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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-11 16:42:56Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-11 16:12:55Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) 12/003

TIME: 112200Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC-KINETIC INTERSECTION; UAF WITHDRAWAL/DMZ PROPOSAL CONFIRMED; GRAU CONVOY INTERDICTION WINDOW REMAINS IMMEDIATE.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains focused on the converging RF pincer movement targeting the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub, leveraging the newly seized Siversk breach and the continued urban fighting in Konstantinovka.

  • T-0514 Axis: Remains the critical avenue of approach for RF mechanized exploitation south from Siversk.
  • Huliaipole: RF sources confirm heavy artillery fire ("tons of pig iron") on UAF positions near Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia Front), suggesting high-intensity kinetic pressure persists across multiple operational sectors, taxing UAF reserve allocation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change reported. Conditions continue to facilitate high-tempo offensive and mechanized movement. Continued RF strikes on national energy infrastructure stress C2 and rear-area sustainment.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF strategic C2 remains unified and directed for continued kinetic operations, explicitly confirmed by the release of video footage of President Putin chairing a high-level military meeting (MoD Russia). UAF efforts are currently focused on delaying and stabilizing the new front lines while simultaneously managing the escalating crisis in the diplomatic information environment.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains high kinetic capacity and strategic intent for continued ground operations. The delivery of 80 UAZ vehicles by Chechen leadership (Kadyrov) indicates continued non-kinetic support and a focus on rugged, forward logistics mobility, likely complementing the incoming GRAU materiel. Intention (Kinetic): Exploit the Siversk breach rapidly, leveraging overwhelming artillery superiority once the 260th GRAU materiel arrives. Intent remains to isolate Kramatorsk. Intention (Diplomatic/IO): To leverage the high-level Putin meeting and confirmed diplomatic pressure points (US proposal) to portray a unified, decisive RF command structure, contrasting sharply with perceived UAF internal/external weakness.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the integration of auxiliary resources (e.g., Chechen-sourced off-road vehicles) into the logistics chain. This suggests RF is mitigating known vulnerabilities in last-mile transport necessary for distributing the massive incoming artillery surge.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL UPDATE)

FACT: The 260th GRAU munitions surge has departed its depot (SAR 0.00). The current window for interdiction remains immediate and critical. Judgement: The donation of 80 UAZ vehicles (Technology Deployment: Use of Off-road vehicles by Russia, $0.005368$) increases RF capability to move ammunition from railheads (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) to forward fire positions, thereby reducing the vulnerability of the materiel once it leaves the major rail nodes. The window for striking the main convoy before dispersion is closing rapidly. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

Strategic C2 is highly unified (Putin meeting confirmation). Tactical C2 effectiveness on the Siversk axis remains partially degraded by UAF EW efforts (as per previous report), but this window of opportunity is temporary.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is critically impacted by simultaneous frontline stress and strategic diplomatic constraints.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Political Setback (CRITICAL): President Zelenskyy confirmed the core components of the US-proposed peace plan: (1) UAF withdrawal from Donbas, (2) creation of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) / Free Economic Zone (FEZ), and (3) a limitation on future UAF troop strength to 800,000 personnel. This validates the MDCOA of Strategic Isolation from the previous report.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most significant constraints are:

  1. LRPF Assets: Immediate need for 260th GRAU interdiction.
  2. Strategic Maneuver Space: The US proposal imposes a political constraint on territorial integrity, reducing the strategic maneuver space available to the General Staff regarding the commitment of reserves and defense of key nodes like Slovyansk.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF messaging is fully exploiting the confirmed diplomatic proposals:

  1. Narrative of Coercion: RF media is amplifying reports (WSJ) that Western leaders are being urged to pressure Zelenskyy to accept the plan, suggesting UAF is isolated and facing unified Western rejection of its sovereign claims.
  2. Internal Dissension: RF channels are actively mocking Zelenskyy for confirming the proposal, attempting to frame him as a "military dictator" confirming a humiliating withdrawal (Alex Parker Returns).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is under stress from kinetic losses (Siversk) and the direct confirmation of a diplomatic proposal requiring territorial withdrawal. Clear, immediate NCA messaging is required to manage the domestic perception of this foreign proposal.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (IMMEDIATE STRATEGIC CRISIS)

FACT (NCA Confirmation): President Zelenskyy confirmed the US proposal for a UAF withdrawal from Donbas in exchange for a DMZ/FEZ, emphasizing the final decision rests with the Ukrainian people. He explicitly maintained the redline: "Where we stand, we stand" in the Donbas. FACT (Aid Outlook): Preliminary assessments from the Kiel Institute suggest Ukraine may receive the lowest level of military aid since the start of the war. Judgement: The 13 DEC diplomatic meeting is now the crucible for Ukraine’s strategic future. The confirmed proposal places the burden of choice (territory vs. continued conflict funding/security guarantees) directly on Kyiv. The proposal’s FEZ component is seen by RF as potential de facto annexation, aligning with the "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

  1. KINETIC ACCELERATION: RF forces will increase the tempo of the assault on the T-0514 axis and Konstantinovka over the next 36 hours. The objective is to secure the largest possible land mass, particularly pushing past the current contact line, to maximize the size of the territory subject to the proposed "DMZ/FEZ" before the 13 DEC meeting.
  2. LOGISTICS COMPLETION: The 260th GRAU materiel will successfully reach forward staging areas (Volnovakha/Ilovaisk) NLT 121800Z DEC and begin distribution, enabling the MLCOA kinetic push.
  3. DIPLOMATIC HARDENING: Russia will use the 13 DEC meeting to formally reject any Ukrainian proposal that maintains control over the current contact line, while simultaneously demanding immediate UAF withdrawal from Donbas as a precondition for de-escalation.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

  1. SIMULTANEOUS COLLAPSE (Kinetic & Diplomatic): RF forces achieve a breakthrough on the T-0514 axis, forcing a large-scale UAF operational retreat, which coincides precisely with the 13 DEC meeting. Western partners, citing the kinetic setback and the decreasing aid outlook, strongly advise Kyiv to accept the withdrawal/FEZ proposal, framing it as the only pathway to securing guaranteed reconstruction and limited long-term security commitments.
  2. RF Strategic Reserve Activation: RF activates the identified 1st Tank Army (previously held in reserve) for operational exploitation if the Siversk-Slovyansk axis collapses, accelerating the isolation of Kramatorsk NLT 140000Z DEC.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated TimelineDecision Point
Logistics Interdiction Window (260th GRAU)CRITICAL: NLT 120600Z DECEXECUTE STRIKE/LRPF: Interdict mobile convoy or highest probability rail concentration point. Failure means immediate, overwhelming RF artillery saturation on the Siversk-Slovyansk axis.
Slovyansk Kinetic DecisivenessNLT 131200Z DECCommitment of UAF operational reserves to the Northern Flank to hold the line west of Siversk, regardless of GRAU interdiction success.
Strategic Diplomatic ResponseIMMEDIATE (Before 13 DEC meeting)NCA/Foreign Ministry must formally and preemptively communicate to key allies (US, UK, FR, DE) a definitive rejection of the territorial transfer (DMZ/FEZ) component of the proposed plan, and lobby to prevent the US plan from being presented as a unified allied consensus.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence Assessment
P1 (LOGISTICS TARGETING - CRITICAL)Confirmation of 260th GRAU convoy location. Precise location and distribution of the convoy (mobile or stationary at railheads like Ilovaisk/Volnovakha).TECHINT/SAR/HUMINT: Continuous, prioritized ISR coverage of logistics chokepoints and forward staging areas. Confirm status and target suitability immediately.MEDIUM
P2 (DIPLOMATIC INTENT)Detailed text and sponsor(s) of the proposed UAF troop limitation (800k) and the mechanism for the 'Free Economic Zone' administration.HUMINT/OSINT: Collection focused on US and Ukrainian diplomatic circles, focusing on NSC and MoD sources regarding the security guarantees component.LOW
P3 (RF RESERVE STATUS)Status and readiness of the RF 1st Guards Tank Army. Confirmation of forward deployment or readiness to exploit a UAF operational collapse in Donbas.TECHINT/IMINT: Satellite imagery focused on known RF staging areas in the Kursk/Belgorod/Rostov regions.MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

PriorityDomainActionCommander/Staff
1. KINETIC COUNTER-LOGISTICS (J3/J2)Deep Strike/TargetingINTERDICTION PARAMOUNT: Execute LRPF strikes NLT 120600Z DEC against the 260th GRAU materiel, prioritizing the highest-probability staging or mobile target regardless of full BDA confidence. Assume the window is nearly closed.Joint Staff / Long Range Fire Command
2. STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY (NCA/P7)IO/DiplomaticREJECT TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE: Immediately issue high-level directives to all negotiating teams: explicitly reject the UAF withdrawal from Donbas for a DMZ/FEZ. Frame the proposed 800k troop limit as unacceptable outside of a full, ratified security guarantee framework.NCA / Foreign Ministry
3. DEFENSE MANEUVER (J3 OC East)Force Posture/DefenseDELAY T-0514 AXIS: Reinforce the newly established defensive line west of Siversk with heavy engineer effort (mining, demolitions, AT obstacles). Prioritize delaying the mechanized advance rather than holding fixed positions.Operational Command East (OC East)
4. IO COUNTER-NARRATIVE (P7)Information WarfareMANAGE DOMESTIC CRISIS: Issue clear, unified, presidential communications emphasizing that the UAF refuses to cede territory and that the diplomatic proposals are negotiating positions, not decisions. Counter RF IO exploitation of the US proposal to maintain troop and civilian morale.P7 (Strategic Communications)
Previous (2025-12-11 16:12:55Z)

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