Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 121400Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: GRAU MUNITIONS ARRIVAL LIKELY; SKDA ARTILLERY SATURATION IMMINENT; KHARKIV THREAT PERSISTS; INTENSIFIED RF IO TARGETING UAF PEACE TERMS.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA) remains the main effort. The critical threat vector is the synchronized pincer movement following the confirmed RF seizure of Siversk (North) and ongoing urban penetration of Konstantinovka (South). Logistical security has transitioned from preventing RF resupply to mitigating the effects of overwhelming RF fire saturation, which is now anticipated NLT 130000Z DEC.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility conditions continue to favor RF long-range UAS reconnaissance (as confirmed near Kharkiv) and impede effective UAF LRPF target acquisition, especially for highly mobile targets.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

DEEP BATTLE UPDATE (JUDGMENT):

• P1 Gap Closure (GRAU): The critical T+0 to T+03:00 HR window for kinetic interdiction of the 260th GRAU rail cargo has expired without confirmation of successful engagement. Analytical Judgment: The cargo is highly likely to have reached forward railheads (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) and is now dispersing or staged for the final push. This ensures maximum artillery support for the upcoming SKDA assault.
• Kharkiv Reconnaissance: Confirmed RF UAV activity continues, indicating high preparatory priority for deep infrastructure strikes.
• Tver Incident (RUSSIA): The successful UAF strike forces continued RF diversion of AD assets, providing a persistent but temporary strategic advantage.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent remains the operational collapse of the SKDA, now enabled by the likely arrival of high-volume munitions, coupled with intensified IO operations designed to erode Western political will prior to a major offensive.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the intensification and diversification of the RF Information Warfare campaign, targeting both UAF leadership credibility (Zelenskyy) and UAF negotiation terms (Peace Plans). This synchronization implies high-level strategic coordination between military and political objectives.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL DETERIORATION)

JUDGMENT: The window for intercepting the 260th GRAU cargo (P1) has expired. The default assumption is that the munitions have arrived, resulting in a minimum 40-60% immediate increase in RF operational fire support capacity in the Donbas sector. This guarantees the planned preparatory fire mission NLT 130000Z DEC will be executed at maximum volume.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, particularly in synchronizing the upcoming kinetic offensive with the immediate, high-tempo IO campaign targeting US/EU political cohesion.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces in SKDA are prepared for a major defensive stand. The confirmed loss of the GRAU interdiction window (P1) requires an immediate shift in force protection and counter-battery allocation to mitigate the impending high-volume RF fire.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: The strategic leverage gained by the Tver UAV strike is still active, forcing RF internal AD commitment. UAF defensive holding actions in Konstantinovka persist.
• Setbacks (CRITICAL): The inability to execute a successful LRPF interdiction of the 260th GRAU cargo is a significant strategic setback that will translate into severe kinetic pressure on the frontlines within 18 hours.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate priority shifts from LRPF offensive use (P1) to maximizing Counter-Battery Fire (CBF) resources (HIMARS/MLRS) and increasing the operational density of EW/AD assets, particularly around Kharkiv.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (MAXIMUM INTENSITY)

The RF IO campaign is focused on generating maximum diplomatic turbulence during the window of 121400Z to 130600Z DEC. The new TASS messaging (via Azarov) confirms the narrative line: "Kyiv is circulating false peace terms to sabotage legitimate negotiations." This serves to undermine the authority of UAF representatives and precondition Western partners to view any future Ukrainian peace proposal with suspicion. This is a direct, pre-emptive strike against UAF diplomatic efforts.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal morale is at risk due to both the Odesa infrastructure strikes and the intensified IO campaign suggesting UAF leadership is obstructing peace. Strategic communication must rapidly stabilize the narrative regarding both Western support and UAF peace readiness.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO aims to achieve diplomatic ambiguity or conditionality in the upcoming aid negotiations. The priority for UAF StratCom is to regain the narrative initiative immediately.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. SKDA Breakthrough Effort (T+12 to T+48 HRS): RF will execute massive, sustained preparatory artillery fire (enabled by GRAU cargo arrival) beginning NLT 130000Z DEC, followed by synchronized heavy armor and mechanized assaults to achieve penetration in Konstantinovka and south of Siversk.
2. Kharkiv Deep Strike (T+6 to T+24 HRS): Execution of targeted deep strikes against confirmed critical infrastructure nodes (energy/logistics) in the Kharkiv or Poltava region, based on the persistent UAV reconnaissance.
3. Information Victory (T+0 to T+12 HRS): RF will intensify political pressure using proxy statements (e.g., Azarov) to secure favorable diplomatic messaging or conditional aid commitments from Western partners.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Collapse under Fire Saturation: The successful arrival of the GRAU cargo enables RF to suppress UAF CBF efforts, leading to a catastrophic collapse of defensive lines in Konstantinovka. This forces a disorderly retrograde from SKDA and opens the operational theater for RF exploitation toward Dnipro.
2. Diplomatic Isolation and Aid Freeze: RF IO successfully undermines UAF leadership legitimacy, causing key Western partners to delay or impose significant operational constraints on future SAFE II funding, critically restricting UAF defensive sustainment capabilities.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS