Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 120100Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDA CRITICAL PINCER OPERATION; GRAU LOGISTICS MOBILIZED; ESCALATION OF RF "DMZ SOVEREIGNTY" IO CAMPAIGN.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture in Donetsk Oblast is characterized by an escalating crisis driven by a synchronized RF dual-axis pincer movement targeting the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA).

• Northern Axis: Confirmed RF seizure of Siversk. RF 3rd Army is exploiting the breach, establishing the northern flank of the operational encirclement of Slovyansk. This necessitates the immediate establishment of a secondary defensive line west of the Siversk-Slovyansk road network.
• Southern Axis (Current Epicenter): High-intensity urban combat within Konstantinovka. RF forces claim 45% control. Control of Konstantinovka and the associated Highway T0515 is critical for maintaining logistical connectivity to Kramatorsk.
• Deep Battle: UAF capability for deep strikes remains confirmed (Caspian Sea platform strike). RF maintains increased air defense readiness (531st Guards Regiment activity rising) and persistent multi-axis UAS pressure (Sumy, Odesa).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility and nighttime conditions persist across the operational area. This favors covert RF mechanized movement and facilitates high-tempo, low-altitude FPV and UAS operations, exacerbating the multi-axis drone threat.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are engaged in high-intensity defense (165 engagements). The critical control measure surrounding the 260th GRAU logistics package has transitioned from interdiction planning to damage assessment/mitigation. RF C2 is observed coordinating high-value logistics deployment with localized frontline advances.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The key tactical adaptation is the immediate exploitation of the Siversk breach, preventing UAF from fully stabilizing the northern flank while maximizing kinetic pressure on the southern (Konstantinovka) urban center. This reduces RF exposure to simultaneous high-risk operations.

• Manpower Policy: The UAF decision to reassign Absent Without Leave (SZCh) personnel to assault units is noted by RF intelligence and will likely be exploited in subsequent IO efforts to portray UAF discipline as collapsing.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL)

FACT: SAR data indicates the massive munitions load-out from the 260th GRAU arsenal has departed (SAR Score 0.00). JUDGMENT: Since the interdiction window (120200Z DEC) has expired without confirmation of a successful strike (P1 Gap), the cargo is assumed to be in transit to the forward railheads (Volnovakha/Ilovaisk). This logistical surge directly enables the MDCOA 1 (SKDA Collapse) within the next 72 hours.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrates high effectiveness in coordinating deep logistics (GRAU) with multi-front kinetic activity and sustained deep UAS targeting. The brief UAF EW success near Siversk indicates a transient C2 vulnerability that must be replicated immediately in the Konstantinovka urban fight.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains high due to the critical nature of the defense, but manpower resources are severely strained. The General Staff’s directive reassigning SZCh personnel to assault units reflects this critical constraint and carries high risk of localized disciplinary issues if not mitigated by effective troop management and leadership.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks: Confirmed loss of Siversk; significant penetration of Konstantinovka.
• Successes: Continued execution of deep strike capability (Caspian Sea); localized C2 disruption via EW near Siversk. The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade's effective FPV defense in Konstantinovka highlights a critical local capability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Target Acquisition and Interdiction of GRAU Cargo. The priority shifts from the depot to the rail choke points (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha).
• Constraint: The simultaneous requirement to sustain deep strike capability, manage the manpower crisis (SZCh policy), and defend against the immediate kinetic threat at SKDA demands complex resource allocation, particularly for LRPF munitions and EW assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO strategy is executing a significant strategic escalation:

1. "DMZ Sovereignty" Narrative: RF is aggressively shifting its rhetoric from proposing an armistice ("Korean Model") to demanding that any proposed buffer zone/contact line be formally recognized as sovereign Russian territory. This is a strategic move designed to undermine international support ahead of the SAFE II commitment.
2. Targeted PSYOP (NEW): Cryptic messages referencing "high offices" and a specific UAF politician ("Maryanushka") in compromising circumstances strongly indicate a targeted PSYOP aimed at undermining faith in Ukrainian military-political leadership and breeding suspicion.
   • Confidence Assessment: MEDIUM. Dempster-Shafer beliefs support an Information Warfare/PSYOP hypothesis (0.56 total belief weight).
3. Endurance Signaling: Continued focus on the "VOIN" Center training reinforces the narrative of deep, institutionalized Russian capability and conflict endurance.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF morale is under dual threat: high operational tempo and casualty rates (165 engagements) combined with the strategic risk associated with the SZCh reassignment policy and the destabilizing nature of the targeted PSYOP (Bezuhla/high offices).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmation of the massive €150 billion SAFE II EU investment program is the critical strategic anchor. UAF operational stability in the next 72 hours is crucial to sustaining partner confidence against the RF "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative. Operational failure at SKDA could be exploited to justify aid reductions or conditionality.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Fire Assault and Link-Up (T+12 to T+48 HRS): RF assumes successful GRAU delivery. NLT 120800Z DEC, RF will initiate a sustained, high-volume artillery preparatory fire campaign focusing on UAF positions and logistics hubs west and northwest of Konstantinovka. This fire will enable mechanized forces to secure the city and connect the southern breach with the Siversk-Slovyansk axis.
2. Increased Deep Interdiction: RF will utilize the mobilized 531st Guards AD Regiment (rising SAR activity) to provide increased protection for logistical nodes while simultaneously intensifying dispersed deep UAS strikes (Sumy, Odesa) to suppress UAF long-range targeting capability and divert SHORAD assets.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational SKDA Collapse: Un-interdicted GRAU munitions overwhelm UAF defenses in Konstantinovka, leading to the rapid loss of the city and T0515. The necessary retrograde movement from Kramatorsk collapses under RF artillery saturation, resulting in the strategic loss of the SKDA defensive belt within 72 hours.
2. Strategic Isolation and IO Victory: The loss of SKDA, combined with the successful execution of the "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative, convinces key international partners that the UAF defensive posture is unsustainable, leading to the conditionality or freezing of the SAFE II investment.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS