Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) UPDATE 1.2

TIME: 2025-12-11 1200Z SUBJECT: RF Force Concentration via KAB Strikes on Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia; Strategic IO Shift to "Core 5" Anti-G7 Narrative; Continued Logistical Stressors

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The operational tempo remains critically high across the Eastern and Southern axes, characterized by intense Russian Federation (RF) tactical pressure supported by precision guided munitions.

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): The situation around Dimitrov remains unresolved; UAF elements are presumed under complete RF fire control or isolated following the capture of Svetloe and Grishino (Previous Report). Fog exploitation continues to be the primary RF maneuver tactic against UAF FPV/anti-armor assets.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (HIGH PRESSURE): UAF forces continue the Contingency Plan PHOENIX retrograde (Stepnohorsk). This withdrawal is now actively being targeted by high-volume RF guided air-delivered munitions (KABs) launched from the East, indicating an attempt to disrupt controlled movement and inflict mass casualties/materiel losses on the retreating forces.
• Kharkiv Axis (RENEWED AIR THREAT): Following the consolidation of the Vovchansk salient (Liman), this sector is now also subject to confirmed KAB strikes, suggesting RF intent to degrade UAF defensive capacity before potential reserve reassignment or follow-on spoiling attacks.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Dense fog persists on the Pokrovsk contact line. This low-visibility condition is actively being leveraged by RF mechanized infantry for infiltration, while simultaneously restricting UAF ISTAR and Close Air Support (CAS). The use of KABs is an RF adaptation to circumvent poor ground visibility by relying on pre-planned strikes supported by high-altitude guidance systems.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Prioritizing preservation of combat power (Plan PHOENIX). Air Defense Command confirms active engagement with both low-flying UAVs (near Kherson) and high-value KAB threats (Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia).
• RF: RF forces are coupling armored pressure with massed air-delivered guided munitions on secondary fronts to prevent UAF reserves from supporting the critical Pokrovsk sector. RF C2 maintains a high degree of synchronicity between diplomatic/IO efforts and kinetic activity.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

• Capability: RF exhibits HIGH capability for sustained, multi-axis pressure, augmented by the ability to launch precision guided munitions (KABs) far from the front line, neutralizing UAF tactical advantage conferred by fog/EW.
• Intention (Operational): Exploit the vulnerability of UAF maneuver formations during the Stepnohorsk retrograde by utilizing KAB saturation strikes. The objective is to convert a controlled withdrawal (PHOENIX) into a rout, freeing the RF 37th GMRB for decisive action.
• Intention (Strategic): Maximize saturation of the global information space with the "Core 5" narrative, aiming to provoke internal policy friction among G7 members ahead of critical Western security conferences.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Air-Ground Convergence: The shift to utilizing KABs against maneuvering UAF formations in Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv is a significant adaptation, designed to negate the effectiveness of UAF ground interdiction and drone defense measures.
• IO Synchronization: Lavrov’s continued public statements coinciding with US political leaks (Core 5) confirms a highly synchronized diplomatic-military information offensive.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY) The massive logistical surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base remains the single most important kinetic target. The sustained KAB strikes and high-tempo Pokrovsk assaults confirm that RF is accepting high tactical logistical stress (water shortages reported previously) to rapidly deliver materiel for operational gains. Failure to interdict the 260th GRAU throughput directly enables the MDCOA (Southern Collapse). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness RF Strategic C2 is effective and unified (Putin/Lavrov messaging). While the reported operational disruption to PM Pashinyan's travel due to drone activity indicates low-level, persistent vulnerabilities in the RF rear air defense envelope, it did not prevent the diplomatic mission, confirming high-level C2 functionality.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is in an active state of controlled maneuver (PHOENIX). High air defense readiness is required in Zaporizhzhia/Kharkiv to counter the KAB threat, diverting limited SHORAD assets from front-line protection.
• Readiness: Forces are demonstrating high lethality (225th OShP FPV use) but are highly strained by the RF multi-domain attack profile (ground armor, UAV swarms, guided bombs).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed successful engagement of an adversary UAV near Kherson. Continued reporting of high tactical attrition against RF personnel (confirmed losses of 6 officers).
• Setbacks: UAF maneuver forces are now being targeted by highly accurate, massed KAB strikes, increasing the risk profile for Plan PHOENIX.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Requirement: Critical need for additional mobile Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems specifically optimized for countering KAB threat trajectories (high altitude/high speed glide phase) in the Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv operational areas.
• Constraint: The simultaneous need for air defense coverage for maneuvering troops and static critical infrastructure is severely straining existing SHORAD and radar resources.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO is focused on undermining the G7 structure and presenting Russia as a co-equal partner in a new global order:

• Core 5 Narrative (STRATEGIC PRIORITY): The proposal for a US-led "Core 5" (US, China, Russia, India, Japan) replacing the G7 is a strategic disinformation maneuver, designed to create uncertainty and diplomatic paralysis within the Western coalition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Morale Boosting: WarGonzo promoting the BARS-22 volunteers aims to stabilize domestic opinion regarding manpower requirements.
• Domestic Friction: UAF StratCom has a clear opportunity to exploit confirmed RF domestic failures (conscript abuse, xenophobia, internal economic distractions like palm oil regulation) to counter RF stability narratives.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors UAF morale is sustained by operational successes (officer attrition, successful drone defense) but is vulnerable to strategic narratives (Core 5) that suggest impending loss of Western support. The domestic UAF fraud conviction requires quick, transparent action by the Prosecutor General's Office to maintain public trust in wartime institutions.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The Core 5 narrative must be explicitly countered by Kyiv and its Western partners. The convergence of Pashinyan's arrival in Moscow and Lavrov's statements indicates immediate diplomatic pressure points that may lead to regional military/economic agreements impacting UAF strategic planning.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

RF will prioritize destruction of UAF combat power in retreat and maximization of IO influence:

1. KAB Saturation & PHOENIX Disruption: RF aerospace forces will sustain high-tempo KAB strikes (Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Odesa hinterland) over the next 48 hours to attempt to break the cohesion of UAF Plan PHOENIX and destroy associated logistical infrastructure (Shyriaieve corridor).
2. Pokrovsk Attrition: RF ground forces will continue small-unit, fog-enabled mechanized probing actions near Pokrovsk to fix UAF defenses, preventing troop rotation or reinforcement toward Zaporizhzhia.
3. Core 5 Amplification: RF diplomatic assets will dedicate the next 72 hours to maximizing the visibility of the "Core 5" concept across international media, aiming for maximum friction at the next major G7/NATO meeting.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

1. Southern Collapse & Breakthrough: Sustained, successful KAB strikes on UAF assembly areas and logistics (combined with the non-interdiction of the 260th GRAU surge) cause Plan PHOENIX to become uncontrolled retreat. The RF 37th GMRB exploits this chaos to seize a major communication hub on the Zaporizhzhia axis (e.g., Orekhiv or Velyka Novosilka), forcing UAF to divert strategic reserves from the Donbas.
2. Strategic C2 Decapitation: RF CI exploitation of the Kuzmuk breach yields a successful strike against a major UAF operational command post in Dnipropetrovsk or Odesa that had failed to implement the "RED PLAN" relocation protocols effectively.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS