Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 111400Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CONFIRMED RF CLAIM OF SIVERSK SEIZURE (UNVERIFIED); CRITICAL PERSONNEL POLICY SHIFT (AWOL TO ASSAULT); CONTINUED STRATEGIC IO ATTACK

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is now dominated by the highly sensitive and unverified Russian Federation (RF) claim regarding the Northern Donetsk front.

• Siversk Axis (CRITICAL NEW THREAT): RF Command (via Presidential Spokesperson) claims full control of Siversk (111336Z DEC). This, if confirmed, represents a major operational breakthrough, fundamentally altering the defense posture of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and exposing the Northern flank of the Donbas defense line. Immediate verification is the top tactical priority.
• Pokrovsk/Dimitrov Axis (CRITICAL): Holding attacks continue to enable the emergency exfiltration of UAF elements from the Dimitrov pocket, facing high-density RF attrition fire.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: Contingency Plan PHOENIX retrograde operations continue under intense pressure. The exploitation window following the Niobi-SV degradation remains open but transient.
• Kyiv (Darnytskyi District): Localized explosion incident resulting in two casualties is under investigation (111334Z DEC). Initial assessment classifies this as a potential internal security breach (SRG activity or sabotage) NSTR (Not Sourced To) kinetic strike.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility and persistent overcast conditions favor continued deep and tactical UAV operations by both sides, contributing to surveillance difficulty and masking RF logistics flows from the 260th GRAU base.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Resources remain stretched across the Dimitrov exfiltration and PHOENIX retrograde. The internal administrative order to assign all AWOL/Self-Exile (СЗЧ) personnel solely to Assault Units (111321Z DEC) signals critically low combat power reserves in high-attrition sectors, indicating strategic manpower strain.
• RF: RF C2 is prioritizing the Northern DNR axis, confirmed by Presidential focus (111335Z DEC). RF is leveraging claimed tactical success (Siversk) to bolster morale domestically and internationally reinforce the narrative of UAF collapse.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (HIGH): RF maintains high kinetic capability, supported by sustained logistical surge (260th GRAU) and demonstrated capacity for synchronized IO campaigns tied directly to kinetic events (Siversk claim).
• Intention (Operational): The primary kinetic intention is to confirm and exploit the operational gain provided by the alleged seizure of Siversk. Exploitation vectors would target UAF positions south toward Krasna Hora or west toward Slovyansk.
• Intention (Strategic Hybrid): RF continues to prosecute the multi-pronged IO campaign (Kolomoisky allegations, Korean Model narrative) while strategically amplifying warnings by NATO figures (Rutte) to frame the conflict as inevitable, world-scale war, increasing the psychological pressure on NATO allies to curtail support.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift of RF C2 focus to the Northern DNR sector (Siversk, confirmed by Kremlin briefing) marks a prioritization of the Northern flank over the immediate Pokrovsk encirclement, potentially intending to break the main defensive line rather than simply liquidate existing pockets.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains CRITICAL. The SAR score for the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base remains high, indicating the incoming saturation fire volume destined for the Eastern and Southern fronts is significant and imminent. This materiel is necessary to sustain the current high rate of attrition warfare in Pokrovsk and enable the exploitation of Siversk.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in aligning strategic narrative with kinetic reporting. The immediate denial of the hack on the military registry (111324Z DEC) suggests a priority on maintaining domestic control over military manpower data.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is currently optimized for controlled withdrawal and force preservation. However, the new administrative policy (AWOL to Assault Units) indicates profound stress on UAF manpower reserves needed for front-line rotation and reinforcement. This decision carries extreme morale risk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: UAF deep strike capability confirmed successful AD degradation in the Zaporizhzhia region (Niobi-SV).
• Setbacks (Unverified but CRITICAL): The potential loss of Siversk is the most severe operational setback since the last reporting cycle. Internal security incident in Kyiv requires diverting security resources.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most urgent constraint is combat personnel availability for high-attrition units. The tactical imperative is stabilizing the Northern front against Siversk exploitation. Strategically, immediate resources must be allocated to counter the diplomatic damage from the Kolomoisky narrative, which threatens material support.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The strategic IO threat is escalating:

1. Diplomatic Weaponization: RF continues pushing the Kolomoisky/assassination allegations (previous SITREP).
2. Escalation Narrative: RF channels are widely amplifying NATO SG Rutte's "War on the doorstep" warnings, framing the conflict as an inevitable WWI/WWII-scale struggle, potentially attempting to exhaust Western risk tolerance and justify extreme RF actions.
3. Peace Traps: German FM calling for "peace by Christmas" creates a diplomatic vulnerability that RF can exploit to push the "Korean Model" narrative (previous Daily Report), pressuring UAF to negotiate from a position of tactical weakness (i.e., Siversk/Dimitrov).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal morale is fragile. The decision to mandate AWOL personnel into assault units must be communicated internally with maximum transparency and sensitivity to avoid widespread cynicism or collapse of disciplinary trust. Domestic security requires clarification on the Kyiv incident to preempt RF-pushed sabotage claims.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Rutte's warnings are a long-term positive for deterring RF expansion but create short-term political volatility. UAF must immediately counter the "Peace by Christmas" narrative to maintain unity on the 20-Point Peace Formula and deny RF diplomatic leverage.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Siversk Exploitation and Consolidation: RF forces will immediately seek to consolidate control over Siversk (if confirmed) and launch limited, reconnaissance-in-force (RIF) operations to test UAF defensive lines south toward Bilohorivka and west toward the Slovyansk defense perimeter.
2. Logistical Saturation: The material surge detected at the 260th GRAU base will begin reaching forward operating bases (FOBs) NLT 130000Z DEC, allowing RF to increase fire density by 30-40% across the Eastern front, accelerating the Dimitrov pocket collapse and increasing attrition rates on the Northern flank.
3. IO Weaponization: RF media will link the unverified Siversk success to the diplomatic campaigns, arguing that UAF is collapsing and negotiations based on the "Korean Model" are the only viable path.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Northern Front Collapse: RF successfully breaches the secondary defensive line west of Siversk, utilizing combined mechanized and air assault forces to achieve operational depth and threaten the critical logistics hub of Slovyansk. This forces UAF to commit the strategic reserve, weakening defenses in Zaporizhzhia and Pokrovsk.
2. Targeting the NCA: RF successfully exploits intelligence (e.g., from the Kuzmuk breach) to launch a deep strike on a relocated UAF Command and Control (C2) node, severely degrading UAF capacity to manage the escalating crisis in the East.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS