Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 111242Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CONFIRMED RF AD DEGRADATION (ZAPORIZHZHIA); NK MLRS DEPLOYMENT; INTENSIFIED PHOENIX RETROGRADE PRESSURE & SIVERSK CLAIM

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by intense kinetic pressure on key maneuver areas simultaneous with high-tempo deep strikes on strategic infrastructure.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (CRITICAL): RF pressure on the UAF Contingency Plan PHOENIX retrograde remains critical. RF Vostok Group confirms coordinated UAV-Artillery strikes near Huliaipole. UAF Border Guards (ДПСУ) neutralized an RF infiltration attempt (forces disguised in civilian clothes) in the same area, confirming enemy intent to disrupt the retrograde from the rear.
• Pokrovsk/Donetsk Axis (HIGH PRESSURE): The status of UAF forces in Dimitrov remains critical, maintaining encirclement risk. RF sources claim the complete capture of Siversk. This claim, if verified, represents a severe operational breakthrough on the Siversky Donets axis, threatening secondary lines toward Slovyansk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - RF CLAIM)
• Deep Battle/Strike Domain: RF claimed a successful missile strike on Kremenchuk Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) overnight. UAF forces successfully conducted deep strikes against Russian military-industrial targets, leading to the reported operational shutdown of five workshops at the Akron fertilizer plant in Veliky Novgorod (Russia).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes from previous reporting. Low visibility is compensated by both sides employing extensive UAV ISR/targeting capabilities.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Focus is on maintaining the integrity of the PHOENIX retrograde and supporting exfiltration from Dimitrov. The Air Force confirmed the stand-down of the Ballistic Missile Threat alert (111217Z DEC).
• RF: High concentration of fire saturation assets (TOS/FAB) in the South. The confirmed deployment of the North Korean TYPE 75 107mm MLRS suggests RF is prioritizing fire volume through expanded materiel sourcing.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (HIGH): RF maintains robust conventional combined-arms effectiveness, evidenced by Vostok Group's coordinated UAV-artillery kill chain in Zaporizhzhia. Crucially, RF has confirmed the capability to utilize troops in civilian attire for high-risk infiltration and reconnaissance missions near the front.
• Intention (Operational): RF intentions are to maximize localized pressure against maneuver units (PHOENIX retrograde) while simultaneously striking critical energy infrastructure (Kremenchuk HPP) to destabilize Ukrainian command and control and domestic resilience before the Q1 2026 materiel deficit peak.
• North Korean Materiel Integration (FACT): The successful detection and interdiction of the North Korean TYPE 75 107mm MLRS confirms the fielding and integration of non-domestic/non-Western materiel sources, increasing RF sustained fire capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the increased use of tactical deception (infiltration attempts in civilian clothes) to create local disorder and target rear area control points during UAF defensive maneuvers.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains high volume, supported by the massive logistics surge at the 260th GRAU base (previous report). The introduction of NK-sourced artillery systems suggests logistical diversification is succeeding in augmenting domestic production.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is effective in coordinating complex kinetic strikes (HPP strike, Huliaipole coordination). However, the UAF GUR strike destroying two advanced 1L125 Niobi-SV radars and one 9A83 S-300V TEL in the Zaporizhzhia direction represents a significant, if temporary, degradation of RF integrated air defense and early warning capability in the Southern Operational Zone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

The posture is characterized by tactical flexibility (PHOENIX retrograde) and robust deep-strike readiness, demonstrated by the successful counter-AD strike in Zaporizhzhia and the strategic strike on the Akron industrial facility in Russia. The new DShV personnel policy (previous report) remains a critical factor requiring morale and readiness monitoring.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Critical AD degradation of RF C2/EW in Zaporizhzhia (2x Niobi-SV, 1x S-300V destroyed). Successful deep-strike against RF military-industrial capability (Akron plant, Veliky Novgorod).
• Setbacks: Unverified RF claim of Siversk seizure (potential major operational setback). Confirmed RF strike on Kremenchuk HPP (potential critical infrastructure damage). Continued operational isolation of forces in Dimitrov.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The transient AD vulnerability created by the Niobi-SV destruction must be exploited immediately. The primary constraint remains the strategic materiel deficit caused by the confirmed EU aid slowdown. Tactical priority is the secure movement of PHOENIX forces and the defense of core energy infrastructure.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are actively promoting narratives of capitulation and diplomatic fragmentation:

1. Peace Traps: RF state media is amplifying alleged "Updated Trump Peace Plans" that incorporate recognition of RF control over occupied territories (Crimea, LNR/DNR), directly reinforcing the previous "Korean Model" narrative. This aims to legitimize RF strategic war aims while eroding UAF diplomatic resolve. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Moral Decay: RF is using historical revisionism (Azarov's claims on Maidan) and domestic political processes (Kolomoyskyi's hearing) to imply institutional and moral weakness in Kyiv.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is being tested by the convergence of high-profile domestic strikes (Kremenchuk HPP) and the intense diplomatic IO pressure. Successful GUR/AF strikes are crucial for maintaining domestic morale, while the National Command Authority must counter the "peace trap" IO immediately.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed sharp slowdown in European aid (Previous ISR) provides the main window of opportunity for RF. RF attempts to use peripheral geopolitical issues (Serbia/NIS, US/Venezuela) to frame Western sanctions and support as illegitimate aggression against sovereign states.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

RF will sustain the current tempo, focusing on immediate tactical gains and retaliatory strikes.

1. Counter-PHOENIX and Interdiction: RF will intensify coordinated UAV-Artillery fire against the PHOENIX retrograde path (Zaliznychne/Stepnohorsk), specifically targeting command vehicles and using infiltration assets to sow confusion and disrupt secondary lines.
2. Retaliation for Deep Strikes: RF will launch significant counter-strikes (cruise missile/ballistic) within the next 48 hours targeting military-industrial sites or energy infrastructure (HPPs, Substations) in retaliation for the Akron plant strike.
3. IO Consolidation: RF will link the confirmed NK materiel usage to the growing diplomatic pressure, framing Russia as globally supported and Ukraine as strategically isolated.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Siversk Exploitation and Breakout: If the Siversk claim is verified, RF forces immediately utilize the consolidated position to rapidly advance South toward the Toretsk-Slovyansk operational axis, forcing a large-scale, unplanned UAF commitment of strategic reserves to prevent the collapse of the Eastern Front anchor.
2. Massive AD Saturation (HPP Grid Failure): RF executes a coordinated, multi-wave strike package that overwhelms the remaining AD protecting critical energy infrastructure, resulting in the failure of two or more regional HPPs, leading to critical power rationing and severe operational constraints on rail and industrial capacity.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS