Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 112300Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: GRAU LOGISTICS INTERDICTION WINDOW (T-MINUS 03:00 HRS); ESCALATION OF RF STRIKES IN SUMY OBLAST; CONTINUED PINCER CONVERGENCE (Slovyansk/Kramatorsk).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational situation remains defined by the imminent threat to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Agglomeration (SKDA) driven by the Siversk-Konstantinovka pincer.

• SKDA Vulnerability: With Siversk confirmed seized and urban fighting confirmed within Konstantinovka (RF claims 45% control), the RF axis of advance is converging rapidly.
• New Critical Kinetic Vector (Northern Border): Confirmed coordinated RF artillery/FPV strike on a UAF UAV Command Post (CP) in Myropillia, Sumy Oblast (2205Z). This confirms RF commitment to kinetic operations against UAF C2/ISR in the North, mirroring the deep strike expansion seen in Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk.
• Decisive Terrain (Logistics): The window for interdicting the 260th GRAU munitions surge at a rail choke point (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) is rapidly closing.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility conditions (nighttime) are prevalent.

• Tactical Impact (Judgment/HIGH Confidence): Low visibility facilitates RF mechanized night maneuver (MLCOA/MDCOA 2) and continued long-range UAS/missile strikes (facilitated by difficult UAF SHORAD acquisition).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are critically stretched between immediate frontline stabilization (Lysivka/Konstantinovka), and necessary air defense dispersion to cover newly active rear/deep strike zones (Pavlohrad, Lozova, Sumy). Control measures prioritize the allocation of the final LRPF asset to the GRAU interdiction mission.

• Air Defense Allocation (Confirmed): UAS alerts in Sumy (Novhorod-Siverskyi vector) and the confirmed strike in Myropillia necessitate an immediate reassessment of SHORAD/EW deployment to the northern border region, diverting resources previously allocated to the Donbas sector protection.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT/HIGH Confidence)

Capability (Integrated Attack): RF forces, specifically the 'Sever' grouping, demonstrated high proficiency in coordinating deep reconnaissance, FPV strike, and tube artillery in the Myropillia strike. This integration suggests a refined capability for targeted C2/ISR degradation in border areas. Intention (Immediate Kinetic): To execute the logistics surge (GRAU) and achieve decisive fire superiority by 121000Z DEC to enable the final mechanized push to isolate the SKDA. Intention (IO/Operational): To use the impending threat on Kramatorsk to generate fear and demoralization, facilitating operational objectives (supported by the 2205Z "Kramatorsk prepares" IO message).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (JUDGMENT/HIGH Confidence)

• Integrated Northern Targeting: The successful coordinated RF strike on the UAF UAV CP in Myropillia (Sumy) represents a significant tactical adaptation. Previously, northern border activity focused on attrition and minor raids. This shift to high-value C2/ISR targeting indicates RF is using the Northern front as a critical flank-support operation to degrade UAF deep battle capabilities while the main effort progresses in Donetsk.
• Logistics Commitment: The SAR score of 0.00 at 260th GRAU and the approaching deadline confirm RF commitment to achieving logistical superiority despite UAF deep strike threats.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL FACT)

The window for high-confidence interdiction of the 260th GRAU munitions surge is T-MINUS 03:00 HOURS (NLT 120200Z DEC). The cargo is confirmed mobile. The failure to interdict this package will result in a rapid escalation of RF fire rates in the Donbas sector within T+12 hours.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, coordinating deep logistics, multi-domain kinetic strikes (Lozova/Sumy), and IO messaging effectively. The Myropillia strike confirms effective coordination between multiple reconnaissance and fire elements within the "Sever" grouping.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains highly focused on maintaining the Lysivka defensive line and managing the Konstantinovka urban fighting. The necessity to divert critical SHORAD/EW assets to cover three separate active deep strike vectors (Pavlohrad, Lozova, Sumy) compromises air protection for frontline maneuver units.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The successful EW disruption of RF C2 near Siversk (previous report) must be urgently leveraged and replicated to slow the RF exploitation of the current breach.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Time Constraint: Absolute priority must be given to the GRAU strike authorization before the 120200Z DEC deadline.
• Air Defense/EW Constraint: The confirmed targeting of UAF UAV CPs in the North necessitates immediate, dedicated EW/SHORAD deployment to protect the remaining ISR architecture in border oblasts. This strains already insufficient assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (JUDGMENT/HIGH Confidence)

RF IO is actively targeting the morale of the SKDA population. The 2205Z message framing Kramatorsk's defense preparations as inevitable defeat aligns with the strategic goal of precipitating an unforced UAF withdrawal or civilian panic.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The operational setbacks (Siversk, Konstantinovka penetration) combined with targeted morale operations (Kramatorsk) pose an increased risk to public confidence in the Donbas sector. UAF StratCom must counter the narrative that the SKDA is collapsing.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The internal friction amplified by RF IO (Trump/EU) and the legal resilience of the RF shadow fleet continues to complicate Western aid discussions ahead of upcoming high-level coordination meetings.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. GRAU Delivery & Intensified Assault (T+0 to T+8 HRS): RF forces will complete the delivery of the 260th GRAU consignment to forward depots and initiate limited distribution to frontline batteries NLT 120600Z DEC. Simultaneously, RF will utilize low visibility to push mechanized/dismounted units to secure Lysivka.
2. Coordinated Deep C2 Degradation: RF will sustain high-tempo, coordinated FPV/Artillery/UAS strikes against UAF deep logistics (Pavlohrad/Lozova) and now, critically, UAF border ISR/C2 infrastructure (Sumy/Kharkiv), forcing UAF to over-commit scarce defensive resources.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Logistics Strike Failure & Operational Collapse: Failure to interdict the 260th GRAU convoy leads to immediate, overwhelming RF artillery saturation (NLT 121000Z DEC). This, combined with the successful C2 degradation by RF 'Sever' units in the North, forces UAF Operational Command East to conduct an emergency, uncoordinated retrograde from the SKDA under heavy fire, resulting in massive material and personnel losses.
2. Slovyansk Flank Breach: RF utilizes the confirmed low nighttime visibility to launch a high-volume, mechanized night attack on the newly established secondary line west of Siversk toward Slovyansk, achieving a rapid operational breakthrough before UAF reserve forces can redeploy.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS