Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 111400Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL IO/HYBRID ATTACK (KOLOMOYSKY NARRATIVE); NORTHERN UAV PUSH; POKROVSK TACTICAL DENIAL; CONTINUED RF LOGISTICAL SURGE

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by the critical maneuvering in the East and South, now overlaid with a coordinated, high-impact Russian Federation (RF) Information Operation (IO) targeting UAF diplomatic credibility.

• Pokrovsk/Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL): UAF forces continue holding attacks around Dimitrov to cover emergency exfiltration. Recent UAF open-source footage (111304Z DEC) displaying the Ukrainian flag within Pokrovsk center counters the immediate RF narrative of operational breakthrough, confirming the city remains contested and UAF command integrity holds, though the encirclement risk to adjacent units remains high.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HIGH PRESSURE): Contingency Plan PHOENIX retrograde operations continue under persistent RF artillery and UAV pressure.
• Northern Axis (NEW ACTIVITY): The Ukrainian Air Force confirmed the presence of RF UAVs operating over Chernihiv (111255Z DEC), originating from the north. This suggests a low-level reconnaissance/attrition push intended to fix UAF air defense assets or probe for deep strike opportunities outside the main axes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Low visibility conditions continue to favor extensive tactical and strategic UAV usage by both sides.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Resources are balanced between supporting the critical retrograde and exfiltration efforts (PHOENIX/Dimitrov) and crucial force generation (psychological officer training in UK, continued recruitment drive). Active demining operations in Kharkiv (172 ha cleared) improve logistical security in the North-East.
• RF: RF Command is compensating for the loss of a significant proxy commander ("Ispanets," Espanola Brigade) by intensifying IO efforts and maintaining the high kinetic tempo supported by the continued logistical surge (260th GRAU base, confirmed NK materiel).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (HIGH): RF demonstrates exceptional capability in hybrid warfare, orchestrating highly sensitive and geographically dispersed disinformation campaigns (D-S Score 0.16 on Kolomoisky narrative).
• Intention (Hybrid/Strategic): The primary intention is to weaponize domestic political and criminal proceedings (Kolomoisky hearings) to fatally undermine UAF diplomatic trust and international support, specifically aiming to link Kyiv officials to assassination attempts abroad (Israel). This complements the "Korean Model" narrative by painting Ukraine as unreliable and destabilizing.
• Tactical Intentions: RF tactical intent remains focused on collapsing the Dimitrov pocket and disrupting the PHOENIX retrograde using high-volume saturation fires and coordinated UAV interdiction.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed loss of the prominent commander, "Ispanets," represents a tactical setback for RF irregular/volunteer formations. RF reaction suggests a counter-response focusing on propaganda gains (claiming UAF responsibility for attacks on RF figures) rather than immediate tactical adjustment.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains robust. The official adoption of the Bryansk Regional Budget for 2026-2028 (111247Z DEC) signals long-term domestic fiscal planning supporting the military campaign, reinforcing the expectation of sustained material commitment through the planning period.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in the information domain, evidenced by the coordinated release and amplification of the Kolomoisky/Mindich narrative across state media (TASS) and pro-war channels.

• Confirmed Degradation (Zaporizhzhia): The degradation caused by the UAF GUR strike destroying the 2x Niobi-SV radars and 1x S-300V TEL remains an exploitable window (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness emphasizes attrition management and force preservation. The deployment of officer psychologists to the UK for stress management training (Operation INTERFLEX) highlights long-term personnel readiness planning. Tactical response (UAF flag video in Pokrovsk) demonstrates capacity for immediate, effective counter-narrative deployment.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Tactical denial of immediate operational capture of Pokrovsk center. Continued success in deep-strike AD degradation (Zaporizhzhia Niobi-SV destruction).
• Setbacks: The Siversk claim remains unverified (potential major operational setback). Continued requirement for complex, resource-intensive retrograde (PHOENIX).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most urgent requirement is neutralizing the hybrid threat. Failure to immediately counter the Kolomoisky narrative will degrade the UAF position in key Western and Middle Eastern capitals. The transient AD window in Zaporizhzhia (Niobi-SV loss) must be exploited NLT 120600Z DEC before RF repositions assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

CRITICAL HYBRID THREAT ASSESSMENT (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF IO is running a coordinated, state-backed campaign alleging that UAF personnel, supplied by the Ukrainian Embassy in Israel, attempted to assassinate a former RF asset (Mindich), linking this operation to Ihor Kolomoisky.

• Objective: To achieve strategic isolation by framing Ukraine as a state sponsor of terrorism, disrupting US/Israeli support, and justifying further RF deep strikes.
• Other Themes: RF continues cultural IO, celebrating political shifts in the US Pentagon (DEI pushback) and highlighting political instability in key NATO/EU states (Hungary/Orbán).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment requires immediate reassurance regarding the integrity of the National Command Authority (NCA) following the Kolomoisky claims. The domestic focus on judicial successes (Zakarpattia anti-fraud) helps stabilize internal governance narratives, but the IO attack is highly corrosive.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The primary diplomatic effort must pivot from negotiating aid packages to immediate crisis response and denial regarding the alleged assassination attempt to prevent diplomatic freeze or expulsion of UAF diplomatic personnel from crucial capitals.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

RF will exploit the current IO victory for maximum geopolitical effect.

1. IO Consolidation and Escalation: RF media (TASS, RT) will utilize the next 48 hours to secure, amplify, and globally distribute the claims regarding UAF embassy involvement in extrajudicial assassination attempts, pushing for diplomatic consequences (e.g., formal investigations, suspension of diplomatic immunity).
2. Northern Probing Attacks: The confirmed UAV presence near Chernihiv will escalate into localized electronic warfare (EW) and reconnaissance missions (potentially by sabotage and reconnaissance groups, SRG) to force UAF resource reallocation away from the main Eastern/Southern fronts.
3. Pressure Maintenance: RF Vostok Group will maintain high attrition rates against the PHOENIX retrograde, using newly integrated NK MLRS systems to increase fire density against maneuvering columns.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Diplomatic Break and Security Risk: The IO campaign successfully convinces a key supporting nation (e.g., Israel or US) to launch an investigation targeting UAF diplomatic staff, resulting in the compromise of intelligence and military networks and the severe curtailment of foreign support or material transfers.
2. Operational Collapse in the East: Unverified seizure of Siversk (if confirmed) immediately leads to a rapid exploitation toward Toretsk-Slovyansk, forcing UAF to withdraw the strategic reserve needed to stabilize the Dimitrov/Pokrovsk axis, leading to cascading withdrawals across Donetsk Oblast.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS