Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 112200Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC-KINETIC INTERSECTION; UAF WITHDRAWAL/DMZ PROPOSAL CONFIRMED; GRAU CONVOY INTERDICTION WINDOW REMAINS IMMEDIATE.
The operational picture remains focused on the converging RF pincer movement targeting the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub, leveraging the newly seized Siversk breach and the continued urban fighting in Konstantinovka.
No significant change reported. Conditions continue to facilitate high-tempo offensive and mechanized movement. Continued RF strikes on national energy infrastructure stress C2 and rear-area sustainment.
RF strategic C2 remains unified and directed for continued kinetic operations, explicitly confirmed by the release of video footage of President Putin chairing a high-level military meeting (MoD Russia). UAF efforts are currently focused on delaying and stabilizing the new front lines while simultaneously managing the escalating crisis in the diplomatic information environment.
Capability: RF maintains high kinetic capacity and strategic intent for continued ground operations. The delivery of 80 UAZ vehicles by Chechen leadership (Kadyrov) indicates continued non-kinetic support and a focus on rugged, forward logistics mobility, likely complementing the incoming GRAU materiel. Intention (Kinetic): Exploit the Siversk breach rapidly, leveraging overwhelming artillery superiority once the 260th GRAU materiel arrives. Intent remains to isolate Kramatorsk. Intention (Diplomatic/IO): To leverage the high-level Putin meeting and confirmed diplomatic pressure points (US proposal) to portray a unified, decisive RF command structure, contrasting sharply with perceived UAF internal/external weakness.
The primary adaptation is the integration of auxiliary resources (e.g., Chechen-sourced off-road vehicles) into the logistics chain. This suggests RF is mitigating known vulnerabilities in last-mile transport necessary for distributing the massive incoming artillery surge.
FACT: The 260th GRAU munitions surge has departed its depot (SAR 0.00). The current window for interdiction remains immediate and critical. Judgement: The donation of 80 UAZ vehicles (Technology Deployment: Use of Off-road vehicles by Russia, $0.005368$) increases RF capability to move ammunition from railheads (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) to forward fire positions, thereby reducing the vulnerability of the materiel once it leaves the major rail nodes. The window for striking the main convoy before dispersion is closing rapidly. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)
Strategic C2 is highly unified (Putin meeting confirmation). Tactical C2 effectiveness on the Siversk axis remains partially degraded by UAF EW efforts (as per previous report), but this window of opportunity is temporary.
Readiness is critically impacted by simultaneous frontline stress and strategic diplomatic constraints.
The most significant constraints are:
RF messaging is fully exploiting the confirmed diplomatic proposals:
Domestic morale is under stress from kinetic losses (Siversk) and the direct confirmation of a diplomatic proposal requiring territorial withdrawal. Clear, immediate NCA messaging is required to manage the domestic perception of this foreign proposal.
FACT (NCA Confirmation): President Zelenskyy confirmed the US proposal for a UAF withdrawal from Donbas in exchange for a DMZ/FEZ, emphasizing the final decision rests with the Ukrainian people. He explicitly maintained the redline: "Where we stand, we stand" in the Donbas. FACT (Aid Outlook): Preliminary assessments from the Kiel Institute suggest Ukraine may receive the lowest level of military aid since the start of the war. Judgement: The 13 DEC diplomatic meeting is now the crucible for Ukraine’s strategic future. The confirmed proposal places the burden of choice (territory vs. continued conflict funding/security guarantees) directly on Kyiv. The proposal’s FEZ component is seen by RF as potential de facto annexation, aligning with the "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point |
|---|---|---|
| Logistics Interdiction Window (260th GRAU) | CRITICAL: NLT 120600Z DEC | EXECUTE STRIKE/LRPF: Interdict mobile convoy or highest probability rail concentration point. Failure means immediate, overwhelming RF artillery saturation on the Siversk-Slovyansk axis. |
| Slovyansk Kinetic Decisiveness | NLT 131200Z DEC | Commitment of UAF operational reserves to the Northern Flank to hold the line west of Siversk, regardless of GRAU interdiction success. |
| Strategic Diplomatic Response | IMMEDIATE (Before 13 DEC meeting) | NCA/Foreign Ministry must formally and preemptively communicate to key allies (US, UK, FR, DE) a definitive rejection of the territorial transfer (DMZ/FEZ) component of the proposed plan, and lobby to prevent the US plan from being presented as a unified allied consensus. |
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 (LOGISTICS TARGETING - CRITICAL) | Confirmation of 260th GRAU convoy location. Precise location and distribution of the convoy (mobile or stationary at railheads like Ilovaisk/Volnovakha). | TECHINT/SAR/HUMINT: Continuous, prioritized ISR coverage of logistics chokepoints and forward staging areas. Confirm status and target suitability immediately. | MEDIUM |
| P2 (DIPLOMATIC INTENT) | Detailed text and sponsor(s) of the proposed UAF troop limitation (800k) and the mechanism for the 'Free Economic Zone' administration. | HUMINT/OSINT: Collection focused on US and Ukrainian diplomatic circles, focusing on NSC and MoD sources regarding the security guarantees component. | LOW |
| P3 (RF RESERVE STATUS) | Status and readiness of the RF 1st Guards Tank Army. Confirmation of forward deployment or readiness to exploit a UAF operational collapse in Donbas. | TECHINT/IMINT: Satellite imagery focused on known RF staging areas in the Kursk/Belgorod/Rostov regions. | MEDIUM |
| Priority | Domain | Action | Commander/Staff |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. KINETIC COUNTER-LOGISTICS (J3/J2) | Deep Strike/Targeting | INTERDICTION PARAMOUNT: Execute LRPF strikes NLT 120600Z DEC against the 260th GRAU materiel, prioritizing the highest-probability staging or mobile target regardless of full BDA confidence. Assume the window is nearly closed. | Joint Staff / Long Range Fire Command |
| 2. STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY (NCA/P7) | IO/Diplomatic | REJECT TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE: Immediately issue high-level directives to all negotiating teams: explicitly reject the UAF withdrawal from Donbas for a DMZ/FEZ. Frame the proposed 800k troop limit as unacceptable outside of a full, ratified security guarantee framework. | NCA / Foreign Ministry |
| 3. DEFENSE MANEUVER (J3 OC East) | Force Posture/Defense | DELAY T-0514 AXIS: Reinforce the newly established defensive line west of Siversk with heavy engineer effort (mining, demolitions, AT obstacles). Prioritize delaying the mechanized advance rather than holding fixed positions. | Operational Command East (OC East) |
| 4. IO COUNTER-NARRATIVE (P7) | Information Warfare | MANAGE DOMESTIC CRISIS: Issue clear, unified, presidential communications emphasizing that the UAF refuses to cede territory and that the diplomatic proposals are negotiating positions, not decisions. Counter RF IO exploitation of the US proposal to maintain troop and civilian morale. | P7 (Strategic Communications) |
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