Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) UPDATE 1.3

TIME: 111400Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: Escalation of Strategic IO (Korean Model/Trump Plan); Deep Strike on RF Defense Industry; Confirmed RF Pressure on Sumy Axis (Myropillia)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The operational environment is characterized by increased UAF deep strike activity against RF strategic targets, concurrent with sustained RF pressure on key offensive axes and the emergence of a localized threat in the North.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HIGH PRESSURE): Defensive depth is being actively tested. UAF GUR reported a successful deep strike operation, indicating proactive counter-offensive action against RF elements targeting Plan PHOENIX maneuver. Simultaneously, the State Border Guard Service (ДПСУ) neutralized a RF tactical infiltration attempt near Huliaipole, confirming RF utilization of low-signature (civilian clothes) tactics in the rear.
• Sumy Axis (NEW PRESSURE): Confirmed presence and operations by RF Spetsnaz ("Akhmat" units) near Myropillia. This area previously saw only sporadic cross-border engagements. The presence of specialized forces suggests an RF intent to fix UAF northern reserves or conduct high-impact spoiling attacks/raids. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Hinterland (DEEP STRIKE): UAF long-range assets executed a successful strike on the Dorogobuzh Thermal Power Plant (TPP), which supports a critical RF defense industry facility. This, combined with reports of a "massed UAV attack" on RF territory, confirms a high UAF capacity for kinetic strategic interdiction.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Prolonged power outages are reported in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, intensifying the need for decentralized power solutions (Points of Invincibility). If KAB strikes continue to target infrastructure and maneuvering formations, the lack of power will degrade UAF C2 and logistical capacity in the crucial Stepnohorsk retrograde zone.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Defensive lines are demonstrating resilience against conventional pressure (Kupyansk, Huliaipole counter-sabotage). Resources are allocated to Deep Strike targeting (Dorogobuzh TPP). Official communication emphasizes recruitment (38 OBRMP) and morale stability.
• RF: RF forces are exhibiting high pressure on the Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia axes while utilizing limited special operations assets to open a secondary front (Myropillia). Strategic messaging is intensely focused on domestic economic stability (pensions, poverty reduction) to manage internal dissent linked to war costs.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

• Capability: RF maintains HIGH capability for coordinated IO campaigns that utilize international political leaks to undermine UAF statehood (Trump Plan/Korean Model). RF retains sufficient manpower and specialized units (Akhmat) to probe secondary axes, even if suffering high attrition on primary fronts (Kupyansk).
• Intention (Strategic): To leverage diplomatic instability and alleged Western fatigue to force UAF acceptance of a non-favorable ceasefire, specifically one requiring UAF demilitarization in Donbas while allowing RF forces to maintain control.
• Intention (Operational): Test UAF response capabilities on the Sumy axis (Myropillia) to determine if reserves can be drawn away from the critical Pokrovsk or Zaporizhzhia fronts.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Infiltration Tactics: The use of RF personnel disguised in civilian clothes near Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia) indicates an attempt to bypass established UAF defenses and potentially target rear area C2, logistics, or infrastructure. This is a low-resource, high-risk tactic, often symptomatic of limited reconnaissance resources or urgency to disrupt the PHOENIX retrograde. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New Front Activation: Confirmed deployment of Akhmat Spetsnaz (typically used for blocking/security) in the Myropillia area suggests the initiation of light, focused probing operations designed to generate uncertainty along the northern border.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status The UAF strike on the Dorogobuzh TPP is an attempt to disrupt the sustainment of the RF defense-industrial base (DIB) rather than just frontline forces. This is a critical development. However, the operational tempo necessitates continued focus on the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base to address immediate frontline munitions throughput. The DIB targeting demonstrates UAF reach and strategic prioritization.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness RF Strategic C2 is prioritizing domestic economic stability (Putin statements). This suggests the Kremlin views internal messaging as equally important as kinetic operations. The Kadyrov indictment by the PGO (UAF) is a direct, targeted legal/IO attack on a high-profile RF operational leader and a specific component of RF combat power (Akhmat forces).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is maintaining a high operational tempo in Deep Battle operations, successfully striking both DIB facilities (Dorogobuzh) and forward enemy operations (GUR strike, Zaporizhzhia). Defensive forces are alert to tactical infiltration threats (ДПСУ, Huliaipole).
• Readiness: High focus on troop generation and professionalization (38 OBRMP recruitment video). Energy resiliency remains a tactical risk (Zaporizhzhia power issues).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Deep strikes on Dorogobuzh TPP and reported massed UAV attacks on RF territory. Successful GUR operation in Zaporizhzhia. Confirmed RF retreat and heavy losses in the Kupyansk sector.
• Setbacks: Infrastructure remains vulnerable to RF strikes, leading to widespread power outages in active war zones (Zaporizhzhia). RF IO successfully generated significant media coverage regarding UAF corruption (NAIB report), requiring immediate counter-action.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Requirement: Immediate deployment of specialized counter-infiltration and counter-sabotage units (CI/SOF) to cover logistics and C2 nodes in the Zaporizhzhia axis rear area due to confirmed RF disguised infiltration tactics.
• Constraint: The simultaneous need to defend against kinetic attacks and manage widespread infrastructure failure (power cuts) forces a difficult allocation choice for repair and defense assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns The core threat is the intensification of the "Korean Model / Trump Peace Plan" narrative.

• KEY THREAT: Reports suggest the plan explicitly proposes that only Ukraine must withdraw troops from a demilitarized zone in Donbas. (Source: Financial Times via pro-UA channels). This narrative, amplified by TASS reports of European consultation with Trump on territorial concessions, is a HIGH-confidence, coordinated attempt to impose diplomatic defeat.
• RF Domestic Focus: Putin's repeated emphasis on domestic economic growth, pensions, and family payouts is designed to insulate the home front from the perceived resource strain of the war, reinforcing internal support.
• RF Counter-Narrative: Immediate exploitation of the 102 million UAH corruption case in the UAF defense sector aims to degrade trust in Kyiv's ability to manage Western aid and resources.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors UAF morale is supported by the highly public GUR/DIB strikes and official military messaging (38 OBRMP, Taras Bilka). However, the corruption allegations require transparent, rapid response to prevent RF exploitation from severely damaging confidence in military institutions.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The "Trump Plan" leaks represent the MLCOA of the RF information offensive. Kyiv must secure immediate, high-level, multilateral statements from G7/EU capitals explicitly rejecting any concept of forced territorial concessions or demilitarization of UAF forces in the Donbas. Failure to do so risks freezing Western security commitments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

RF will exploit diplomatic opportunities and test new pressure points:

1. Diplomatic Leverage & Coercion: RF will escalate its information campaign focusing on the "Korean Model/Trump Plan" to create fissures in the Western coalition over the next 72 hours, coinciding with maximized tactical pressure in Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia to reinforce the narrative of UAF failure.
2. Sustained KAB & Infiltration: RF will continue KAB saturation against PHOENIX maneuver corridors in Zaporizhzhia and increase the frequency of low-signature, disguised infiltration attempts to disrupt UAF logistics and C2 in rear areas (e.g., Huliaipole, Orikhiv hinterlands).
3. Myropillia Probing: Akhmat Spetsnaz elements on the Sumy axis will conduct limited, high-profile raids (e.g., targeting small villages or checkpoints near Myropillia) to force UAF General Staff to commit reserves to the northern border.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Operational Paralysis (Zaporizhzhia): Widespread, continuous power outages (due to RF deep strikes) in Zaporizhzhia Oblast combine with successful KAB strikes on UAF forward command posts, leading to the fragmentation of Plan PHOENIX. RF 37th GMRB executes a high-speed mechanized breakthrough, capitalizing on degraded UAF C2 and mobility.
2. Strategic Shift (Nuclear/Escalation): Putin’s focus on domestic stability is a political shield. The MDCOA remains an unexpected, low-probability, high-impact escalation (e.g., limited tactical nuclear device usage or targeting of NATO logistics hubs outside Ukraine) to shock Western capitals into accepting the "Korean Model" political solution.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS