Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 112300Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL LOGISTICS INTERDICTION WINDOW (T-MINUS 01:00 HR); RF IO CAMPAIGN SHIFT TO STRATEGIC RETREAT NARRATIVE; CONTINUED MULTI-DOMAIN KINETIC PRESSURE.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains critically threatened by the ongoing RF pincer convergence targeting the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA). The RF 3rd Army continues to exploit the confirmed seizure of Siversk, while urban combat persists in Konstantinovka.

• Key Terrain: The rail network connecting Volnovakha/Ilovaisk to the Donbas front remains the most critical terrain feature, as it controls the impending 260th GRAU munitions surge.
• Operational Rear: Confirmed RF deep kinetic operations continue to stress UAF C2/Assembly Areas (AAs), evidenced by a confirmed aviation strike against a Temporary Deployment Point (PVD) near Krasnyi Lyman (2233Z). This suggests RF is systematically clearing support nodes immediately behind the SKDA frontline.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility and nighttime conditions persist across the operational area.

• Tactical Impact (Judgment/HIGH Confidence): This favors continued high-tempo RF UAS/FPV operations (confirmed by repeated alerts in Sumy and Mykolaiv Oblasts) and mechanized night assaults on vulnerable secondary defensive lines (e.g., west of Siversk toward Slovyansk).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are managing simultaneous threats: immediate frontline stabilization and the dispersion of limited Air Defense/Electronic Warfare (EW) assets to cover newly active RF deep strike vectors (Sumy, Mykolaiv).

• Air Defense (FACT): Air Force tracking indicates active RF UAV threats in Sumy Oblast (northward and central axes, 22:18Z, 22:26Z) and the Mykolaiv Oblast (Berezanka vector, 22:24Z). This confirms RF intent to maintain kinetic pressure across multiple axes, straining UAF SHORAD reaction time.
• Control Measures: Focus remains on the immediate authorization of the Long-Range Precision Fire (LRPF) strike against the 260th GRAU logistics package.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability (Multi-Domain Kinetic Integration): RF forces are demonstrating high proficiency in integrating deep reconnaissance, aviation/airstrikes, and FPV operations, as shown by the coordinated Myropillia strike (previous SITREP) and the Krasnyi Lyman PVD strike (new data). This capability targets UAF ability to maneuver and sustain forces near the frontline. Intention (Immediate Kinetic): To neutralize UAF C2/AAs ahead of the anticipated logistics delivery (GRAU), thereby maximizing the impact of the impending artillery saturation. Intention (Strategic IO): To shift the strategic narrative toward predicting and broadcasting an inevitable large-scale UAF retreat (e.g., "closer to the Dnipro"), aiming to generate panic and pressure UAF high command into a premature operational withdrawal.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (JUDGMENT/HIGH Confidence)

• Deep AA Targeting: The strike on the PVD in Krasnyi Lyman demonstrates RF adaptation to target smaller, mobile UAF concentration points, contrasting with the prior focus on fixed C2 nodes. This indicates effective RF reconnaissance (UAS confirmed active in Sumy/Mykolaiv).
• Time-Sensitive Logistics: The continued mobility of the 260th GRAU consignment (SAR score 0.00) confirms RF prioritization of logistics delivery, betting on UAF failure to interdict the transit window.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL FACT)

The operational window for high-confidence interdiction of the 260th GRAU munitions surge at a rail choke point (Volnovakha/Ilovaisk) is closing CRITICALLY FAST. ESTIMATED DEADLINE: NLT 120200Z DEC. (Approx. T-01:00 hour remaining from this report time).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, synchronizing deep strike coordination and parallel IO campaigns (TASS broadcast confirming the narrative immediately following the Siversk seizure).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is currently characterized by high alert status across deep logistics and northern border sectors. The deployment of mobile EW/SHORAD remains critical but severely constrained by the number of active threats (Donbas convergence, Sumy C2/ISR threat, Mykolaiv rear logistics threat).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The successful EW disruption near Siversk (previous report) provides a temporary tactical advantage that must be exploited immediately before the GRAU package enables RF fire superiority.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Time Constraint (Logistics): The failure to execute the GRAU interdiction strike within the next hour risks operational collapse (MDCOA 1).
• Kinetic Constraint (Aviation/LRPF): Allocation of the final long-range asset must be prioritized for the GRAU target, despite competing threats to rear infrastructure (Krasnyi Lyman PVD strike).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (JUDGMENT/HIGH Confidence)

RF IO has escalated from merely asserting tactical victory to promoting a strategic narrative of systemic UAF failure and inevitable retreat.

• Narrative Focus: TASS, citing Major General Lipovoy, claims UAF is already constructing defensive lines "closer to the Dnipro." (22:12Z).
• Objective: This disinformation campaign aims to accelerate the collapse of civilian and military morale in the Donbas and sow doubt among international partners regarding the sustainability of the UAF defensive posture.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The heightened strategic IO push, combined with the confirmed loss of Siversk and urban fighting in Konstantinovka, demands an immediate, powerful counter-narrative to prevent pre-emptive withdrawals or organizational panic.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The statement by EC President von der Leyen (22:24Z) prioritizing a sustainable peace framework suggests ongoing internal EU debate on the long-term diplomatic strategy. This requires UAF StratCom to link operational resilience (e.g., successful GRAU interdiction) directly to diplomatic leverage.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. GRAU Delivery & Immediate Fire Surge (T+0 to T+6 HRS): The 260th GRAU consignment will reach forward depots NLT 120600Z DEC. RF will immediately initiate a massive preparatory artillery barrage to enable a mechanized assault against the weakened Lysivka line, aiming to isolate Kramatorsk.
2. Sustained C2/ISR Degradation: RF will continue deep kinetic and electronic attacks against UAF C2/AAs (like Krasnyi Lyman PVDs) and ISR assets (confirmed UAV activity in Sumy/Mykolaiv) to prevent UAF counter-maneuver.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Imminent Operational Collapse: FAILURE TO STRIKE GRAU CONVOY (T-01:00 HR). The successful arrival and deployment of the munitions package facilitates an overwhelming artillery concentration NLT 120800Z DEC, forcing a rapid, disorganized UAF retrograde from the SKDA sector under conditions of complete RF fire superiority.
2. Strategic Retreat Precipitator: RF IO (Dnipro defense line narrative) combined with tactical failure (Konstantinovka collapse) succeeds in compelling a non-military, politically driven decision to abandon the SKDA before defenses are fully breached.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS