Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 112145Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL LOGISTICS INTERDICTION WINDOW (T-MINUS 04:15 HRS); ESCALATED REAR AREA THREATS (Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv); CONTINUED FRONT LINE DETERIORATION (Siversk Axis).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis centers on the converging pincer movements targeting the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub. RF forces continue kinetic exploitation of the Siversk breach (Northern axis) toward Lysivka. Urban fighting is confirmed within Konstantinovka (Southern axis).

• Decisive Terrain (Logistics): The logistics hubs of Pavlohrad and Synelnykove remain under active RF UAS targeting. Confirmed strikes necessitate urgent force protection measures.
• New Front/Threat Vector (Kharkiv): Confirmed UAS presence detected in Lozova Raion, Kharkiv Oblast, indicating RF is expanding its deep interdiction/reconnaissance efforts outside of the immediate Donetsk conflict zone. This forces UAF Air Defense to cover a wider, now actively targeted, area.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility conditions persist during nighttime hours, confirmed by internal reports detailing extreme difficulty for ground movement and surveillance.

• Tactical Impact (Judgment/MEDIUM Confidence): Low visibility favors RF special reconnaissance and infiltration operations while increasing difficulty for UAF deep-strike BDA and precision targeting necessary for the mobile 260th GRAU convoy.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF control measures are defined by critical resource allocation decisions:

1. Immediate kinetic action required to meet the GRAU interdiction deadline (NLT 120200Z DEC).
2. Urgent redistribution of C-UAS/SHORAD assets to critical rear areas (Pavlohrad, Synelnykove) and the new threat area (Lozova, Kharkiv). This diversion critically reduces air cover for maneuver units at the frontline (Lysivka/Konstantinovka).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (JUDGMENT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Capability (Logistics): RF is executing a highly coordinated logistics surge (260th GRAU) simultaneous with high-tempo, multi-domain interdiction strikes (Pavlohrad, Synelnykove, Lozova). This demonstrates sustained operational tempo and C2 effectiveness. Intention (Immediate Kinetic): To close the breach to the Northern approaches of Slovyansk (Lysivka) and complete the urban clearance of Konstantinovka before the arrival of the 260th GRAU munitions, which will then enable a decisive artillery preparation for the final push on Kramatorsk. Intention (IO/Strategic): To exploit and amplify internal NATO/Western political friction (Von der Leyen vs. Trump narrative) to undermine support for Kyiv.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (JUDGMENT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Deep Strike Expansion: The confirmed UAS activity in Lozova (Kharkiv) represents an expansion of the RF operational deep strike zone beyond the previously confirmed Dnipropetrovsk logistics focus. This adaptation suggests RF aims to paralyze UAF response capabilities across multiple operational sectors simultaneously.
• Focus on Legal Resilience: The German court ruling protecting the RF "shadow fleet" tanker indicates RF is proactively managing its economic resilience against Western sanctions, confirming a layered approach to warfare (Kinetic, Economic, IO).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL FACT)

The window for interdicting the 260th GRAU munitions surge is T-MINUS 04:15 HOURS (NLT 120200Z DEC). SAR data confirms the cargo is mobile. Failure to strike this logistics package prior to dispersal will guarantee a doubling of RF fire superiority in the Donbas sector within the next 12 hours.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, capable of coordinating strategic IO campaigns (Western friction), high-value logistics protection, and multi-vector deep kinetic strikes.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains high, but the defensive posture is fractured by the requirement to address concurrent, critical threats: the frontline pincer, the organizational conflict within the 2nd International Legion ZSU, and the expanded rear-area deep strike threat.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Organizational): The internal instability within the 2nd International Legion is an intelligence concern that risks degrading combat effectiveness and morale, both internally and internationally.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Time: The critical timeline for the 260th GRAU interdiction dictates all immediate long-range fire resource allocation.
• Air Defense (CRITICAL): The confirmed UAS vectors (Pavlohrad/Synelnykove/Lozova) necessitate the immediate redirection and deployment of at least three (3) mobile SHORAD/C-UAS teams, creating risk in other sectors.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF information operations are currently focused on Amplifying Western Discord. Messages highlighting the Ursula von der Leyen / Donald Trump disagreement are being maximized by primary RF IO channels to support the narrative of a fragmented and unreliable Western alliance.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF StratCom must rapidly address the organizational friction within the International Legion to prevent negative perception contagion, while concurrently leveraging tactical successes (Kacha Airfield strike) to stabilize domestic morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The convergence of the renewed "DMZ Sovereignty" annexation rhetoric and the public Western friction (Trump/EU) creates a challenging environment immediately preceding the critical Dec 13 coordination meetings. The German tanker ruling subtly undermines the effectiveness of economic pressure narratives.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. GRAU Delivery & Frontline Assault (T+0 to T+8 HRS): RF forces will secure the 260th GRAU consignment at a forward depot (Volnovakha/Ilovaisk) and initiate the tactical movement of the first waves of munitions toward the Slovyansk/Konstantinovka front line. Simultaneously, mechanized elements will push to secure Lysivka before the bulk artillery preparation begins.
2. Sustained Interdiction (T+0 to T+12 HRS): RF will maintain high-tempo, multi-vector UAS operations against UAF logistics hubs (Pavlohrad, Synelnykove, and now probing Lozova) to pin down UAF air defense assets and disrupt internal resupply efforts into the Donbas.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Logistics Failure and Breakthrough: Failure to execute the deep strike on the 260th GRAU convoy results in massive RF artillery saturation (NLT 121000Z DEC). This, combined with successful RF kinetic interdiction of key UAF logistics (Pavlohrad rail lines) and the distraction provided by the Lozova UAS vector, forces UAF OC East into an uncoordinated defensive collapse, potentially leading to the rapid operational isolation of Kramatorsk.
2. Exploitation of Low Visibility: RF utilizes the confirmed low nighttime visibility to launch a high-risk, large-scale mechanized night attack on a compromised axis (e.g., south of Siversk toward Lysivka), capitalizing on UAF difficulties with BDA and target acquisition in the dark.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS