Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) 12/002

TIME: 112100Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CONFIRMED RF KINETIC CONTINUATION (PUTIN ORDER); CRITICAL LOGISTICS INTERDICTION WINDOW EXPIRES; DIPLOMATIC REDLINE CLARIFICATION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF forces have validated the seizure of Siversk (Confirmed by RF MOD and TASS) and are now actively exploiting the breach along the T-0514 highway axis toward Slovyansk. The operational objective remains the converging pincer movement on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub. Fighting in Konstantinovka (South) reinforces the pincer threat.

• Key Terrain: The T-0514 axis is the critical avenue of approach for the RF 3rd GCAA exploitation forces. UAF defensive maneuver must stabilize this corridor immediately.
• Deep Battle Escalation: UAF strikes on RF chemical production facilities (confirmed by RBC-Ukraine) indicate a commitment to interdicting RF industrial mobilization capacity, offsetting potential advantages from the 260th GRAU surge.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Conditions continue to facilitate high-tempo mechanized assault. However, persistent RF strikes are successfully targeting the Ukrainian power grid, leading to confirmed, scheduled national power outages (RBC-Ukraine). This impacts UAF rear area sustainment, C2 resilience, and national morale.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF strategic C2 is unified, confirming the intent for continued high-intensity kinetic operations (Putin's direct order validated). UAF forces are heavily committed to delaying actions on the T-0514 axis and conducting urban warfare in Konstantinovka. The focus remains on preventing the linking of the northern and southern prongs.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: High kinetic capacity, reinforced by strategic political alignment and industrial output. Increased RF air defense activity (531st Guards AA Regiment SAR spike) suggests heightened concern over UAF deep-strike capability. Intention (Kinetic): FACT: President Putin has issued a direct public order to military commanders to continue combat operations "in strict accordance with plans" (Rybar, Operatsiya Z). This explicitly overrides any immediate de-escalation pressure ahead of the 13 DEC diplomatic meeting. Intention (IO/Strategic): To formalize and consolidate the narrative of "DMZ Sovereignty" over newly captured territories, maximizing political leverage before the 13 DEC talks.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF C2 structure has demonstrated improved synchronization between tactical success and strategic communication. The rapid official recognition and celebratory messages regarding Siversk (Belousov/TASS) are intended to quickly normalize the gain both domestically and internationally.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL UPDATE)

FACT: The 260th GRAU munitions surge has fully departed its depot (SAR 0.00). Judgement: The critical interdiction window remains the most time-sensitive requirement. Failure to strike the mobile convoy or key staging areas (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) NLT 120600Z DEC will enable RF artillery saturation, forcing UAF operational decisions under extreme pressure. UAF counter-industrial strikes on RF chemical plants may slightly degrade future RF artillery shell production, but will not affect the immediate 260th GRAU delivery. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

Strategic C2 remains highly unified and directed from the top. However, reports of extreme internal disciplinary issues (murder of RF soldier over ATM PIN near Kursk, via Sever.Realii) indicate severe systemic morale and discipline decay in some rear area units, providing a potential opportunity for future HUMINT exploitation and IO targeting.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is highly stressed by the dual-axis assault and national energy shortages. The commitment to deep strikes (Caspian Sea platform, two RF chemical plants) demonstrates a continued capacity and willingness to impose costs on the RF military-industrial base, despite frontline pressures.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Strike): Confirmed drone strikes on two RF chemical plants producing explosives. This action degrades RF long-term sustainment capacity.
• Success (Tactical): Confirmed successful close-quarters combat against RF infantry on the Lyman direction (Butusov report), demonstrating local unit effectiveness.
• Setback (Operational): Confirmed loss of Siversk, opening the high-speed axis of exploitation.
• Setback (National Resilience): Confirmed national, scheduled power outages due to sustained RF missile/UAV strikes on the energy grid.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraints are LRPF assets for immediate counter-logistics operations (GRAU convoy) and the increasing stress on national energy supply and C2 redundancy systems. Manpower strain remains high, evidenced by the high-risk SZCh reassignment policy.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF messaging is focused on:

1. Kinetic Justification: Utilizing Siversk capture to prove momentum.
2. Strategic Coercion: Using the "DMZ Sovereignty" claim to frame any diplomatic resolution as tacit annexation of claimed buffer zones.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stressed by operational setbacks and domestic infrastructure instability (power outages). The continued exposure of severe RF internal disciplinary failures (murder over PIN) offers StratCom opportunities to contrast UAF conduct.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (CRITICAL)

FACT: President Zelenskyy clarified the UAF negotiating redline: the UAF insists on maintaining positions along the current contact line, rejecting the RF claim that a demilitarized zone constitutes Russian territory. Judgment: The 13 DEC meeting will focus squarely on the definition and disposition of the immediate forward contact line. The UAF must be prepared for proposals that trade aid/security guarantees for acceptance of a de facto annexation of the buffer zone, which aligns closely with the MDCOA of Strategic Isolation. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Immediate Kinetic Follow-Through: RF 3rd GCAA will utilize the Siversk breach to conduct heavy preparatory fire and mechanized probing actions along the T-0514 axis toward Slovyansk NLT 121800Z DEC, seeking to disrupt UAF efforts to stabilize the new frontline.
2. Artillery Saturation: The 260th GRAU materiel will successfully reach forward railheads (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) and begin distribution. Resulting artillery saturation will enable sustained RF maneuver in both the Siversk and Konstantinovka axes by 130000Z DEC.
3. Pressure on C2/Infrastructure: RF will continue targeted strikes on UAF power generation and distribution facilities to increase strategic pressure ahead of the diplomatic meeting.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Collapse & Encirclement: GRAU delivery is successful, enabling RF forces to penetrate UAF defenses on the T-0514 axis simultaneously with a breakthrough in Konstantinovka, achieving the operational isolation of Kramatorsk NLT 140000Z DEC.
2. Strategic Isolation: Western partners propose a framework at the 13 DEC meeting that includes a cease-fire along the current contact line, imposing limitations on LRPF systems (to satisfy Russian demands for a deep buffer), and potentially restricting future offensive operations, thereby formalizing RF battlefield gains.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS