Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) 12/001

TIME: 112000Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL LOGISTICS INTERDICTION WINDOW (260th GRAU); NORTHERN AXIS EXPLOITATION; TRUMP PEACE PLAN DIPLOMATIC INFLECTION POINT

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF operational objective remains the isolation and capture of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub via a converging pincer movement, which has intensified following the verified seizure of Siversk.

• Northern Axis (Siversk-Slovyansk): RF control of Siversk is validated by multiple RF command and propaganda sources (FACT). The RF 3rd Army is actively exploiting the breach, using Siversk as a forward staging area for continued advance South/Southwest.
• Southern Axis (Konstantinovka): Urban combat is sustained. The threat of full encirclement is imminent pending the arrival of critical RF artillery surge capability.
• Logistics Corridors (CRITICAL): The 260th GRAU materiel is now mobile and represents the most time-sensitive, high-value target set. Its destination is the forward railheads (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) which feed the operational pincer.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions continue to favor high-tempo mechanized assault and sustained aerial operations, including KAB strikes on rear areas.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces are fully synchronized between strategic C2 (Putin's public order to continue operations) and tactical exploitation (Siversk advance). UAF forces are heavily committed to counter-penetration efforts North of Slovyansk and urban defense in Konstantinovka. The operational crisis requires immediate and decisive action against the mobile logistics threat to prevent overwhelming fire superiority NLT 130000Z DEC.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability: RF maintains high kinetic capability, reinforced by strategic intent from the highest command levels. Intention (Kinetic): Confirmed by Putin's video address (FACT), the immediate and sustained intention is the continuation of high-intensity kinetic operations to achieve the defined goals (likely the full occupation of Donetsk Oblast and the establishment of the claimed "DMZ Sovereignty" buffer). Intention (IO/Strategic): To rapidly consolidate battlefield gains (Siversk) and present them as a fait accompli ahead of international diplomatic discussions (e.g., the upcoming 13 DEC Trump Plan meeting).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to leverage state media and war correspondents (Warkors) to immediately amplify tactical successes (Siversk seizure) to shape the domestic and international narrative. RF sources also report issues in logistics and benefits for volunteer formations, indicating potential long-term internal personnel sustainment vulnerability, though this does not currently affect frontline action intensity.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL UPDATE)

FACT: The munitions surge from the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (GRAU) has fully departed (SAR 0.00). This mobile cargo must be struck en route or at the forward staging areas of Ilovaisk or Volnovakha.

• Judgment: If the convoy is not interdicted NLT 120600Z DEC, the resulting artillery saturation will enable the RF MLCOA, achieving critical breakthroughs on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk perimeter. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

Strategic C2 is highly effective and unified (Putin, Gerasimov meeting validated by multiple sources). Tactical C2 remains responsive, despite localized UAF EW success near Siversk, which RF is likely mitigating.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains highly stressed, characterized by adaptive, but high-risk, manpower policies (SZCh reassignment to assault units). UAF Manpower Constraint Judgment: RF reports of foreign volunteers terminating contracts due to reluctance to serve in assault units (Kotsnews) provide circumstantial evidence that the UAF policy requiring high-risk assault roles is creating internal friction across multiple personnel classes (domestic SZCh and foreign volunteers).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Battle): Confirmed Border Unit "Phoenix" successfully eliminated two BM-21 Grad MLRS systems in the Donetsk region.
• Success (Logistics): Confirmed seizure and transfer of over 100 tons of assets from Russian/Belarusian-linked enterprises to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) by the Prosecutor General's Office in Chernihiv. This provides a minor offset to critical resource requirements.
• Setback: Confirmed RF control of Siversk, opening the high-speed avenue of exploitation toward Slovyansk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The overwhelming constraint is the requirement for Target Acquisition (TA) and Long-Range Precision Fire (LRPF) assets focused exclusively on the Ilovaisk/Volnovakha rail network. Secondary constraints include the maintenance of morale among assault units following the high-risk SZCh reassignment policy.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF messaging is fully kinetic-driven, linking the seizure of Siversk directly to the expansion of claimed "DMZ Sovereignty." RF state media is simultaneously attempting to address internal issues, notably pay/benefit deficiencies for volunteers, indicating a long-term sustainment vulnerability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stressed by the operational setbacks, but adaptive successes (UGV use, Grad destruction) provide local lifts. The SZCh policy requires careful Strategic Communication (StratCom) management to prevent RF exploitation of perceived internal discipline issues.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments (CRITICAL)

FACT: High-level meeting between the US, Ukraine, and the "Euros Three" (UK, France, Germany) is scheduled for 13 DEC to discuss the "Trump Plan."

• Judgment: This meeting represents a critical decision point for future strategic support alignment, raising the diplomatic risk associated with the MDCOA (Strategic Isolation). FACT: UK banks are resisting the transfer of $10.6B in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. This reinforces the logistical constraint regarding long-term, large-scale financial backing. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Immediate Kinetic Follow-Through: RF 3rd Army will continue direct exploitation of the Siversk breach, using heavy artillery preparatory fire to precede mechanized probing toward Slovyansk (NLT 121800Z DEC).
2. Artillery Saturation: The 260th GRAU materiel will successfully reach forward railheads and begin transfer to the artillery fire lines. This will result in a projected 100% increase in saturation fire rates on UAF forward positions by 130000Z DEC.
3. IO Synchronization: RF will maximize political messaging surrounding Siversk and the "DMZ Sovereignty" claim immediately prior to the 13 DEC diplomatic meeting to influence outcomes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Collapse (Fire Superiority): Successful GRAU delivery enables catastrophic fire superiority, forcing the UAF General Staff to commit scarce strategic reserves prematurely. This collapses the defense of the Kramatorsk Defensive Area, potentially leading to operational encirclement of forces in Konstantinovka.
2. Strategic Isolation (Diplomatic Risk): The diplomatic meeting on 13 DEC results in an agreement to pursue a de-escalation framework based on the Trump Plan, potentially imposing a cease-fire along the current contact line (confirming the RF "DMZ Sovereignty" claim) and restricting Western provision of LRPF systems necessary to counter deep RF logistics.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS