearization talks (Belief score: 53.7%) represent the most significant near-term threat in the information and diplomatic domain. If Western capitals pivot their focus to nuclear stability, Ukraine aid packages could be deprioritized or made highly conditional.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Pre-Assault Fire (NLT 130000Z DEC): Execution of sustained, high-volume artillery saturation across the Siversk-Konstantinovka axes, with specialized thermobaric assets (TOS-2) tasked against confirmed UAF strongpoints.
2. Kharkiv/Chernihiv Deep Strike: Kinetic or reconnaissance strikes in the Kharkiv or Poltava region, possibly expanding the deep threat to Chernihiv region based on confirmed UAV detection tracking West.
3. Diplomatic Exploitation (T+0 to T+24 HR): RF maximizes strategic leverage from the denuclearization talks and US/EU friction to demand favorable terms (e.g., recognition of DMZ sovereignty) or achieve conditional aid limitations from key partners.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Collapse under Fire/Thermobaric Saturation: The combined effects of massive artillery fire and localized use of TOS-2 systems breaks the UAF defensive line in Konstantinovka, forcing the commitment of unprepared SZCh-reassigned units into a counter-attack, leading to massive attrition and potential mutiny/disciplinary failure.
2. Western Aid Re-Prioritization: Key NATO partners freeze or heavily condition SAFE II funding based on the political imperative of US-RF nuclear dialogue, leading to a critical shortage of CBF and AD munitions within 30 days.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS