Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 111600Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: KONSTANTINOVKA CRISIS; RF STRATEGIC IO CONVERGENCE ON DMZ SOVEREIGNTY; P1 COUNTER-LOGISTICS STRIKE REMAINS CRITICAL

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity (CoG) has shifted from the localized Siversk exploitation (per previous SITREP) to the immediate threat against the key logistical and civil hub of Konstantinovka (Krasnoarmeysky axis).

• Konstantinovka Axis (CRITICAL THREAT): RF Chief of General Staff Gerasimov claims forces are engaged in the southern part of Konstantinovka and control 45% of the buildings (TASS, 14:35Z). RF simultaneously claims capture of Kucherovka and Kurilovka (14:34Z), confirming the successful conversion of the Dimitrov pocket clearance into an aggressive push on Konstantinovka. The loss of Konstantinovka would severely complicate the defense of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk from the south.
• Siversk Axis: Sustained RF pressure continues, though no new confirmed settlement losses are noted. RF intent to exploit the northern flank toward Slovyansk remains active.
• Deep Battle: UAF Air Force confirms multiple КАБ (Guided Aerial Bomb) launches into Donetsk Oblast (14:13Z), indicating high-volume aerial bombardment in support of the ground offensive on Konstantinovka/Pokrovsk axes.
• Kharkiv Eastern Flank: Threat of RF aviation weapons employment noted (14:38Z). Status of a potential new secondary pressure point or a means of fixing UAF reserves.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Previous conditions (overcast, low visibility) favoring low-altitude attack and mechanized movement are assumed to persist, supporting the high-density RF ground assaults in Donetsk Oblast.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Focus is currently on fixing UAF forces within the Konstantinovka defense perimeter to prevent stabilization and consolidation. High political C2 focus on amplifying kinetic success (Putin/Gerasimov synergy).
• UAF: OC East is engaging in high-attrition defensive fighting. General Staff is implementing critical internal C2/personnel reforms (14:38Z) aimed at improving efficiency and internal cohesion.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (HIGH): RF maintains synchronization between deep fire support (КАБ, artillery from GRAU surge) and high-tempo mechanized ground assault toward urban centers.
• Intention (Kinetic): Immediate intent is the decisive seizure and clearance of Konstantinovka NLT 130000Z DEC 25, leveraging the reported partial control (45%) to force a rapid UAF retreat or encirclement.
• Intention (Hybrid/Strategic): The critical intention remains the manipulation of international diplomacy by weaponizing the "Korean Model" narrative. RF is now explicitly claiming that the proposed Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is intended to be internationally recognized Russian territory (TASS, 14:22Z), demanding full sovereignty concession rather than just a ceasefire line.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift toward large-scale employment of Guided Aerial Bombs (КАБ) in the Donetsk sector indicates a sustained effort to flatten defenses ahead of mechanized assaults, conserving high-precision missile stocks. This requires responsive UAF countermeasures (EW and improved passive defense).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The identified surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (GRAU) remains the single most critical threat factor (Previous SITREP, SAR Score 24.96). If this materiel flow arrives at the forward depots, RF will achieve fire superiority sufficient to overwhelm defenses in Konstantinovka and Slovyansk simultaneously.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in aligning strategic military claims (Gerasimov) with political validation (Putin) and IO amplification (TASS). This C2 synergy aims to demonstrate inevitable success domestically and pressure international support externally. (Confidence Assessment: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are in a defensive posture, fighting to prevent the operational collapse of the Konstantinovka axis. The implementation of General Staff administrative reforms to simplify personnel movement (14:38Z) is a long-term positive development for readiness and mitigating morale issues related to bureaucracy.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF 3rd Separate Assault Brigade (3 OSHB) reported verified destruction of an RF Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) using FPV drones (14:26Z), confirming local effectiveness of high-lethality tactical systems.
• Setbacks: Unconfirmed but highly probable loss of the eastern defensive perimeter around Konstantinovka, forcing urban combat within the city limits and exposing UAF defenses to RF claims of '45% control.'

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is the requirement for short-range air defense (SHORAD) and electronic warfare (EW) assets to counter the intense КАБ and UAV attacks targeting defensive positions and logistics lines feeding Konstantinovka. Reinforcements must be committed to stabilize the southern and northern approaches to Konstantinovka.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF strategic information campaign has achieved critical convergence:

1. Sovereignty Claim: The TASS report claiming the proposed DMZ will be internationally recognized Russian territory (14:22Z) transforms the "Korean Model" into an explicit demand for unconditional territorial surrender and annexation. This must be neutralized immediately.
2. Internal Dissuasion: RF sources are actively pushing the narrative that Foreign Legions are refusing to act as assault troops (14:31Z), targeting international military support and volunteer morale.
3. Domestic Justification: Continued high-profile IO (WWII claims, Putin statements) aims to justify the high-intensity offensive and sustain domestic support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF morale benefits from reports of effective tactical resistance (3 OSHB FPV strike). The General Staff's public commitment to bureaucratic reform (14:38Z) is a positive step to counter long-standing service member frustrations. However, morale is severely stressed by the Konstantinovka situation and the psychological pressure of the "DMZ annexation" IO campaign.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Political instability in Bulgaria (government resignation, 14:40Z) and potential power consolidation by Orbán in Hungary (14:14Z) create increased short-term uncertainty regarding EU consensus on sanctions and aid packages. UAF diplomatic efforts must immediately address the RF sovereignty claim regarding the DMZ to prevent the narrative from taking root in Western capitals. (Confidence Assessment: MEDIUM/HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Decisive Assault on Konstantinovka: RF forces will utilize concentrated air and fire support (КАБ, artillery) to attempt to seize full operational control of Konstantinovka within the next 48-72 hours (NLT 140000Z DEC). The objective is to open the road to Kramatorsk.
2. Sustained Hybrid Campaign: RF will utilize political meetings (Gerasimov/Putin) to validate kinetic success, while TASS/Kremlin sources maintain intense diplomatic pressure, demanding Western recognition of the DMZ as sovereign Russian territory.
3. Limited Advance on Kharkiv Flank: RF will execute limited aviation/artillery probing operations in Eastern Kharkiv (as noted by Air Force, 14:38Z) to fix UAF northern reserves and prevent their deployment to the Donbas.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Paralysis via C2/Logistics Collapse: RF succeeds in bypassing Konstantinovka defenses, cutting off the main logistics lines, while the 260th GRAU surge materializes. This combined action triggers a full UAF operational collapse in the central Donbas, requiring an uncontrolled withdrawal from Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.
2. International Capitulation: Western powers, influenced by the escalated "DMZ sovereignty" narrative, pressure Kyiv to enter immediate, unfavorable negotiations based on the current line of control, leveraging political instability in key EU states.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS