Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) UPDATE 1.4

TIME: 111400Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: Escalated Kinetic Pressure in Zaporizhzhia (TOS/FAB); Intensified IO Blitz (DMZ); Expanded Northern Flank Probing (Chernihiv)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational tempo remains high on all primary axes, with significant kinetic escalation in the South coinciding with strategic information warfare.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (CRITICAL PRESSURE): RF forces are maximizing high-intensity fires near Huliaipole and Zaliznychne, utilizing heavy FAB/KAB glide bombs and Thermobaric Rocket Artillery (TOS-systems). This represents a concentrated effort to destroy UAF defensive depth and disrupt Contingency Plan PHOENIX (Controlled Retrograde).
• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL POCKET): The immediate threat of encirclement of UAF elements in Dimitrov persists following the confirmed loss of Svetloe and Grishino.
• Northern Border (EXPANDED PROBING): RF KAB strikes are confirmed in Sumy Oblast (civilian infrastructure hit), and UAV activity is now detected moving toward Horodnia in Chernihiv Oblast. This confirms the threat to the northern flank is widening beyond the previously identified Myropillia sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Donbas/Eastern Axis: Reports confirm adverse weather (low cloud/fog) severely restricts RF fixed-wing air operations (CLOSE AIR SUPPORT/KAB delivery). This provides a temporary, localized advantage for UAF ground maneuver and denies RF dominance in the air domain in these sectors.
• Energy Infrastructure: While power outages persist, government reporting anticipates a reduction in outage duration NLT 130000Z DEC. This remains a HIGH vulnerability until addressed.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Active defense of the PHOENIX maneuver space (South Operational Command reports high RF attrition). UAF deep strike operations against RF hinterland continue at a high rate (RF claims 32 intercepts). Active, high-skill recruitment efforts (UAV operators) confirm forward-looking force generation priorities.
• RF: Prioritizing maximal fire saturation (FAB/TOS) to shatter UAF maneuver in the South. RF is maintaining a high rate of deep strike attacks against both military and civilian infrastructure (Sumy KAB strike, attempted drone strike near Lviv).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capability (HIGH): RF retains robust capabilities for massive kinetic impact in tactical zones (TOS-systems, FAB) and high-volume UAV interception (Air Defense).
• Intention (Operational): To use overwhelming fire superiority (TOS, FAB) in the Huliaipole/Zaliznychne corridor to collapse UAF organized withdrawal (PHOENIX) into a rout. Simultaneously, RF intends to fix UAF northern reserves by expanding the localized probing (Myropillia) into a multi-oblast border threat (Chernihiv). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Fire Concentration: The shift to documented TOS/FAB use near Zaliznychne indicates that RF is attempting to bypass established defensive structures by destroying them outright, potentially compensating for slower mechanized advance speeds due to previous losses or the onset of adverse weather.
• Weather Exploitation: RF ground forces are likely exploiting limited visibility to consolidate logistics and reinforce captured positions in Donetsk while UAF close air support is limited.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF internal messaging on veteran support (PSB cards) and domestic economic stability (Putin Q&A pre-event focus) strongly suggests that the Kremlin is proactively managing negative public perception related to sustained casualties and war expenditure. UAF deep strikes continue to stress RF Air Defense resources.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating high-intensity fires (FAB/TOS) with strategic IO campaigns (DMZ leaks). The successful interception of 32 UAF UAVs demonstrates effective, coordinated air defense command at the regional level.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF forces in the Southern Operational Zone are exhibiting high resilience under fire, successfully inflicting heavy attrition on RF formations (OpCmd South reports 350+ KIA/WIA). Active recruitment confirms commitment to high-tech and specialized combat readiness.
• Readiness: High, but C2 and logistics integrity in the Zaporizhzhia rear areas are under immediate threat from combined kinetic (TOS/FAB) and potential infiltration attacks (per previous ISR).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed high attrition inflicted on RF forces in the South. UAF Deep Strike operations continue at a high tempo, forcing RF to commit scarce AD resources to internal defense.
• Setbacks: Confirmed KAB strike casualties in Sumy Oblast underscore the difficulty of providing adequate AD coverage for the northern border against stand-off weapons. The critical risk remains the degradation of C2/logistics under heavy fire in the PHOENIX zone.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Requirement: Urgent need for counter-battery and counter-TOS fires in the Huliaipole/Zaliznychne area to reduce the devastating impact of thermobaric and glide bomb saturation.
• Constraint: The required AD assets needed to counter KAB/FAB threats (Northern/Eastern axes) and long-range UAVs (Deep Strike coverage) are finite, forcing difficult prioritization choices.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The "Korean Model" IO offensive is now fully engaged. RF state media explicitly links the alleged US proposal for a demilitarized zone contingent on UAF withdrawal from Donbas. This is a deliberate, synchronized operation designed to:

1. Create doubt among Western partners regarding UAF negotiating intentions.
2. Preemptively undermine any future UAF peace proposal (20-point plan).
3. Imply internal diplomatic weakness within the US/Western alliance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is supported by high reported RF losses in the South and continued UAF deep strike actions. However, the political noise surrounding the "Korean Model" leak, combined with confirmed infrastructure damage/casualties in the North (Sumy), risks creating strategic uncertainty that could be exploited by RF.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF narrative implies that US (Army Secretary Driskoll) officials are discussing a forced UAF withdrawal from Donbas. This demand requires an immediate, high-level, verifiable diplomatic denial to prevent diplomatic success for the RF IO campaign.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

RF forces will prioritize maximizing kinetic pressure on the PHOENIX retrograde corridor while expanding psychological and physical coercion on the northern flank.

1. Huliaipole Fire Blitz: RF will sustain maximal TOS/FAB saturation in the Zaliznychne sector over the next 48 hours to attempt a breakthrough or rupture the UAF retrograde discipline.
2. Northern Fixation: RF will increase KAB/FAB strikes and Spetsnaz/UAV activity along the Sumy-Chernihiv border to divert UAF reserves away from the primary Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia battlegrounds.
3. IO Escalation: The "Korean Model" narrative will be relentlessly pushed NLT 121800Z DEC, specifically targeting political figures perceived as being susceptible to the narrative of diplomatic fatigue.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Zaporizhzhia Collapse: Coordinated RF artillery (TOS/FAB) fire successfully destroys a critical UAF C2 node or logistics choke point in the PHOENIX rear area. The resulting tactical confusion allows the RF 37th GMRB to launch a successful, high-speed mechanized exploitation that secures control of key terrain vital to the controlled withdrawal.
2. Dimitrov Liquidation: RF utilizes adverse weather (denying UAF air support) to successfully complete the isolation and liquidation of UAF forces in the Dimitrov pocket, freeing up mechanized reserves to join the final push toward Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS