Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 111430Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SIVERSK AXIS EXPLOITATION CONFIRMED; STRATEGIC IO CONVERGENCE ON "KOREAN MODEL"; CRITICAL LOGISTICAL THREAT REMAINS

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The center of gravity (CoG) has decisively shifted to the Siversk-Slovyansk operational axis.

• Siversk Axis (CRITICAL THREAT): RF claims of Siversk seizure are being heavily amplified by state media and presidential spokespersons, linking the gain directly to the potential capture of Slovyansk (TASS, 14:10:18Z). This confirms RF intent to exploit the Northern flank breakthrough for operational depth, threatening the key logistics and C2 hub of Slovyansk. Immediate establishment of a new Defensive Line of Contact (DLOC) is mandatory.
• Pokrovsk/Dimitrov Axis: Heavy attritional and mechanized assaults continue (Sternenko, 14:03:01Z). UAF elements conducting the emergency exfiltration from Dimitrov are facing intense pressure, though reports suggest UAF holding actions are inflicting catastrophic losses on RF mechanized units (Butusov+, 13:41:40Z).
• Northern Border: Confirmed deployment and activity of UAVs toward Chernihiv (AFU, 13:43:54Z). While not kinetic, this indicates continued RF reconnaissance and potential targeting expansion outside the Donbas main effort.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Persistent overcast conditions and low visibility continue to favor low-altitude UAV operations and mask heavy mechanized movements, which RF is leveraging for large-scale assaults in the Pokrovsk sector.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: OC East must divert forces, including newly available AWOL/Assault personnel, to rapidly construct and man the secondary DLOC west of Siversk (e.g., along the Seversky Donets-Donbas canal system or existing prepared positions). Contingency Plan PHOENIX (Zaporizhzhia retrograde) continues, stressing Southern reserve allocation.
• RF: C2 priority is confirmed for the Northern axis exploitation. RF propaganda channels are using Siversk as immediate kinetic validation for their strategic diplomatic campaigns (see Section 4).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (HIGH): RF maintains capability for high-intensity, synchronized kinetic and hybrid operations. The logistical surge from the 260th GRAU base (SAR Score 24.96) remains the primary enabler for this high-rate offensive capability.
• Intention (Kinetic): Immediate operational intent is to launch Reconnaissance-in-Force (RIF) and mechanized penetration attacks along the Siversk-Slovyansk axis to fix UAF secondary defenses and prevent stabilization. Continued pressure on Pokrovsk aims to deny UAF the ability to shift forces north.
• Intention (Hybrid/Strategic): The critical intention is to synchronize the perceived kinetic success (Siversk) with the strategic IO campaign promoting the "Korean Model" peace trap (Rybar, 14:07:01Z). This is designed to pressure NATO/EU partners (Rutte statements) into reducing support or pushing for unfavorable negotiations based on current lines of control.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift from methodical pocket liquidation (Dimitrov) to immediate operational exploitation (Siversk/Slovyansk) demonstrates RF confidence in their localized breakthrough and a willingness to commit reserves to achieve a strategic objective (Slovyansk) before UAF can react fully.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains CRITICAL THREAT LEVEL. The detected surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base is the single greatest kinetic threat factor. Failure to interdict this flow will lead to a guaranteed 30-40% increase in RF fire density across the Eastern front NLT 130000Z DEC.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high effectiveness in aligning messaging (Kremlin, state media, military bloggers) to amplify tactical success. The denial of the hacking of the Military Records Register (MoD Russia, 13:44:32Z) suggests that maintaining the integrity and secrecy of RF mobilization data is a high-priority C2 concern.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is currently optimized for immediate counter-breakthrough measures in the Northern DNR sector and controlled retrograde (PHOENIX). While the tactical situation is severe, UAF units remain capable of inflicting disproportionate losses (Butusov+ reports).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed successful engagement resulting in catastrophic losses for an identified RF unit during holding operations. Successful AD degradation in Zaporizhzhia (Niobi-SV window remains open).
• Setbacks: Unverified, but strategically accepted, loss of Siversk, fundamentally degrading the Northern Donbas defensive barrier and immediately exposing Slovyansk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most immediate constraint is the need for rapid deployment of heavy engineering equipment and prepared reserve units (armor, ATGM teams) to fortify the Slovyansk perimeter. Logistical resupply for high-attrition units covering the Dimitrov exfiltration must be prioritized.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF strategic campaign is fully integrated:

1. Peace Trap Convergence: RF sources (Rybar) are explicitly framing the unverified Siversk capture as justification for the US-promoted "Korean Model" or "Trump Peace Plan," designed to isolate Ukraine from Western support and force immediate cessation of hostilities based on current lines.
2. Escalation Narrative: RF military commentators (Poddubny, 13:52:21Z) are intensifying the narrative that RF seeks war with NATO, aiming to intimidate European allies (e.g., UK banks resisting asset transfer due to fear of retaliation, 13:59:01Z).
3. Domestic Control: RF denial of the Register of Military Records hack (13:44:32Z) is a domestic IO measure intended to maintain faith in mobilization capabilities and data security among the population.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF morale requires reinforcement. The reports of high lethality inflicted on RF forces (Butusov+) must be leveraged internally to offset the Siversk loss and the stress associated with the new AWOL/Assault unit policy. Focus on improving veteran benefits (eOselia program update) provides a positive signal to service members (13:54:51Z).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

NATO SG Rutte’s comments regarding "common language on a peace plan" (13:44:17Z) create a dangerous diplomatic opening for RF to insert the "Korean Model." UAF diplomatic efforts must immediately counter this perceived consensus and re-center the discussion solely on the 20-Point Peace Formula.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Immediate Thrust on Slovyansk Axis: RF forces will utilize mobile units (likely VDV or dedicated assault brigades) to conduct rapid, limited penetration operations (RIF) from Siversk, probing defenses toward Bilohorivka and the main Slovyansk perimeter (NLT 120600Z DEC).
2. Increased Attrition Fire: The leading edge of the logistical surge from the 260th GRAU base will begin arriving at Forward Operating Bases, enabling a sustained increase in artillery saturation across the Pokrovsk and Siversk axes (NLT 130000Z DEC).
3. Coordinated IO Amplification: RF state media will flood Western diplomatic channels with talking points linking the Siversk success directly to the feasibility and necessity of the "Korean Model" partition plan.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Slovyansk Operational Encirclement: RF succeeds in bypassing the hastily established secondary DLOC west of Siversk, utilizing combined arms (mechanized/air assault) to cut key highways and fire-control approaches to Slovyansk, triggering the commitment of UAF strategic reserves under unfavorable circumstances.
2. IO Paralysis: The RF strategic IO campaign (Korean Model) succeeds in creating political paralysis among key US and European partners, leading to the immediate freezing or reduction of long-range fire support systems critical to UAF defense.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS